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ABSTRACT 
By the later decades of the twentieth century, retail internationalization was no longer the 
activity of a few multi-national retailers; revising the traditional view of retailing as a 
national business and the need to understand the process of internationalization. Academic 
research enriched the understanding of this activity, moving away from the early use of 
surveys to delve into the specific processes of the retailers in order to properly analyze 
foreign expansion activity. Initial research focused on the perspective of the firm, 
contributing to knowledge of the why, where, and how of the internationalization process. 
As this research expanded its scope, it became necessary for researchers to explore when 
internationalization occurs and to document what was the impact of internationalization on 
the host country. This call for research was made by Dawson (2003), who proposed a 
framework for the study of foreign impact on the domestic retailers of a host country. This 
study utilizes the Dawson model to measure, analyze, and explain the when and what of the 
retail internationalization process. 
In recognition of the complexity of the retail internationalization process, it was determined 
that the study would focus on one type of impact: changes in sectoral competitiveness. It 
was also determined that this study should be undertaken in a market and retail sector 
where substantial foreign entry had occurred and could potentially be measured, analyzed 
and explained. Therefore, the study is undertaken in the Canadian apparel sector between 
1989 and 2007.  
The study was conducted as a mixed method research in two stages: an empirical study of 
market data and an interview study of industry experts. Since retail functions at the local 
level, the shopping centre was used as a microcosm of the market and provided empirical 
evidence to measure impacts in a temporal sense and by intensity. The interviews with 
industry experts were used to collaborate and explain the mall data, providing important 
first-hand context to explain the retail internationalization process. This study contributes to 
the validation of the Dawson model as a tool to measure and explain the impacts of foreign 
entry on a host country’s sectoral competitiveness, and through its methodology will 
 
 
 
provide the necessary modifications to the model for continued study of the retail 
internationalization process.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
1.1 Overview 
The pace of international retail expansion advanced significantly through the late 1900s and 
into the twenty-first century, establishing foreign expansion as a common strategic decision 
for growth among a large group of capable retailers (Dawson, 2007). Although this 
phenomenon was documented decades ago in the seminal work of Hollander (1970), recent 
research by academics has contributed to a more nuanced understanding of the retail 
internationalization process.  
Dawson (2003) has identified the need for a broader understanding of internationalization 
that extends beyond the dominant perspective of the retail firm. Currently, academics are 
attempting to move beyond the common predisposition of focusing narrowly on the 
expansion of retail from developed countries into developing countries, which overlooks the 
more frequent and significant activity of retailers expanding from developed home 
countries into other developed host countries. In addition, academic retail research has 
been primarily conducted from a European perspective, which is understandable given the 
greater activity of retail internationalization from Europe as well as the advantage of close-
knit, accessible national boundaries. However, this Euro-centric focus often overlooks 
American-based expansion within the North American continent and into the Asian-Pacific 
region activity toward the later part of the twentieth century. It is the goal of this study to 
address these under-examined areas to better understand and further conceptualize the 
internationalization of the retail sector.   
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1.2 Justification for the Study 
By the first decade of the twenty-first century, the number of retail companies engaged in 
international expansion had grown to represent 71 of the largest 100 retailers. This 
expansion happened rapidly: only 50 companies in this group were engaged in retail 
operations outside of their home country before 1986 (Dawson, 2007). The acceleration of 
retail activity during this period piqued the interest of many academic researchers, notably: 
Kacker, 1985; Treadgold, 1991; Sternquist, 1998. Initial research efforts investigated two 
specific aspects of internationalization: 1) a firm’s motivations for entering foreign markets, 
and 2) the positioning of a firm along the continuum of standardization and adaptation of 
offerings. These researchers challenged the traditional perception of retailing as a local 
activity and focused on understanding the impact that international expansion had on retail 
companies.  
The majority of past research has focused on the processes of internationalization in the 
pre-entry context, analyzing the actions of firms to identify the initial steps necessary to 
engage in foreign expansion, such as: motivation for expansion (Alexander, 1990; Williams, 
1992: Dawson, 1994; Sparks, 1996), where retailers choose to enter (Evans, Treadgold & 
Mavondo, 2000), and which method of entry has been utilized (Doherty, 1999; Burt, Davies, 
McAuley & Sparks, 2005). While there continues to be calls for further theoretical and 
empirical studies of these pre-entry behaviours (Alexander & Myers, 2000; Dawson, 1994), a 
general framework of firms’ processes prior to expansion have become fairly well 
understood through numerous studies. It became evident to researchers that the focus 
needed to shift from the study of pre-entry activity to what was now happening post-entry 
in these new host markets, stimulated by observations that both the firm and the host 
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country are heavily affected once foreign retailers become established in these new 
countries.  
In the early 2000s, retailers had already been operating on various levels of international 
business activity for many years. International retail activity was in the process of growing – 
with firms such as Zara, IKEA, and Body Shop operating in over 20 countries by 2000 – and 
the study of this post-entry activity became more intensive within academic research. 
Dawson (2003) was thus able to identify three primary international business areas: 1) 
export activity, 2) sourcing products from foreign countries, and 3) the internationalization 
of managers and managerial ideas. Furthermore, he recognized that, “with a few notable 
exceptions, the operation of shops internationally by large firms, other than as a token 
presence in another country, is a relatively new phenomenon associated with the 
globalization trends in economies” (Dawson, 2003: p. 2). Dawson asserted the need for 
further studies to look at retail internationalization from a new perspective in order to 
expand the understanding of post-entry impacts and processes for foreign retail activity. 
Other academics have made similar recommendations for inquiries into the study of post-
entry impacts and processes including: Alexander & Myers, 2000; Coe & Wrigley, 2007. To 
further this research, this study will focus on the processes involved in a retailer entering a 
foreign country and adjusting the framework of its store operations accordingly.   
Studies into specific areas of retail has highlighted the need for better understanding of 
what happens to a firm once it is operating in a foreign country, such as branding (Burt & 
Sparks, 2002; Burt & Davies, 2010), knowledge transfer (Palmer & Quinn, 2005), and retail 
failure or divestment in a foreign operation (Alexander & Quinn, 2002; Burt, Dawson & 
Sparks, 2003). These areas have revealed that the host country and the domestic retailers in 
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that country have significant roles in the internationalization process, but little is known 
about what that role has been. Dawson (2003) recognized this research gap, which he split 
into two categories: “consideration of when retail internationalisation takes place and what 
the effects and impacts are on the domestic retail system of foreign retailer arrival in a 
country” (p. 3; my emphasis). This study will specifically address the question of what 
occurred when foreign retailers entered the Canadian marketplace.   
Early research into retail foreign expansion focused on those retailers entering less 
commercially established (referred to as developing) countries from more commercially 
established (referred to as developed) countries. Studies by Goldman (1981, 1986) and 
Hollander (1970) tended to view internationalization as having the potential for social, 
economic, and cultural advances in developing foreign countries; however, this position has 
been called into question because it may be influenced by corporate interests, using pre-
established research that promotes the advantages of globalization to secure profits. In 
addition, although the entry of retail stores into the emerging markets of China and India 
has been significant, this research overlooks the equally important need to study what 
happens after retailers from developed countries expand into other developed countries. In 
reality, most retailers have taken their early internationalization steps into other developed 
countries in close proximity, e.g., IKEA opening stores in Europe and other Scandinavian 
countries, Walmart entering into Canada and Mexico, and UK and European company 
expansion within the European Union.  
Finally, the majority of academic research has focused on the mass merchant, discount, and 
grocery categories of the retail sector, which is understandable given that much of the 
research is dominated by a European perspective and appeals to major retailers such as 
 
 
5 
Carrefour, Metro, Ahold, Tesco, IKEA, and others. Similarly, most of the non-European 
research has concentrated on Walmart, Home Depot, and McDonalds as large companies 
who were comparatively early movers in the internationalization activity. However, there is 
a significant gap in the study of other retail categories, most notably the foreign expansion 
of apparel companies.  
Only a few studies have looked at specific firms – such as the Gap (Evans & Cox, 1997) and 
Zara (Lopez & Fan, 2009) – and although several have looked at the fashion sector and 
luxury brands (Wrigley & Moore, 2007; Moore, Fernie & Burt, 2000), there has been an 
absence of research into the broader expansion of clothing retailers, particularly from 
perspectives other than a specific firm’s. Although specialty apparel retailers are often 
overlooked in terms of company size, revenues, profitability, and market capitalization value 
– which are far below global leaders such as Walmart and Metro – they are amongst the 
most prolific internationalizing companies in the past thirty years, particularly in terms of 
market spread or coverage, and therefore deserve an isolated study which highlights their 
unique processes for foreign expansion. 
The focus of this research is to examine the impact of foreign apparel retailers on the 
domestic market of a host country, specifically within the context of companies from a 
developed country moving into another developed country. This study will contribute to the 
furthering global understanding of the retail internationalization process, examining the 
perspective of the host country and its domestic retail sector that are affected when foreign 
companies enter the market. In particular, the analysis will be focused on the entry of 
foreign apparel retailers into the Canadian market between the years 1989-2007. The 
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significance of these dates and the rationale for selecting the Canadian apparel market will 
be clarified in the next section.  
1.3 Research Context: The Post-1989 Canadian Retail Market  
Retailing has become an international economic force, which was made possible and 
accelerated due to an international mentality that embraced globalization. The year 1989 is 
a particularly significant global milestone in the post-WWII era for two reasons: 1) It is the 
year that both the ‘iron’ and ‘silk’ curtains fell, marking a new era of global capitalism, and 
2) It is the year of the initial commercialization of the internet. These events established a 
framework for global economic activity in the twenty-first century, facilitating the 
development of increasingly open markets and communication networks that permitted the 
evolution of retail expansion into markets around the globe. This study will place emphasis 
on the host market and its commercial market to examine the retail expansion process, as it 
is necessary to understand the particulars of the Canadian market in the assessment of the 
types, processes, and intensity of international retail, which are unique to its own historical 
progression. 
Historically, the Canadian market has been open to foreign retail entry. Like most markets, 
Canada has been the recipient of foreign investment for many decades. Dating back to the 
early twentieth century, companies such as Sears, Woolworth, K-mart, and many others had 
established businesses in Canada. In 1973, Marks & Spencer opened the first of forty stores 
in the Canadian market, expanding through a combination of acquisitions and organic 
growth, but eventually exited Canada in 1999. The challenges and misfortunes of Marks & 
Spencer in Canada have been well documented (Burt, Mellahi, Jackson & Sparks, 2002; 
Evans & Cox, 1997), however, despite its lack of success, Marks & Spencer’s expansion 
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reflects the evolutionary change of the retail environment during the 1970s and 1980s as 
new suburban malls were opened, replacing the strip plazas and main streets as primary 
shopping destinations. Other than Marks & Spencer and American mass merchants, very 
few foreign clothing retailers operated in Canada in the 1970s and 1980s, yet these early 
entries established the beginnings of foreign retail growth in Canada. For example, in 1975, 
non-automotive foreign retail sales only accounted for 10% of total Canadian sales, but by 
1990 this share of market had increased to 17% (Simmons & Kamikihara, 1999: p. 19).  
The Canadian retail market would simultaneously become more accessible and increasingly 
vulnerable to the internationalization movement in retailing across all retail categories. In 
particular, events in the late 1980s changed several aspects of the Canadian market (both 
internal and external) that supported significant retail growth for foreign operators and had 
a considerable impact on the apparel category. These factors occurred during the period of 
1989-2007 and had a permanent impact on Canada’s retail market. 
1.4 Accessibility of the Canadian Retail Sector before 1989 
After World War II, Canada’s coming of age and the increasingly looser alliances of the 
Commonwealth gradually eroded British influence on Canada. As Canada is geographically 
positioned beside the large commercial market of the United States, it began to open its 
markets to commercial trade from the United States. Thus, Canadian policy and practice has 
been a balance of taking commercial opportunities while attempting to protect the much 
smaller economy and population interests of Canada.  
Interested in building its own national identity, Canada established government bodies to 
develop its own national interests, such as the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) 
established in 1973, the National Energy Board (NEB) established in 1959, and the Canadian 
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Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) established in 1968. These 
agencies, boards, and commissions (ABCs) were powerful entities that helped shape the 
growth of Canada. Each of these ABCs had a central mandate to protect the interests of 
Canada in any interactions with foreign countries or companies; however, in the 1980s, the 
mandate and influence of these three ABCs and other protection-oriented laws began to 
facilitate foreign investment due to pressure from new international trade agreements and 
corporate international expansion. Overall, there are three dominant factors that 
contributed to increasing accessibility to the Canadian market for foreign retailers by 1989: 
1. Free Trade Agreements and the resultant opening of international borders 
2. Increasingly receptive Canadian consumers 
3. Socio-Cultural realities in Canada 
Each of these factors warrant an isolated study to understand the full extent of economic 
and socio-cultural changes in Canada, but this is beyond the scope of this study. For the 
purposes of this study, these factors will be summarized to identify the role they played in 
creating a Canadian retail market structure that was accessible to foreign entry. 
1.5 Free Trade Agreements and Opening International Borders 
Historically important trading partners, Canada and the United States entered a period of 
formal trade discussions in the 1980s. The goal was to create one of the world’s largest free 
trade zones at a time when similar trade agreements were developing in other regions of 
the world. These negotiations would mark a significant departure from the traditional 
protectionist trade laws and mandate of agencies such as FIRA.  
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In reality, FIRA provided little protection to Canadian industry and approved most 
applications for foreign investment. In 1985, FIRA was re-established as Investment Canada 
with a mandate of stimulating foreign investment. This change was made based on trade 
discussions between Canada and the United States that were initiated in 1982, were agreed 
to in principle in 1987, and enacted in 1989 as the first free trade agreement between the 
two countries. The complicated bureaucratic processes required to expand foreign retailing 
into Canada were removed and the accessibility of the market proved to be enticing for 
American retail companies. 
By January 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect in 
Canada, the United States, and Mexico. It marked the formalization of agreements for the 
flow of goods and services between the three countries. Most importantly, NAFTA was an 
understanding that the border between Canada and the United States would be more open 
to generate economic benefit for both countries. However, the agreement was not without 
its contentious issues: for example, the lumber and steel industries held protectionist 
positions on both fronts, and Canadians foresaw a competitive threat to long-standing 
manufacturing industries such as garments, footwear, and other important vendor sources 
for the Canadian retail industry.  
The implications of the 1989 trade agreement that led to NAFTA would eventually eliminate 
the ownership restrictions that had made foreign entry more difficult. Prior to this date, 
foreign direct investment had been subject to extensive review; for example, to ensure an 
advantage for Canadian industries, the government often restricted the percentage of 
foreign ownership. Yet from this point onward, the Canadian retail market was open for 
American expansion and vice versa. Growth-oriented retail companies seized this 
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opportunity to develop international expansion strategies. The Canadian market was 
attractive to foreign retailers not only because of its accessibility, but also because foreign 
retailers sensed vulnerability created by a receptive consumer and a comparatively weak 
domestic retail sector. This confluence of accessibility and vulnerability offered a perfect 
entry point for foreign retailers and created a market environment in which foreign entry 
would have direct impact on the domestic sector. 
1.6 Increasing Mobility and Receptiveness of the Canadian Consumer 
There are many similarities between Canada and the United States, as illustrated in Burns 
and Rayman’s (1995) comparison of the two nations, but their retail businesses are not 
identical. Burns and Rayman argue that much of this has to do with timing of progress: 
American retailers advanced earlier and more competitively through the introduction of 
new formats and formulas. In addition, with the majority of Canadians living within 200 
miles of the U.S. border, the movement of visitors between the two countries increased 
drastically in the 1960s and 1970s. Disproportionate to population size, Canadians have 
been more frequent travelers to the United States, primarily in the flow of tourists for 
annual trips to warmer climates. Thus, Canadians became familiar with the more advanced 
retail formats and concepts that were spreading across the United States. This awareness of 
American retail brands would prove to be an important advantage for their entry into 
Canada.  
In addition to the attractiveness of the U.S. shopping environment, Canadian consumers 
also found the prices to be lower and the retailers to have better service. U.S. retailers were 
able to maintain lower prices due to benefits from their economies of scale, and lower 
operating costs as a result of lower taxes and labour costs. Collectively, these factors 
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stimulated a significant amount of cross-border shopping, which continued to be appealing 
even with a currency exchange rate that typically put the Canadian dollar at a lesser value to 
the U.S. dollar. Some of the highs and lows of currency exchange rates through the 1970s 
and 1980s reveal the dramatic swings in currency value – from a high of 1.0443 in 1974 to a 
low of .6913 cents in 1986 (see Appendix 1). The relative strength of the Canadian dollar in 
the 1970s played a significant role in creating the cross-border shopping behavior that drew 
consumers to the American retail brands. In addition, the incentive for cross-border 
shopping escalated when the Canadian government introduced the Goods and Services Tax 
(GST) on almost all goods and services in 1991, providing a further push for consumers to 
seek out foreign retailers.  
1.7 Socio-Cultural Realities in Canada 
Accessibility to the Canadian market was increasing for foreign retailers in the years leading 
up to the early entrants in 1989. This was supported by memorable shopping experiences 
during trips to the United States as well other cultural influences originating in the United 
States such as magazines and newspapers, radio, and television. While efforts by the CRTC 
initially focused on protecting Canadian content by limiting foreign cultural access to 
Canadians, these efforts were generally futile given the proximity and the growing 
dominance of American culture throughout the world. By the later part of the twentieth 
century, American media was fully entrenched in the Canadian market. This media served to 
provide even broader awareness of American retailers – in particular, the U.S. fashion 
publications were everywhere and were highly effective marketing tools for clothing 
retailers. 
 
 
12 
The fundamental social norm of Canada was fixated on the ‘cultural mosaic’ model, which 
further contributed to the accessibility and receptiveness of the Canadian market (Burns & 
Rayman, 1995; Evans, 1996). This mentality perpetuated connections with foreign 
homelands, creating a much more global-oriented populace than would be found in the 
American ‘melting pot’ society. The impact of this mosaic would lead Canadians to openly 
accept and often desire foreign products, resulting from less emphasis on developing a 
sense of Canadian-made superiority. This helped England, France, and the U.S. to dominate 
fashion retail during the second half of the twentieth century. 
By 1989, foreign entry into the Canadian market had been well established. The 
combination of more open trade structures and a receptive and knowledgeable consumer 
were powerful contributors to this accessibility; however, these factors are not sufficient to 
account for the penetration into the market and the impact of foreign retailers. The 
vulnerability of the competitive environment and the Canadian market structure were also 
contributors to what would occur with retail internationalization. 
1.8 Vulnerability: The Canadian Retail Landscape 
The evolution of retailing in Canada follows a similar trajectory of change as the United 
States. However, as noted by Burns and Rayman (1995), there were significant differences in 
the timing of change (Canada was significantly slower) and the degree of change (the U.S. 
was much more aggressive and innovative). As the two retail environments began to 
converge in the 1980s, these differences would leave Canada with a much more vulnerable 
market structure. This vulnerability can be best described under the broad headings of 
changing patterns in format growth and the complacency of existing market oligopolies. 
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By 1989, three decades of significant growth in major shopping mall development was 
beginning to slow down. The opening of new shopping centres throughout the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s had been the catalyst for expanding Canadian department stores and 
specialty chains, particularly clothing. However, Canada had more restrictive zoning by-laws 
than in the United States, and a lack of quality sites would cause the rapid growth to come 
to a sudden halt. The opening of the Erin Mills Town Centre in Mississauga in 1989 and 
Mapleview Shopping Centre in Burlington in September 1990 would be the last major 
enclosed malls to be developed until Vaughan Mills in 2004. In the late 1980s, it was obvious 
that the rate of growth was slowing, but neither developers nor retailers foresaw the 
recession of 1991-1992 when the associated interest rates rose to 14% to 16%.  
The Canadian market structure had been well established by 1989 with the majority of 
major shopping centres anchored by two Canadian department stores – such as Eaton’s, 
Simpsons, Woodwards, Sears, or The Bay – as well as the mainstays of Canadian specialty 
retailing, such as Dylex Limited, Reitmans, and Jack Frasers, which operated numerous 
banners as in-line stores. As has been well documented (Burns & Rayman, 1995; Hernandez 
& Du, 2009), the development of these shopping centres in North America provided the 
catalyst for both department store and specialty clothing chain growth into the expanding 
suburban markets. This development evolved into a changing competitive dynamic between 
the department stores and the specialty chains: while department stores had been the 
dominant one-stop shopping destination in urban street locations, they now were 
positioned as one of several choices within the mall environment. Clothing departments had 
been central to the department store offering, but could not remain competitive among the 
in-line shopping centre apparel stores that catered to specific segments of the consumer 
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market. In particular, younger more fashion-conscious consumers were drawn to specialty 
chains with their unique merchandise selection, purposefully seeking alternatives to the 
department store as it became synonymous with their parents’ shopping experience.  
As the new shopping centre development peaked in Canada in the later part of the 1980s, 
the progressive loss of customers by the department stores was all too clear. The early 
stages of the decline of department stores in Canada would eventually lead to consolidation 
and closures in the 1990s (see Appendix 2). This represented an additional threat to the 
growth opportunities of mall developers: beyond the problems with zoning by-laws and the 
U.S. dominated market, the deterioration of Canadian department stores as standard mall 
anchors was a significant concern. Collectively, these market conditions left mall developers 
in a vulnerable position. To stay competitive, they would need to address these 
shortcomings in the 1990s. 
Just as the expansion of major shopping centres in Canada slowed to a halt, the entry of 
new retail formats in the form of big box category killers, superstores, and membership and 
warehouse clubs were gaining momentum. These new retail formats led to the formation of 
new planned shopping destinations such as power centres and power nodes (CSCA, 1994). 
There was limited activity for this growth in Canada before 1989, but the pace of expansion 
in the United States was escalating. Following the early moves of the large discounters, it 
was evident that the new formats would expand into Canada significantly in the years 
ahead. Unlike traditional malls, these new formats adopted a new style of land 
development, enabling them to find openings in the zoning by-laws to secure attractive 
locations for growth.  
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These new formats were primarily dominated by categories other than apparel. The main 
focus for inventory included home furnishings, do-it-yourself, office supplies, electronics, 
toys, and other hard goods. The off-price company Winners, which was purchased by 
TJMaxx in 1981, is one of the few exceptions that sold apparel in these new centres. In this 
respect, the early days of the large discounters had limited impact on the specialty clothing 
retail market. However, these stores had a much greater impact on the department stores, 
which were already weakened by the increased competition from the specialty clothing 
retailers. The department stores were now being attacked on non-apparel category 
assortments and were especially vulnerable to the pricing advantages of the new formats. 
With the exception of Simpsons-Sears, the department stores began to retreat from such a 
large range of product categories, focusing instead on their apparel offerings. By 1989, some 
early consolidation had taken place with the Hudson’s Bay Company: the company 
purchased Zellers, Robinsons, and the Simpsons Limited business from Sears Roebuck Co., 
which ended the twenty-five year partnership of Simpsons-Sears. A significant 
transformation was taking place: retail innovation was no longer happening in the major 
shopping centres, but seemed to be accelerating in new retail structures.  
All of this activity marked a critical point in the evolution of the Canadian retail market 
structure, leaving it increasingly vulnerable to foreign entry. Department stores and 
specialty clothing stores were forced to adjust to the limited growth opportunities for new 
store expansion, particularly in the apparel category. At the same time, the clothing retail 
sector was increasingly concentrated in the suburban malls, all of which led to the market 
being controlled by a small number of mall developers and apparel retailers, which created 
the oligopoly structure that further contributed to the vulnerability of the Canadian market. 
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1.9 The Complacency of Market Oligopolies 
The Canadian market was particularly vulnerable because the control of most retail and 
shopping centres was in the hands of a small number of companies. After years of 
competing in a closed market, there was a general sentiment among industry experts that 
the oligopoly structure of the market led to a degree of competitive complacency. There 
were essentially only three major landlords owning or managing the prime shopping centres 
in Canada, Cadillac Fairview, Oxford and Ivanhoe Cambridge. This significantly limited the 
potential for new domestic innovations. In addition, department stores were not expected 
to pay rent in their role as anchor and the specialty chains had established a comfortable 
hierarchy of location and leasing that made the competitive market almost non-existent. 
Within the clothing category, the legacy of close ties to Montreal-based manufacturers 
further entrenched the closed competitive environment. 
As a country with a relatively small population spread across expansive space, the 
number of domestic companies operating in Canada was few and generally held by family 
interests. Eaton’s, Hudson’s Bay Company, Woodwards, Zellers, the Reitman’s fashion chain, 
Dylex Limited, and a few other clothing chains were the primary tenants in shopping malls. 
One exception was the Simpsons-Sears department stores, a partnership between Sears 
Roebuck and Simpsons, which in 1989 represented the only major retailer in Canada not 
wholly owned by Canadians. Where some oligopoly structures might inhibit foreign entry 
due to strong dominant competitors protecting their market, the opposite proved to be the 
situation in Canada throughout most retail categories including clothing. It is within this 
context that the author identified the potential to study the process of retail 
internationalization in Canada.  
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1.10 Research Aims and Objectives 
There has been a recent call for further study into retail expansion from perspectives 
beyond the traditional focus on the firm and its pre-expansion processes. This has come 
from two primary sources: Dawson (2003), and Coe and Wrigley (2007). These researchers 
call for a concerted effort to explore the under-studied area of retail globalization, 
particularly the impact of foreign entry and host economies on the internationalization 
process. After considering these two studies, the author determined that the Dawson 
framework provides a more accessible approach to studying any foreign expansion scenario, 
regardless of companies or countries involved. Coe and Wrigley (2007) do not contribute as 
significantly to this study, as they continue to use the more traditional focus on developed-
to-developing expansion with a Euro-centric emphasis on the companies involved. The 
decision to align with the Dawson methodology will be fully discussed at the end of Chapter 
3 through a comparative evaluation of the two models.  
This study utilizes the Dawson (2003) framework to assess the impact of foreign retailers on 
the domestic Canadian market. Dawson specifically proposes the need to distinguish the 
types of impacts, the processes associated with impacts, and the degree of intensity of 
impacts. Furthermore, his extensive research into internationalization has provided the 
basis for a framework that identifies six broad categories related to the institutions and 
structures that are affected by foreign retailers, as illustrated here: 
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Figure 1.1 – Types of impact of internationalization retail in a host country (Dawson, 2003: p. 4) 
Although it would be beneficial to test the entirety of Dawson’s model, the scale of such an 
undertaking is beyond this study. Thus, this study has decided to focus on the change in 
sectoral competitiveness branch of Dawson’s model because all new domestic and foreign 
entries have an impact on the structure of the market, which has a demonstrable affect on 
the competitiveness in a given retail sector. Not all of Dawson’s categories have such a 
consistent impact. For example, the changes in the effectiveness of demand chains and 
performance of the firm categories will generally be company-specific and context-specific. 
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Similarly, increased consumer literacy is also context-specific and, in the growing age of 
internet, it is increasingly difficult to analyze the impact of in-store entry versus online entry.  
Examining this category of the impact of foreign entry on change in sectoral 
competitiveness, there are several types of impacts that may occur. To account for these 
types, this research has been structured in two stages to ensure a comprehensive analysis: 
the processes related to retail expansion, and the intensity of the foreign retailers’ impacts 
on the domestic sector. The first stage will establish that foreign entry does have an impact 
on the host market, exploring how foreign entry can manifest in relation to the types, 
processes, and intensity of impacts as proposed by Dawson’s framework. The second stage 
of the research will expand upon the empirical evidence of the first stage to explore the 
knowledge of industry experts and determine how these impacts can be interpreted and 
understood.  
Utilizing the Dawson (2003) framework this study will specifically address the following 
research questions: 
1) What are the impacts of foreign retailer entry and how can they be measured 
over time and by degree of impact? 
2) What are the changes in sectoral competitiveness that can be measured and 
interpreted? 
3) What processes are used when responding to the changes in sectoral 
competitiveness? 
4) What gaps in the Dawson model can be identified from this application? 
Chapter 4 will provide a detailed discussion of how this study explores these research 
questions and contributes to the understanding of the retail internationalization process.  
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1.11 Research Design and Methodology 
The two-stage design of this study has resulted in a two-stage methodology. The first stage 
is a quantitative analysis, which will provide empirical evidence of whether foreign entry 
does in fact change sectoral competitiveness and, if so, what types of impacts can be 
observed from the data. The second stage is a qualitative analysis that seeks to provide an 
explanation of what the data shows about the impacts of foreign entry. This approach seeks 
reflective first-hand perspectives of the impacts, which is best achieved through a 
qualitative expert survey with those involved in the period of internationalization. These 
interviews were initiated in 2008/09 and analyzed through 2012. 
The value of utilizing both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies in a study 
with Dawson’s framework can be considered on two levels: 
1. The Dawson framework is founded on a comprehensive review of 
internationalization activity and accumulated research, but has no empirical basis for 
the structure of the model. Thus, there is a significant need to provide a quantitative 
analysis to test the framework.  
2. The data in and of itself cannot fully explain the change in types and processes of 
sectoral competitiveness. To fully explain and understand the impact of foreign 
entry, it is essential to provide qualitative context from experts in the field. 
Overall, the value of the combined approach to this study ensures that both the events and 
the processes of internationalization are fully understood through Dawson’s framework. 
Although the study could have been conducted without the quantitative data – utilizing only 
the industry expert interviews to provide commentary on the proposed terms of reference 
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from the Dawson model – the empirical data provides evidence of the intensity of impact. 
However, as with much of the research on retail internationalization, there is an on-going 
need for more empirical evidence, particularly in the form of performance data rather than 
survey data, to advance the understanding of when and what happens in foreign expansions 
activity. 
1.12 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured over seven chapters. The first chapter provides an introduction and 
justification for the study, including the research context for the Canadian retail market. The 
aims and objectives are identified, the context and time frame are explored, and the broad 
design and methodology for the research are explained.  
Chapter Two introduces and reviews the foundational research on retail internationalization 
literature. Starting from the seminal work of Hollander (1970), this chapter will provide 
definitions of essential terms such as adaptation and standardization, in addition to the 
dominant perspectives of researchers who both contributed to and limited the knowledge 
of retail internationalization. 
Chapter Three progresses through the more recent literature on retail internationalization 
and explores the processes and impacts of this activity. This chapter investigates literature 
on the why, where, and how of foreign expansion. It also identifies the evolving study of 
retail branding, knowledge transfer, and ultimately the failure and divestment that have 
lead to the recognition that the when and what of retail internationalization have not been 
fully explored. The framework of Dawson (2003) and Coe and Wrigley (2007) are critiqued 
for their application to this study. It should be noted that given the timeframe of the data 
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collection period for this thesis the literature review in Chapter 3 is a synthesis of academic 
publications primarily up to the end of the year 2007. Post-2007 literature is drawn into the 
thesis only where it is pertinent to the study. 
Chapter Four outlines the research methodology for the study, providing details of the 
design of the study as well as the utilization of empirical data on a microcosm scale to assess 
the impacts of foreign entry. The significance of industry expert interviews will also be 
explained. The chapter charts out the data collection, selection of interviewees, and the 
analysis methods utilized. 
Chapter Five provides an interpretation of the quantitative data and sets up the structure 
for assessing the impact of foreign retail entry on the domestic market sector using the 
Dawson framework. The findings will lay the foundation for conducting the industry expert 
interviews. 
Chapter Six provides the findings of the industry expert interviews. These are analyzed using 
the five types of impacts that Dawson identifies as potentially contributing to changes in 
sectoral competitiveness. This leads to a discussion of the processes for market 
restructuring and the domestic response to these changes.  
Chapter Seven will address the overall findings of the research and provide discussion of the 
Dawson model for the study of impacts of retail internationalization. Finally, some 
suggestions for future research will be offered as a result of this study. 
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Chapter 2 – Foundational Research in Retail 
Internationalization  
2.1  Overview 
In this chapter, the foundational research literature on retail internationalization is reviewed 
to identify the early dominant themes and perspectives that academic studies would be 
built upon. Four authors represent the cornerstones of the foundational research: Stanley 
Hollander, Charles Waldman, Ariel Goldman, and Rita Martenson. They are significant for 
their contributions to initiating the dialogue on retail internationalization and providing 
context for the four most important perspectives of the early research. These four 
perspectives include: 1) the internationalizing firm as the dominant viewpoint, 2) 
transferability of the retail enterprise to foreign markets (also known as the standardization 
versus adaptation discussion), 3) economic impact in the host country (i.e., an attempt to 
align retail internationalization into the broader international business discussion), and 4) 
the role of innovation within the retail foreign expansion context. These early research 
efforts exemplified the evolution from broad surveys to a more narrowly focused analysis, 
which strove to add depth to the understanding of the retail internationalization process. 
This research served as an important foundation for this study, as these perspectives 
revealed the limitations of the knowledge base in international retail expansion.  
The next phase of foundational researchers developed these four perspectives, attempting 
to build a framework for the study of retail internationalization. Researchers such as Walter 
J. Salmon and Andre Tordjman, Alan D. Treadgold, Luca Pellegrini, and many others focused 
on structuring the study of retail foreign expansion into patterns and typologies that would 
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explain the internationalization process. As the pace of retail internationalization 
accelerated, this research increasingly pointed to the complexity and differentiations of 
studying foreign retail expansion compared to other business enterprises, ultimately leading 
to the study of processes and operations that will be addressed in Chapter 3. Through this 
period of foundational research, the four perspectives shifted to more traditional business 
themes of strategic, temporal, and managerial issues within the retail internationalization 
process. 
2.2  Introduction to Foundational Research in Retail Internationalization 
The study of retail internationalization is a comparatively recent phenomenon, only gaining 
interest and more serious investigation by the mid-twentieth century. Yet retail 
organizations have been engaged in business activities in foreign countries throughout the 
evolution of civilization: from early itinerant salespeople and global sourcing for fabrics, 
resource retailers have played a major role in building international networks. However, the 
scale of international retail business and its role in foreign economic development has been 
relatively small in comparison to manufacturing and other business sectors’ global 
expansion. Within this context, retail internationalization has remained under-examined by 
researchers and business theorists. It was not until the economic and business growth years 
following World War II that researchers began a serious investigation into retail 
internationalization.  
The past sixty years of research have provided significant insight into this activity, offering 
up important typologies and theories into the processes of foreign expansion. This research 
has also highlighted significant gaps in the study and understanding of foreign retail activity 
and the markets into which they have expanded. Consistent with early research 
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investigations of any phenomenon, the researchers and their work discussed in this chapter 
were predominately focused on international expansion through the existing knowledge 
and theories from international business literature. To this end, the foundational work 
discussed in this chapter advanced the understanding of: 1) what retailers were doing in the 
period of early international expansion, 2) how this could be assessed through the relevant 
international business theories of the day, and 3) how this would translate into formulating 
new typologies to better understand the patterns that were specific to the retail 
international experience. Chapters 2 and 3 will identify the predominant themes that 
formed the foundation of retail internationalization research, and reiterate the need for 
further investigation into specific topics that are of significant relevance to future retail 
foreign expansion. 
2.3   Academic Overview on Retail Expansion 
It is a widely held view that retailing is a local business. Often expressed through terms such 
as ‘the nation of shopkeepers’ (used to describe the British tradition of retailing), this image 
is reinforced in the seminal work of Hollander (1970) through his opening statement: “The 
very word ‘retailing’ itself seems to suggest small-scale business. The term tends to create a 
picture of a highly localized activity of very narrow scope. Yet in actuality quite a few retail 
firms are veritable giants…” (p. 1).  
Each retail business, whether an independent sole proprietorship or a store unit within a 
multi-store operation, fundamentally engages in business with the consumers of their local 
market. Additionally, there is a dominant tradition of entrepreneurial and ‘merchant king’ 
figures that led the growth of retailing in the early years of economic development. 
Unfortunately, this image only reinforces the perception that retailing is a less sophisticated 
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form of business compared to manufacturing advancements – this mentality led 
international business research and theoretical development to pay little or no attention to 
the retail sector throughout much of the twentieth century.  
The early seminal works of Hollander (1970) and Waldman (1978) investigated retail 
international expansion, attempting to explore the relationships and differences that retail 
shared with more established research in international business and economic development 
theory. The work of Dunning (1981, 1988), a leading business theorist, was frequently 
referenced in the foundational retail research in an attempt to develop a theoretical 
structure to understand this phenomenon of retail international business. With few 
exceptions, these early studies raised more questions than answers about the validity of 
applying traditional international business theory to retail internationalization. In the 
progression of research, there has been a shift in focus away from attempting to explain the 
retail expansion process using existing international business-based theories: subsequent 
researchers formulated several independent representations of the retail 
internationalization process, providing a foundation for further discussion on international 
business theory that demonstrated its limited relevance to the understanding of retail 
internationalization (Dawson, 2007).  
In the final chapter of Hollander (1970), he provides an important message for many of the 
research studies that would follow: “International retailing proved to be even greater in 
scope, magnitude, and diversity than was anticipated at the start of this study” (p. 181). The 
findings of subsequent researchers echoed the challenge that the diversity and complexity 
of retail internationalization patterns called for new theoretical development to replace 
established international business theories. Not enough research had been undertaken on 
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what Hollander viewed as an impressive extent of internationalization, which reinforces 
many misperceptions of retailing that existed in the post-industrialization period. The 
prominent role of these researchers would lead to the development of common themes 
around innovation and the application of retail concepts to the internationalization process.  
For the most part, this foundational research took the perspective of the internationalizing 
firm and its role in the foreign expansion process. This is understandable given the well-
established role of the firm in the formulation of international business theory, as well as 
the fact that most researchers resided in the home country or region of the expanding firms. 
However, while the perspective of the firm has proven valuable to understanding the 
internationalization process, as early as Hollander’s study in 1970 researchers were able to 
recognize that foreign countries, whether developed or developing, would be impacted by 
these new entrants, giving credence to the need to consider more than the firm’s 
perspective in the retail internationalization process.  
In addition, much of the early research in retail internationalization tended to focus on entry 
into developing countries. The work of Goldman (1974) exemplifies the perspective of retail 
foreign expansion as an opportunity for economic development in the host countries; a 
proposition also put forth by Hollander, but one that would prove challenging to support. As 
research advanced, the analysis of entry from a developed to a developing country has 
often become blurred in an absence of specific distinctions between these two types of host 
countries. Although broad demographic and social-economic data has been referenced to 
describe the differences between developed and developing countries, the early stages of 
international expansion research would render these differences secondary to the overall 
process. During the 1970s and 1980s, when most of the foundational research in retail 
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foreign expansion was undertaken, the number of countries categorized as developed was 
generally limited to Western Europe and North America – considerably fewer than exist 
today. Thus, new research is necessary to renew the context of retail internationalization, 
which is crucial and important to understanding the foundational study of retail foreign 
expansion. 
2.4   The Significance of Hollander, Waldman, Goldman and Martenson 
Unlike the broader study of international business – which has a longer history and greater 
scope of research and theoretical development – the study of retail internationalization is 
comparatively recent, offering a narrower field of research from which to build a foundation 
of investigation.  
Within the early studies of retail internationalization, four individuals and their primary 
work have been identified as laying the foundation for future study in this field: Stanley 
Hollander, Charles Waldman, Ariel Goldman, and Rita Martenson are considered the most 
influential researchers that framed subsequent research. While others contributed to the 
study of retailing prior to and during this period – which is well-documented in McNair’s 
(1967) ‘wheel of retail’ and Martenson’s (1981) comprehensive review of retail models – 
these four researchers in particular addressed the primary challenges and opportunities 
confronting international retailers. 
Hollander’s research explored the scope and diversity of the retail business and attempted 
to compare its complexity to the challenges of international business. Regarded as a seminal 
work on the nature of retail internationalization, Hollander’s (1970) study provided an 
authoritative survey of international expansion activities, primarily between the post-World 
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War II period to the late 1960s. To define the scope of international expansion, the study 
documented the following: 1) the full spectrum of retail expansion topics from developed to 
developing countries, 2) the differences between retail formats and internationalization, 3) 
a discussion of European and North American expansion, 4) the motives for retail expansion, 
and 5) the successes and failures of expansion activities during this period. The Hollander 
work was the first to truly capture the complexity of retail foreign expansion by identifying 
several key components and outcomes of doing business outside of the home country.  
Hollander’s work spurred extensive study of the various components of retail 
internationalization. For the most part, these contributions have been well documented 
over the years. Of particular relevance to this author’s research is the adaptation of 
Hollander’s hypothesis on the economic impact of retail expansion, predominantly through 
observations on the standardization versus adaptation continuum, the impact of foreign 
expansion on the firm, and the impact of foreign expansion on the host country.  
Waldman (1978) estimated that, between the early and mid 1970s, the number of 
companies entering the international market would increase by an additional 33%. It was 
within this context that Waldman’s study advanced a more detailed investigation into the 
activities of the mass retailers engaged in foreign markets. Consistent with the research of 
the 1970s, Waldman’s work had a foundation in the broader international business 
research, which viewed retailing as primarily a marketing activity. While this lens ultimately 
limited the perspective of retail expansion as an independent research pursuit, several 
significant findings in the Waldman study would provide the basis to advance understanding 
beyond this limitation. In particular, Goldman’s (1974, 1981) study of supermarket 
 
 
30 
expansion into less developed countries inspired other researchers to frame international 
retail expansion as the transfer of marketing technology.  
The underlying premise of Goldman’s perspective is that the supermarkets’ innovations in 
the marketing distribution network could be easily replicated in multiple markets. Similar to 
Hollander’s proposition on retail expanding into developing countries, Goldman proposed 
that the transfer of retail expertise from developed to developing countries would have 
economic benefit. However, the actual impact of the transfer of a retail formula, innovation, 
or technology into foreign markets was found to depart significantly from projected 
business theory outcomes. Thus, the Goldman study demonstrates the limitations of the 
traditional international business theory that asserts that successful replication of retail can 
be achieved consistently from market to market.  
Amongst the early studies of retail internationalization, the Martenson study of IKEA (1981) 
provides one of the original efforts to develop a framework or theory that would explain 
retail foreign expansion. Taking a fairly exhaustive approach to the investigation of multiple 
business theories, Martenson provides arguments that challenged most existing theories at 
the time, claiming that they having limited or no application to the retail foreign expansion 
process as it related to IKEA. This study resulted in a combined dynamic model that 
Martenson believed addressed the primary issues of retail internationalization. Similar to 
Goldman, the underlying context of innovation and its diffusion is utilized to analyze the 
success of a retail concept and its potential for international expansion. As noted by 
Hollander and others, those companies that engage in retail internationalization are 
generally seen as innovators in their retailing category or format within their home country. 
It therefore made sense in these early studies to analyze international expansion through 
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theories and models founded in innovation studies. Thus, Martenson’s contributions further 
developed the knowledge of retail innovation in the internationalization process and 
identified the determinant forces of the retail market and its dynamic character. 
2.5   The Four Perspectives of Foundational Retail Internationalization 
Research 
2.5.1 Perspective One – The Retail Firm as the Dominant Viewpoint 
From the vantage point of the 1970s, it is understandable that specific firms engaged in 
international expansion dominated the influential research perspectives. Since retail 
internationalization activity was still evolving and limited to relatively few numbers of 
companies, the ability to develop macro views of this activity would have been misguided 
without access to a broad spectrum of results. Each of the four researchers discussed in this 
section contributed distinct but converging views of the retail internationalization process: 
Hollander’s broad survey of retailer activity, Waldman’s narrower study of the firm’s 
motivations and mechanisms, Goldman’s perspective of retailer as part of a marketing 
technique, and Martenson’s specific case of IKEA.  
Hollander’s findings focus predominately on the internationalizing firm, which he explored 
through case studies of each firm’s activities and the interviews of management from these 
companies. While this study was initially tied to expansion in developing countries, 
Hollander concludes that the types of problems encountered by internationalizing firms 
were often similar in both developed and developing countries. As Hollander notes: “The 
really basic problems of site selection, of offsetting competition, of staffing and control, of 
supply, of adjusting to customer tastes and desires, and of living with regulatory controls are 
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inherent in large-scale retailing everywhere, both indigenous and expatriate, and in both 
developed and developing countries” (p. 133). 
The relationship between the home country business and the operations in foreign 
countries is also a significant contribution from Hollander. This research provides a first look 
at the confidence of these innovative retailers, which helped them expand internationally, 
as well as the role of managerial vision and risk-taking necessary to do so. This perspective 
demonstrates that most retail companies that internationalized their business are 
innovative and have first gained a level of success and dominance in their home country. 
However, Hollander accurately observed that, if operations at home become weak, there 
appears to be a direct impact on the foreign business. Since home market business still 
accounts for the major portion of revenues and profits, it becomes necessary to direct 
managerial, financial, and operational resources to the home firm, often at the expense of 
foreign operations. This is an important insight into the understanding of retail foreign 
expansion that would evolve during the next decades of study. 
The broad scope of Hollander’s study provides insight into the complexity of the retail 
internationalization activity leading up to the last quarter of the twentieth century. This 
research would provide the framework for subsequent study of retail foreign expansion, 
however, the dominant viewpoint of the internationalizing firm would overshadow and thus 
limit early research.  
Almost a decade later, the work of Charles Waldman (1978) provides a more focused study 
of larger retail companies engaged in international expansion, offering a more in-depth 
study and analysis of retail internationalization activity and its outcomes. Waldman’s study 
looked at specific mass retailers and further evolved the dominant view of the firm within 
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the internationalization process. Waldman’s study would conclude that the success or 
failure of retail internationalization would be predominately determined by the strategic 
decisions of the firm. For those firms that met with failure or unsatisfactory results in 
foreign expansion, Waldman determined three factors as an explanation: “inadequacy of 
the exported retailing formula with respect to host country consumers’ expectations; 
difficulty in providing at a reasonable cost adequate operational support for the exported 
formula; and finally, insufficient attention given to the integration of geographically 
dispersed decision-making processes” (p. 144-5). Waldman supplied further interpretation 
of these negative outcomes in the study, identifying problems in the firm’s marketing 
strategies and subsequent operational decisions. 
For those mass retailers who were successful in their foreign expansion, Waldman identified 
the strategies that these companies used to overcome failure. Retailers who strategically 
found the proper adaptation of their formula, provided adequate operational support, and 
developed proper systems and personnel strategies were able to achieve acceptable 
performance results in foreign markets. Similar to Hollander’s work, this research gives only 
passing recognition of the other perspectives in the retail internationalization process, such 
as the host country and its domestic retail sector. 
In the study of IKEA’s expansion into three foreign markets, Martenson’s research is clearly 
dominated by the firm’s viewpoint of the internationalization process. However, her work 
introduces the market perspective, taking into consideration the dynamics of differing 
market conditions in the success or failure of a retail business. Focusing on IKEA in its home 
and three foreign markets, Martenson’s study is a significant departure from the other 
foundational research of the late twentieth century. Her work introduced the need to look 
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at the business of retail through analytical tools that were developed specifically for that 
purpose, which opened up the potential for understanding more of the complexity of retail 
foreign expansion. Although still grounded in the perspective of the firm, Martenson’s work 
initiated increased academic interest in the foreign market’s role in international success. 
2.5.2   Perspective Two – Transferability of the Retail Concept: Standardization versus 
Adaptation 
The breadth of Hollander’s study spanned across companies of different origins, expanding 
into diverse countries with varying formats and modes of entry, and providing a wealth of 
observational data on the complexity and diversity of retail internationalization. The factors 
contributing to success or failure proved somewhat inconclusive, but laid the foundation for 
studying one of the most significant strategic decisions in retail internationalization: the 
degree to which the firm implements a standardized or adaptive approach to its foreign 
business. 
It was Hollander’s observations that organizational structure and operational style in a 
firm’s home country had considerable influence on customer orientation toward 
international operations. As such, retailers that were more experienced in operating diverse 
formats at home had an ability to adapt to foreign market conditions more easily, drawing 
upon prior experience to succeed. Hollander does not impose any evaluation or prediction 
on the retailer’s choice of adaptive or standardized strategy, focusing more on the 
relationship between foreign and home operations, and eventually determining that the 
radial organizational structure of most international retailers was standard practice. It is 
worth noting that, in 1970, firms were less likely to be sourcing from global markets than is 
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current practice, and vertical integration and private label development were far less 
evolved. Thus, entry into foreign markets came with limited prior experience on most levels.  
Waldman’s study furthers the understanding of the motivations and mechanisms for 
retailers to engage in foreign expansion. In addition to providing further insight into the 
issues of liberalized trade and economic unions, he identified the role that technology 
advancements would play in supporting foreign growth, particularly in the fields of 
communication and transportation. This was significant to Waldman’s (1978) study of mass 
retailers because he was the first to truly investigate corporate acculturation, concluding 
this was necessary to successfully integrate geographically dispersed operations (p. 156). 
Waldman believed that “the role of foreign operations as a reservoir of ideas and 
experiences definitely is an aspect of international expansion that should be viewed as a 
positive one” (p. 159). These findings would provide the foundation for future research into 
retail internationalization as a process that must continually adjust to market and consumer 
conditions. In addition, Waldman provided some initial insights into the transfer of learning 
and knowledge that would be explored several years later. 
This 1978 work may also be seen as the precursor to the concept of psychic distance. While 
this terminology was not yet defined, Waldman’s work is clear in exploring the factors that 
influenced expansion decisions. The investigation of these firms provides meaningful insight 
into the relationships between the choice of entry mode, the level of managerial support (or 
lack thereof), and the success or failure of a foreign operation.  
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2.5.3  Perspective Three – Retail’s Economic Impact and Developed versus Developing 
Host Countries 
 
Further research advanced the view that retail internationalization was driven by an 
increasing homogeneity among developed countries, which was an implicit notion in the 
Hollander study. In particular, academic research in the late 1970s and early 1980s explored 
the potential that opening retail companies in developing countries would advance their 
progress toward the standard of living of developed countries, which was a popular theory 
amongst writers such as Levitt (1983) and others within the manufacturing sector. These 
researchers also asserted that a successful company in one developed country would be 
well received by other developed countries as part of an advancing global standard of living. 
Specific to retail internationalization, Hollander would be among the first of several 
researchers to advance the idea that the consumers in developed foreign countries would 
welcome the choice of new innovative retail formats, and to assert that local competition 
must embrace marketing advancements and other operational improvements to remain 
competitive. Overall, the impact of retail expansion was expected to be mutually beneficial 
to economic development.  
The expectation within developing countries was that retail expansion would contribute to 
their international manufacturing business, which would stimulate economic growth and, by 
extension, their advancement toward a developed country’s standard of living. Hollander’s 
study was less conclusive on this hypothesis, providing early observations on both the 
positive and negative impacts of foreign expansion. Hollander’s conclusions and 
observations provided important perspectives on what would become the focus of 
subsequent research in the field of retail internationalization. The work of Waldman (1978), 
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Goldman (1974, 1981), and Martenson (1981) would build on this foundational knowledge 
of retail foreign activity, formulating frameworks and theories specific to retail 
internationalization in the later part of the twentieth century.  
Waldman’s study in 1978 would raise further discussion on the strategy of foreign entry 
across the standardization and adaptation continuum. Consistent with Hollander and other 
international business research of the 1970s, Waldman saw international expansion as 
playing a positive role in the modernization of host countries and in influencing local 
competition to improve quality of life. His work provided new perspectives on the 
importance of studying the macro impact on the host country and the need for foreign 
retailers to study the local competition and consumer markets as part of a successful market 
entry. Although he based these insights in the traditional perspective of retail as a 
distribution point in the marketing system, Waldman did much to advance the 
considerations of environmental influences on retail success. His findings on acculturation 
and efficient resource allocation explored both the internal needs of the firm and on the 
external pressures of the market environment. 
2.5.4   Perspective Four – The Role of Retail Innovation in Foreign Expansion 
Drawing from both the economic historian’s framework and that of Rogers’ (1995) diffusion 
of innovation theory, Goldman’s research contributions recognized the role of the 
environment in transferring retail concepts from one country to another. Many of the early 
moves for international business development were motivated by the assumption that 
advanced technology or innovative business concepts would be transferable from one 
country to another. Goldman’s research demonstrated the weakness in these assumptions. 
Specifically, he identified the role of the host country in the success of retail technology 
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transfer: the importance of cultural, social, and economic norms must be taken into account 
because they have a significant influence on consumer behavior and form the basis of the 
marketplace for a successful retail entry.  
Furthermore, Martenson’s study significantly contributed to the understanding of what 
happens when a foreign retailer enters a market, in particular its impact on the current 
retailers within the host market. In referencing Hollander and Waldman’s work, Martenson 
observes: “It has been found that when multinational retailers made their first foreign 
expansion, a number of these firms considered their retailing formulas internationally 
appealing” (p. 362). In order to assess this kind of ‘internationally appealing firm’, 
Martenson considered and subsequently discarded several theories, primarily because they 
did not address the dynamics and changes that the entry of a foreign retailer can have on 
the host market. Her research is significant because it marked the first serious consideration 
of the relationship between competitive retail companies: “The combined dynamic model 
does not describe how institutional retail innovations evolve; the model starts its 
descriptions and predictions when the innovating firm has entered the market” (p. 363). The 
model, presented in Figure 2.1, demonstrates Martenson’s propositions of how this 
dynamic would unfold.  
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Figure 2.1 – Interpretation of the Combined Dynamic Model for Different Types of Firms (Martenson, 1981: 
p. 371) 
 
Although the Martenson model is built using a specific company (IKEA) within a specific 
industry – which may limit the effectiveness of this model for other markets, companies, 
and retail categories – the underlying principles of the expansion process and competitive 
structures still have value when applied elsewhere. As noted, “This confirms the need for a 
model which considers both what the innovator does and what retailers and other parties 
on the market do: the combined dynamic model” (p. 374). 
2.6   Foundational Research: Conclusion 
The early stages of research on retail internationalization provided a rich foundation for the 
subsequent study of the patterns and processes involved in retail expansion outside of a 
firm’s home market. Historically, retail has been viewed as a local or national business. 
Initially, the idea that a retail format could be exported successfully to foreign markets was 
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viewed with skepticism by international business theorists. Although retail companies had 
been trading internationally through both sourcing activities and foreign operations, for 
most of the twentieth century these retailers were viewed as anomalies. Nevertheless, 
there was an implicit expectation in the writing of Hollander, Goldman and Waldman that 
retail expansion would result in greater profits, similar to the more established experience 
of manufacturing internationalization. Goldman’s view of economic impact and Waldman’s 
application of marketing theory exemplify these views. Ultimately, the lack of conformity to 
the international business experience would stimulate further research into the unique 
patterns and processes of retail internationalization. During this research period, retail 
continued to be construed as local business on an international scale; to advance, 
researchers required a new understanding of the impact that these developed companies 
would have on local competition, consumers, and the economy in the foreign market. 
Following this foundational research, the focus of subsequent studies shifted to the themes 
of retail innovation in the host country and the role of transferability in internationalization. 
In particular, these two themes were of primary interest to researchers such as Salmon and 
Tordjman (1989), Treadgold (1990), Pellegrini (1994), Burt & Davies (2010), and Helfferich et 
al. (1997). The study of retail innovation and transferability furthered the understanding of 
the patterns of retail internationalization, which would enable researchers to differentiate 
and explain retail success outside of the home country. Researchers were also able to 
identify the roles of innovation and transferability as integral to creating typologies that 
could explain the retail internationalization process. This literature on retail 
internationalization innovation and transferability would lay the foundation for more in-
depth study of the retailers involved in foreign expansion. Most of this research would take 
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the view of the firm, leaving the understanding of impacts on the host country under-
investigated – for the most part implicitly acknowledged but of little interest to these early 
researchers.  
In addition, researchers supported another flawed perspective, assuming that most 
internationalization would take place in developing or less developed retail economies. This 
view appears to be based on the assumption that retailers capable of foreign expansion 
would come from more advanced retail economies. As a result, the study of retailers from 
developed countries expanding to other developed countries has received little attention 
from researchers. This study will address these under-explored areas of retail 
internationalization, specifically to understand the impact of foreign entry on the host 
market in developed countries. 
2.7   Retail Internationalization Patterns and Typologies 
The study of retail internationalization through the 1970s lay the foundation for an early 
examination of what retailer expansion into foreign markets looked like. As might be 
expected the studies were generally observational, focusing on activities of the various retail 
companies. These early forays into retail expansion only applied frameworks or theories 
from other disciplines, primarily the more developed work of international business in the 
manufacturing sector. Since the study of retailing was still a comparatively new area of 
research, it made sense to analyze activities that were seen as new and innovative through 
the lens of innovation diffusion theory. This theory proved useful in research focusing on the 
primary issues facing retailers entering foreign markets. Overall, these early studies 
predominately identified the need for further research that was unique to the retail 
internationalization experience. 
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By the late 1980s, the study of retail internationalization began to identify patterns in 
foreign expansion. Although international growth had continued to escalate during this 
decade, it still remained a relatively small percentage of total retail activity. As such, little 
advancement had been made in structuring specific theories around the activity and process 
of international expansion. This absence of research frameworks became the focus of 
several pivotal studies during the later years of the twentieth century.  
The work of Salmon and Tordjman (1989) is generally recognized as seminal in identifying 
patterns and developing a typology for studying retail internationalization. Other significant 
contributions were made by Treadgold (1988, 1990), Dawson (1994), Pelligrini (1994), Burt 
(1993), and Helfferich (1997). By the late 1990s, the subject had become sufficiently 
important to researchers: McGoldrick and Davies (1995) dedicated a book to the broad 
range of international retailing topics, and Akehurst and Alexander (1995) released a special 
journal issue, which represented significant gains in the academic study of retail 
internationalization.  
2.7.1   The Strategic View  
Salmon and Tordjman (1989) drew upon the existing views of international business that 
had been established in studies of the manufacturing sector. Working from the perspective 
that retail internationalization would follow one of three strategies (foreign investment, 
global expansion, or multinational strategic growth), Salmon and Tordjman’s work provided 
a typology for categorizing the retailers engaged in these activities. Although anchored in 
the perspective of retail as primarily a marketing activity, this seminal work established a 
preliminary typology for understanding key strategic issues in retail internationalization. 
Table 2.1 – International Retail Strategies – effectively structures the patterns that Salmon 
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and Tordjman had identified and provided the framework for categorizing the 
internationalization strategies for specific retail companies.  
 Global Multinational Investment 
Definition Replicate the same formula 
worldwide 
Adapt the formula to local 
conditions 
Transfer of money for 
buying partially or totally 
an existing retail company 
in a foreign country 
Business formats Specialty chains Hypermarkets, department 
stores, variety stores 
Retailers/non-retailers 
operations 
Marketing • Global segmentation 
and global positioning 
• Standardisation of 
marketing mix 
• Uniform assortment, 
price, store design, 
service, advertising 
• Reproduction of the 
concept but adaptation 
of the content 
• Adaptation of 
marketing mix 
• Similar worldwide 
definition of store 
decor, price strategy, 
service strategy 
• Adjustment of 
assortment and 
advertising strategies 
No real marketing 
implications 
Organisational 
implications 
Vertical integration of design 
function, production process, 
distribution system 
Multidomestic approach Portfolio of foreign 
operations 
Management 
Implications 
• Centralised 
management 
• Excellent information 
system 
• Rapid capacity to 
growth 
• Large economies of 
scale 
• Very little transfer of 
know-how 
• Decentralised 
management 
• Frequent 
communications with 
HQ 
• Average capacity to 
growth 
• No economies of scale 
• Important transfer of 
know-how 
• Partially controlled 
management 
• Fast international 
expansion 
• Lower risk 
• Transfer of skills 
Table 2.1 – International Retail Strategies (Salmon & Tordjman, 1989: p. 12) 
 
In 1989, retailers such as Toys R’Us and Benetton operated as global strategists, taking their 
strong retail format and opening a standardized version in foreign countries. By comparison, 
Carrefour and C&A, equally dominant retailers in their own right, implanted autonomous 
affiliates in foreign countries and are thus defined by Salmon and Tordjman as a 
multinational strategy. Within this typology, the international foreign investment strategy – 
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a practice drawn from manufacturing theory – was assigned to companies such as Vendex 
and Promodes, which suggested a turning point from traditional international business 
model structures. One might argue that international foreign investment by retailers is likely 
another form of multinational strategy within this typology, based on diversifying risk and 
acquiring knowledge on international markets. 
Salmon and Tordjman (1989) advance certain strategies based on this typology, positioning 
them amongst the first researchers to provide a framework that could be applied to 
decision-making in foreign retail expansion. 
2.7.2   The Temporal Dimension  
Advances in understanding retail internationalization were furthered through the work of 
Treadgold (1988). International retailers were organized into types, or clusters, as visually 
demonstrated in Treadgold’s typology (see Figure 2.3). Treadgold identified four distinctive 
clusters: The Cautious Internationalists, The Emboldened Internationalists, The Aggressive 
Internationalists, and The World Powers. Each of these categories were defined 
predominately based on the basis of their mode of entry and operational style.  
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Figure 2.2 – A Typology of Transnational Retailers (Treadgold, 1988: p.10) 
 
Treadgold’s typology focuses on the temporal element to global expansion. Based on 
underlying assumptions that the global market was increasingly fluid with fewer barriers to 
market penetration and more convergence of consumers, innovative retailers would move 
from cautious to emboldened to aggressive over time. This provided Treadgold with a 
predictive structure to the model that build on international experience. Only the fourth 
cluster of world power retailers were seen as operating in a different realm, which would be 
investigated in-depth in future research. 
2.7.3  The Managerial Perspective  
The work of Pellegrini (1994) continued to form typologies for the patterns of retail 
internationalization. Focusing on retail foreign expansion as a strategic growth decision, 
Pellegrini identified a level of decision-making and resource allocation by the firm that had 
not been thoroughly investigated in prior typologies. Grounded in the view of the 
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organization as having specific proprietary retail knowledge, Pellegrini proposes that retail 
internationalization is predominately a managerial decision process of advancing product 
diversification, geographical diversification, or some combination of both. As detailed in his 
typology, the paths to retail growth can be organized around the following diversification 
strategies: 
 
Figure 2.3 – Paths to growth (Pellegrini, 1994: p. 125) 
 
 
Figure 2.4 – Paths for growth in retailing (Pellegrini, 1994: p. 126) 
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Similar to previous studies, Pellegrini draws heavily on the role of innovation in explaining 
retail foreign expansion. His typology offers new insights in the types of decision-making 
processes that might be considered part of the internationalization strategy. In addition, the 
product/geographic options identify many more expansion alternatives than have been 
previously discussed. His research demonstrates that the totality of the international 
expansion strategy is proactive, taking into account the firm, its innovative advantages, as 
well as the opportunities in various markets. However, its foundation in marketing strategy 
creates some limitations to the broader issues of the international business of retailing.  
2.7.4  A Combined Typology for Retail Internationalization 
The final research to be discussed here is the work of Helfferich, Hinfelaar and Kasper 
(1997). Almost thirty years after the seminal work of Hollander (1970), the work of these 
three researchers marks an important point in the study of retail internationalization. While 
much of the research to date has built typologies drawn from international business theory, 
academic discussions have increasingly challenged the applicability of these models for 
understanding the retail experience. Dawson (1994), Sparks (1996), and Akehurst and 
Alexander (1995) are amongst the researchers that challenged the limitations of established 
business theory in analyzing the internationalization of retail.  
Helfferich, Hinfelaar and Kasper (1997) set out to clarify the discussions that had taken place 
and proposed new definitions and classification system to move the study of retail 
internationalization forward. To this end, Helfferich et al. (1997) proposed a typology 
through Tables 2.2 and 2.3: 
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 International (in a 
narrow sense) 
Global Transnational Multinational 
Geographic scope 1 continent 2 or more 
continents 
1 or more 
continents 
1 or more 
continents 
Cultural spread 1 cultural zone 2 or more cultural 
zones 
2 or more cultural 
zones 
2 or more cultural 
zones 
Cultural 
orientation 
Ethnocentric Mixed Geocentric Polycentric 
Marketing Expansion of home 
format or int. 
alliances 
Minimal 
adaptation, 
homogenous 
markets 
Medium 
adaptation, 
heterogeneous 
markets 
Major adaptation or 
diverse formats, 
heterogeneous 
markets 
Management Domestic HQ Centralized control Integrated network Independent units 
Table 2.2 – Five parameters of international retailing (Helfferich et al., 1997: p.303) 
International: beginners 
or slow developers 
Global: fast developers 
or inimitable niche 
Transnational: 
accumulators of 
experience 
Multinational: portfolio 
managers 
• Free Record Shop 
• Blokker 
• Hunkemoller 
• Halfords 
• Hennes & Mauritz 
• IKEA 
• McDonald’s 
• Benetton 
• Toys ‘R Us 
• Shell 
• Aldi 
• Louis Vitton 
• C&A 
• The Body Shop 
• Marks and Spencer 
• Spar 
• Makro 
• Carrefour 
• BATA 
• Schlecker 
• KBB 
• Vendex 
• Ahold 
• Tengelmann 
• Delhaize le Lion 
Table 2.3 – Illustration of proposed new classification system (Helfferich et al., 1997: p.303) 
 
Helfferich, Hinfelaar and Kasper (1997) attempted to encompass the full scope of 
investigations that had been undertaken to create a normative structure with the potential 
to advance the understanding of retail internationalization. This research included aspects 
of Treadgold’s clusters, as well as the increasingly common usage of the terms global, 
transnational, multinational, and international. The study also looked to integrate the 
managerial, marketing and cultural considerations of the internationalization process. This 
classification system highlighted the complexity of the subject and stated the need to 
consider both the temporal and spatial aspects of retail internationalization. 
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2.8   Furthering the Discussion on Retail Internationalization 
The study of retail internationalization had arrived at a new level of development by the 
mid-1990s. The publication of texts such as McGoldrick and Davies (1995) and special issues 
of academic journals devoted to the subject highlighted the interest and the importance of 
the debate and discussion. The McGoldrick and Davies (1995) book highlighted works by 
Burt (1995) on evolution of theory and practice, McGoldrick and Blair (1995) on market 
positioning, Sparks (1995) on reciprocal internationalization, and Davies (1995) on legislative 
environments – all of which pointed to the increasing complexity of the retail 
internationalization process. Akehurst and Alexander (1995) turned the discussion to the 
internationalization process and marked the threat of marginalization for those retailers 
that did not take on the international imperative. In particular, in the mid- to late-1990s, 
academic research identified two significant turning points in the research: 
1. Retail internationalization had become the study of operational expansion into 
foreign markets 
2. The relevance of traditional international business models had come under attack 
and the movement toward formalizing retail models was evolving  
Leading up to the mid-1990s, the patterns of retail internationalization demonstrated some 
important changes in flow of international activity. There is general consensus from 
academics that United States retailers were the early entrants to internationalization, 
proving to be the more dynamic and innovative forces (Akehurst & Alexander, 1995). Sears 
Roebuck and Woolworths symbolized the early expansion into foreign markets. In addition, 
the innovation of self-service systems in grocery retailing was developed in the United 
States in the 1940s and translated to the UK by Sainsbury and to Japan by Kotobukiya in 
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1950. Later research would provide more substantial analysis of when and why the 
American retail companies became less engaged in international expansion. For example, 
studies by Vida, Reardon and Fairhurst (2000), Sternquist (1997), and Muniz-Martinez 
(1998) each contributed to the understanding of international activity between the U.S. and 
Europe. Yet perhaps no work is more comprehensive in reviewing the state of global 
retailing during this foundational period than Kacker (1986). His study bridged the 
perspectives of retailer as economic catalyst and the then-current trend of foreign entry 
into the U.S., providing thoughtful consideration of the complexity of ‘Coming to Terms with 
Global Retailing’ (Kacker, 1986). 
Starting in the 1960s, the level of activity in foreign expansion from the UK and European 
retailers increased dramatically, which shifted the focus of academic study to European 
academics. By the time much of the research in the later part of the 1980s to mid-1990s was 
written, the balance of activity was clearly in the retail internationalization of European and 
UK retailers. Kacker (1985) study of Transatlantic trends in retailing was amongst the early 
works to investigate this trend in direction of foreign expansion. Subsequently it was noted 
by Salmon and Tordjman (1989): “In 1985, Europeans invested $5.55 billion in American 
retailing, in contrast to the $2.5 billion invested by Americans in European retailing” (p. 13). 
Dawson (2007) further substantiates this trend with data showing Europeans significantly 
outpacing U.S. retailers in the percentage of sales coming from foreign operations: 26.0% of 
European sales in 2004 compared to 10.4% for North American companies and 9.1% for Asia 
Pacific retailers (p. 379). A lack of knowledge and analysis of what was happening in this 
market coincided with the shift to European based activity, leaving a gap in how North 
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American retailers might vary from the European experience and perspective. This study 
looks to address this research gap.  
By the 1980s, the study of retail foreign expansion had provided a foundation for 
understanding activities involved in establishing business outside of the home country. The 
research of retail internationalization was evolving with the growth of these activities and 
those involved in its study began to formulate important considerations for how foreign 
expansion might be defined. The main finding of the research reviewed in this chapter 
identified the shift away from utilizing traditional international business theory to study 
retail internationalization. The early formulation of new typologies and frameworks 
facilitated the advancement of new understandings of what happens in the processes and 
operations of retailers entering foreign markets, which ultimately distinguished it from 
other international business models. As noted by Salmon and Tordjman (1989): “the 
internationalization of retailing is not a new phenomenon, but it remains partial and 
marginal” (p. 3). The research that would progress from this early foundational work would 
significantly address this gap in knowledge. Chapter 3 will review this progression and lead 
to the potential for areas of study that require further exploration. 
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Chapter 3 – Literature Review of Retail 
Internationalization, Processes, and Operations 
3.1   Overview 
The pace and degree of retail internationalization continued to accelerate during the later 
part of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. The academic study of 
international business has closely followed this trend. Building on the foundational research 
reviewed in Chapter 2, this chapter will address more recent thinking on retail 
internationalization to investigate the question: what is the impact of retail 
internationalization? 
In order to arrive at this point, Chapter 3 will consider more specific aspects of foreign retail 
expansion. The areas of review will include: 
• Motives for retail international expansion: Drawing on research that generally 
views the motives for retail internationalization as either reactive or proactive, this 
chapter will investigate the driving force of growth and profits, supported by 
innovative retail concepts.  
• Processes for the selection of host countries: The growth potential within a foreign 
market, as well as psychic and cultural distance, is an important factor in selecting a 
country for expansion, particularly in early internationalization moves.  
• Processes for determining the mode of entry: Considerations of the level of risk and 
the degree of control dominate the study of entry mode, providing further insight 
into the standardization-adaptation strategies of foreign expanding retailers. 
• Knowledge and knowledge transfer: Research found that the role of experience and 
the advancement of information and communication technologies supported the 
rapid evolution of retail internationalization transfer, facilitating improvements in 
both domestic and foreign operations. 
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• Brand and brand transfer: The study of brand transfer provides significant insight 
into the more complex issues of the standardization-adaptation decisions that 
retailers make, particularly as they apply to store image and market positioning. 
• Discontinuity and continuity: As retail internationalization has grown and matured, 
the study of retailer’s strategic decisions related to expansion and divestment of 
foreign operations has become important. 
Collectively, these components have become viewed as the retail internationalization 
process. This is a significant departure from the foundational studies in foreign retail 
expansion, which generally limited its focus to the activity of international movement. In 
this study, construing retail internationalization as a process provides a more holistic 
perspective, which is necessary to build frameworks and theories that provide an 
understanding of the overall business strategy. To a large extent the process requires a 
temporal context: researchers have extensively examined multiple retailers over several 
decades, which has allowed the process to become more fully understood (Burt, 1993). 
With researchers developing insights in the retail internationalization process, interest in 
conceptualizing this process has also grown. In much the same manner as the foundational 
research attempted to draw from the more established international business theories and 
concepts, academics proposing conceptualization of the retail internationalization process 
have engaged in similar discussions. A review of these considerations is presented here, as it 
is useful to provide a context for the more detailed review of the research on the retail 
internationalization process that will follow. 
3.2   Conceptualizing the Retail Internationalization Process 
As the study of retail internationalization proliferated in the 1990s, academic researchers 
attempted to explain the processes and mechanisms for foreign expansion. On two ends of 
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the approach to this discussion are Vida and Fairhurst (1998) and Sternquist (1997), who 
advanced models to explain retail internationalization, drawing from the work of 
international business theorists such as Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (1981, 1988) and 
Dawson (1994). Sternquist (1997) attempted to develop an approach for explaining the 
retail internationalization process through the integrated Strategic International Retail 
Expansion (SIRE) model, which provided some limited insight into retailers’ strategic 
decision-making and the potential outcomes within the internationalizing process. Vida and 
Fairhurst (1998) attempted to conceptualize the retail internationalization process through 
their identification of promoters and inhibitors to retail foreign expansion. Alternatively, 
Dawson (1994) employs a more fundamental look at the retail business model to 
understand how the process will unfold in a unique retail context, warning researchers that 
manufacturing-based international business theory has it limitations in explaining retail and 
its international expansion.  
It is significant that all three of these studies arrive at comparatively similar observations: 
retail internationalization is a complex and reiterative process with both internal firm and 
managerial forces as well as external environmental forces, all of which play important roles 
in the outcomes. These findings are repeated throughout the literature on retail 
internationalization processes. More recent research by Burt, Davies, Dawson and Sparks 
(2008) continues to reinforce the complexity and reiterative process of internationalization:  
There is an inherent assumption in most existing academic interpretations of 
business outcomes, that strategy is coherent, consistent, and linear, and that the 
observed patterns in activities are clear and pre-determined. These overviews of 
three European grocery chains show how contested, punctuated and complex the 
internationalisation process is (Burt et al., 2008: p. 91).  
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The work of Alexander and Myers (2000) can be seen as an attempt to bring the opposing 
views of Dawson (1994), Sternquist (1997), and Vida and Fairhurst (1998) into a conceptual 
synthesis of the retail internationalization process, which is exemplified in Figure 3.1 and 
Figure 3.2 from the Alexander and Myers study: 
 
Figure 3.1 – Market Internationalization (Alexander & Myers, 2000: p. 343) 
 
Alexander and Myers (2000) draw from both figures in an attempt to conceptualize the 
retail internationalization process. This research further develops the need to understand 
retail foreign expansion beyond the firm’s perspective, as “the process of retail 
internationalisation has to be viewed not only as a company-based management process 
but as a market-based process” (Alexander & Myers, 2000: p. 341). Incorporating the 
market perspective into this conceptualization of internationalization, these researchers put 
out a call for more research on the impact on the host market, which must be considered to 
fully understand the retail internationalization process. 
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Figure 3.2 – Operational internationalization (Alexander & Myers, 2000: p. 345) 
 
3.3   Motives for Retail Internationalization Expansion 
As retail internationalization accelerated through recent decades, the study of the motives 
for expansion into foreign markets took on greater importance. There are several key 
studies that explored the underlying motives for retail internationalization, including the 
work of Pellegrini (1992), Treadgold and Davies (1988), Kacker (1985, 1988), Williams 
(1992), Alexander (1990), and Vida (2000). In addition to studying the activities of retail 
companies expanding into foreign markets, these studies explored the antecedents to 
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international growth and attempted to interpret the motivational factors for expanding 
outside a company’s domestic market. 
In more recent retail internationalization research, the focus on motives for foreign 
expansion by retailers has tended to be less dominant, giving way to the evolving interest in 
aspects of the process (such as brand and knowledge transfer) or the experiences of 
companies that halt expansion after failing company expectations. It might be argued that 
the more relevant question at this point in the evolution of retail internationalization would 
be: why have some large retailers not been motivated to expand outside their domestic 
market?  
While not directly addressing this question, the recent work of Evans, Bridson, Byrom and 
Medway (2008), and Dawson (2007) have focused on whether retailer motives for foreign 
expansion have changed. The answer appears to be that the desire for growth and profit are 
still the dominant motivators, however, there still are not any defined strategies that 
guarantee expansion to another country will produce profitable growth – a lesson that 
many retailers have learned over the years. Yet the research on motives for retail 
internationalization provides useful insights into what drives specific companies to believe 
they will succeed in foreign markets. 
3.3.1   NAFTA, the EU and Other Factors Paving the Way for Retail Internationalization 
The accelerated pace of retail internationalization in the second half of the twentieth 
century was enabled by the world advancing into a global marketplace. Notably, much of 
this academic research pointed to three factors that can be credited with developing an 
environment able to support this increase in global expansion: 
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1. The trade agreements between developed nations: in North America in 1989 and 
the European Union in 1992 (Alexander, 1996) 
2. The pursuit of foreign markets for sourcing of production (Swoboda, Foscht & 
Cliquet, 2008) 
3. The information and communication technologies (ICT) revolution (Dawson, 2000). 
As summarized by Williams (1992): 
These activities have been fostered by the growing similarity of certain global market 
segments, trends and lifestyles; the emergence of international economic unions; a 
lessening of the traditional obstacles associated with RI; the increasing dominance, 
concentration and constraints on retailers in certain domestic markets; technological 
advances in communication, transport and distribution; the international flow of 
retail techniques, institutions and “know-how”; the globalization of suppliers; the 
rise of global sourcing by retailers; the increased professionalism of senior 
management; the enterprising individuals prepared to pursue international 
opportunities (p. 269). 
The specific motivations would vary for each firm, but there were an increasing range of 
incentives for retail internationalization leading into the 1990s. 
3.3.2   Proactive versus Reactive Retailers 
In response to the push-pull arguments for international growth, which were common in 
academic literature in the 1990s, Williams’ studies (1992) of UK retailers provided a 
structure for identifying and analyzing the relative significance of motivations for retail 
internationalization. Drawing from the earlier work of Alexander (1990), Williams provided 
empirical data to support the arguments that retail internationalization was primarily a 
proactive process, pursued as a strategic process for increased revenues and profits. Thus, 
driven by a business growth goal and the belief that they have developed an internationally 
appealing offering (Martenson, 1981; Waldman 1974; Hollander, 1970), retail 
internationalization has been predominately construed as a proactive decision for those 
companies involved. 
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Alexander’s (1990) study of motives for UK expansion tends to diverge from the push-pull 
literature, particularly when studying the American market. There is general recognition 
that U.S. retailers have been, as Alexander states, “a hot house of retail innovation” (p. 75), 
however, they have been more content to stay at home and maximize the potential of the 
vast U.S. market for growth and profits. This tendency of American retail has been an 
important distinction between the perspectives of UK and European (EU) retail and 
American retail: UK and EU retailers are more global-oriented, while U.S. retailers have 
focused on home or nearby markets, often venturing no further than North American 
neighbours. This research challenged what had originally been considered a globally 
important motivator: academics determined that the push factor or reactive decision-
making, which was caused by a saturated or declining domestic market, has a limited or no 
role in international expansion decision-making. The evidence of retailers continuing to 
expand within their domestic market and engaging in retail internationalization further 
supports the view that push factors play a secondary role in motivating retail foreign 
expansion. 
3.3.3   Retail Know-How Transfer 
Much of the research on retailers engaged in internationalization has identified the 
relationship between foreign expansion and innovative retail concepts. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the early foundational assessment of retail internationalization, such as 
Martenson (1981), examined companies through the view of innovative business practice. 
On a certain level, most foreign expansion has been viewed as an innovative process, as the 
number of companies engaged in the activity is relatively few compared to the total number 
of retailers. Specifically, the early work of Kacker (1985, 1988) began research which 
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advanced the understanding of retailing know-how and its role in the retail 
internationalization process. 
Kacker (1988) has been recognized by many researchers as a milestone in understanding the 
motives for international expansion. Kacker (1988) notes: “new innovations in retailing tend 
to flow across nations as pressures build on both sides – the supplier country where the 
innovation starts and the user country. Pressures may be created from within or may come 
from the outside environment” (p. 58). Kacker’s argument states that retailing know-how 
can be found in two forms (managerial and technical), can be either planned or unplanned, 
and is significantly influenced by the environment. Kacker also observed that a greater 
understanding of the criteria that determines a retail concept’s transferability would prove 
to be relevant over twenty years later. 
3.3.4   Motives for Retail Internationalization in the Twenty-first Century 
A study by Evans, Bridson, Byrom and Medway (2008) examined 12 UK and U.S. retailers, 
which re-confirmed the motivating factors of growth and profitability as dominant in the 
retail internationalization process. Earlier, Dawson (2001) pursued the notion that prior 
expansion decisions had been quite ad hoc (without proper strategic analysis) in his study of 
Western European retailers entering Poland. Evans et al. (2008) formally stated that the 
twenty-first century required a “more strategic focus on the transferability of the firm’s core 
competencies” (p. 276). Furthermore, Evans et al. (2008) also found that retailers were 
increasingly focused on the transferability of brand, an extension of the standardization-
adaptation strategies discussed in earlier research such as Treadgold (1988) and Salmon & 
Tordjman (1994). Wigley, Moore and Birtwistle (2005) also provide support for this view 
based on their study of fashion retailers, which demonstrates a significant evolution in the 
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retail internationalization process and will be addressed later in the discussion of brand 
transfer.  
These researchers identified that the motivation for a retail company to enter into the 
internationalization process ultimately depends on the following decisions: where to 
expand, what mode of entry to employ, and how the brand will be transferred. This study 
will explore the extent to which these decisions have an impact on and also depend upon 
the host market, a perspective that has received little attention from researchers in the 
study of the retail internationalization process. 
3.4   Processes for the selection of host countries 
While the understanding of retail internationalization has become more refined through 
academic research, the issue of where retailers have expanded has been viewed as less 
strategic. Some early international retailers were seen to favour geographic proximity such 
as Sears Roebuck’s entry into Mexico and Canada, or IKEA’s early entries into the Swiss, 
Austrian, and German markets (Martenson, 1981). On the other hand, companies such as 
Hudson’s Bay, Woolworths, and Marks & Spencer followed the path of British 
Commonwealth expansion, which assumed cultural similarities would lead to success. 
Academic research into the country-selection process for retail internationalization has 
attempted to bring structure and conceptual understanding to how retailers determine 
where to open foreign operations. Evans and Mavondo (2002) have contributed to the 
empirical assessment of the role of country selection in the internationalization process, 
however, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the process of where to expand has 
been lacking in strategy, which suggests that retail expansion is more opportunistic and 
managerial-driven. 
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3.4.1   Psychic, Cultural, and Business Distance 
The most advanced of the theories related to country selection have drawn from well-
established work to properly understand of cultural distance, specifically Evans, Treadgold 
and Mavondo (2000) and O’Grady and Lane (1997). In addition, Dupuis and Prime (1996) 
were early contributors to the consideration of business distance in their study of country 
selection. Founded in the broader context of international business studies, the work of 
these writers did much to advance a framework for understanding the country-selection 
process. The definition put forth by Evans et al. (2000) helped to explain psychic distance 
while taking into account cultural and business distance: 
On the basis of this review of existing definitions it is proposed that psychic distance 
be defined as the distance between the home market and a foreign market resulting 
from the perception and understanding of cultural and business differences. Such 
business differences may include the legal and political environment, economic 
environment, business practices, language and industry or market sector structure 
(p. 377/8). 
 
Working from this concept of psychic distance, further studies by researchers expanded the 
understanding of the selection process in retail internationalization. In addition to 
explaining the importance of cultural and business compatibility and geographical proximity 
to country choice, psychic distance also revealed a paradox, as pointed out by O’Grady and 
Lane (1997): too much perceived similarity may result in failure, which was the case with 
Canadian and U.S. retailers entering each others’ countries. In particular, with the 
expectation that shared language and perceived cultural characteristics would extend to the 
retail marketplace, Canadian retailers learned quickly that assuming a company could 
transfer standard operating practices from home to the American retail environment would 
result in failure; notable were the entry and exit of Canadian Tire; Dylex Ltd.; and People’s 
Jewellers amongst others. American retailers were also confronted with unanticipated 
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differences in the Canadian market, but proved more capable of adapting to the variances 
given their size, resources, and well developed competitive skills. It is important to note that 
these adjustments are not unique to the North American experience, as companies moving 
within the European Union have also needed to make adaptations for success. 
3.4.2   Some Realities of the Country Selection Process 
As one of the first stages in the retail internationalization process, it is evident from research 
and practice that the selection of country can be based on undeveloped strategies, often 
prompted by managerial enthusiasm for foreign expansion. As previously discussed, these 
decisions have at times been primarily based on ad hoc criteria or opportunism. Thus, it may 
be argued that retail decisions to expand to foreign countries have been subject to vague 
information. Dawson’s study (2001) on western grocery retail entering into Poland supports 
this view, exploring the relationship between a retail companies’ experience and a foreign 
market. Prior experience has a significant effect on the ability of a company to source for 
products and manufacturing, as well as the company’s perceived understanding of the 
global retail market of those countries. Dawson (2004) noted that a familiarity with markets 
that seem attractive due to low cost production does not necessarily provide the knowledge 
necessary to develop a successful retail operation. 
One must also look to several significant trade agreements – such as the Canada-United 
States Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in 1989, NAFTA in 1994, and the European Union 
trade agreement in 1992 – to identify retail internationalization opportunities opening 
between these developed countries. The movement of retail operations between Canada 
and the United States increased significantly after 1989. It has been well documented by 
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O’Grady and Lane (1997), Evans, Lane and O’Grady (1992), and Burns and Rayman (1995) 
that the Canadian retailers did not fare well in their expansion into the U.S. 
3.4.3   Developed, Emerging and Developing Countries 
Even in the earliest studies of retail internationalization, researchers documented expansion 
into both developed and developing countries. Hollander (1970) and Goldman (1974, 1981) 
supported the early assumption that the transfer of retail from one country to another had 
the potential to impact economic development. In developed countries, this would primarily 
manifest as positive development that allowed for more consumer choice, improving the 
operations of domestic retailers through the necessity of maintaining a competitive 
position. In contrast, entry into developing countries was considered by researchers as more 
idealistic, improving the broader economic well-being of the host country – particularly in 
the context of manufacturing and technology expansion into foreign markets.  
Generally speaking, most early international expansion activity took place in developed 
countries; however, this is a research area that has received little explicit study by academic 
researchers. To fill this gap, this study will provide a more substantial understanding of the 
long-term impact of retail internationalization in developed countries. 
3.5  Processes for determining the Mode of Entry 
As previously discussed, retailers have been expanding internationally for many years, with 
significant expansion of retail stores starting in the 1980s. According to Dawson (1994), the 
opening of physical retail formats has had the greatest impact on the international retail 
market. Both Dawson (1994) and Alexander (1995) have documented the diverse and 
complex strategies that retailers have used as they expand globally. These companies have 
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flourished through organic growth or acquisition, as well as increasingly less costly and risky 
entry modes such as franchising, joint ventures, concessions, licenses, distributors, and 
export agents. Specifically, recent research in the study of entry mode focuses on the 
physical entry of brick-and-mortar formats into the foreign markets, which is the area of 
interest in this study.  
In addition, as the majority of retailers that trade in commodities have moved their product 
sourcing outside of the domestic market in search of lower costs, it might be argued that all 
retailers operate within an internationalized retail environment. This has afforded many 
retailers the opportunity to gain knowledge of foreign markets through their supply chain. 
To further understand how knowledge is transferred from host-country to the expanding 
retailer, it will be necessary to explore the broader context of retail internationalization and 
review several examples of entry strategies. 
3.5.1   Non-operational Internationalization – Sourcing, Responsive Internationalization, 
and the Internet 
Retail has always started as a local or national business, built on physical formats with direct 
interaction with the consumer. Thus, the study of retail internationalization has primarily 
focused on the expansion of retail operations, i.e., stores into foreign markets, as discussed 
in Chapter 2. However, various researchers, starting with the early work of Hollander (1970), 
have acknowledged that, in the broader context internationalization, the pursuit of a 
competitive edge has taken retailing into several different forms beyond the store transfer 
process. Dawson (1993) discusses strategies of retail internationalization; Treadgold (1990) 
examines the role of sourcing in retail; Salmon and Tordjman (1989) discuss international 
investment strategies as means to gain foreign retail know-how; and Kacker (1985, 1986) 
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focuses on knowledge transfer from one country to another, both at the managerial and 
technical level.  
In addition, the emerging role of the Internet must be considered when any future 
discussions of market entry are undertaken – as both an informational and commercial 
channel for retailers. In order to gain a thorough understanding of retail expansion, entry 
mode should be examined through both the processes and the know-how that led to the 
success of a particular retailer. 
3.5.2   Mechanisms for Entry Mode and Operation Mode 
Consistent with many aspects of retail internationalization, the study of entry mode 
mechanisms and processes has been evolving over the past several decades through 
Hollander (1970), Treadgold (1988), Burt (1993), Sternquist (1997), Vida and Fairhurst 
(1998), and Dawson (2001). Most of this discussion regarding retailer choice of entry mode 
was observational and positioned with the broader context of internationalization strategy. 
However, there have been more recent studies on specific entry modes by Quinn (1998) and 
Quinn and Alexander (2002), which discussed frameworks for international franchising, as 
well as Girod and Rugman (2005) who studied business networks. Studies by Sparks (1995), 
Burt (1993), Dawson (2001), and Moore, Fernie & Burt (2000) also looked at the unique 
entry experience of specific companies, sectors, or countries. In general, the research on 
entry mode has reflected the diversity of retailer decision-making and operational 
strategies, however, other studies have attempted to analyze the entry mode mechanisms 
through various international business theories. For example, contributions from Doherty 
(1999, 2000) have looked at the application of economics-based internationalization theory 
and agency theory to evaluate retail entry mode decisions. In addition, Gielens and Dekimpe 
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(2001) provide entry mode analysis within the broader assessment of successful retail 
internationalization strategies.  
The most comprehensive research on entry mode to date has been the work of Picot-
Coupey (2006), which provided a framework for operation mode choice. The conceptual 
model proposed by Picot-Coupey (2006) is noteworthy because the study addressed 
multiple theoretical models that have been applied to the study of entry mode within the 
context of the internationalization process, which include: the Uppsala internationalization 
model, Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, transaction cost analysis, network theory, and retail 
research and strategic considerations (p. 217). The study also goes further, exploring the 
impact of global logics on the decision-making process. In addition, Picot-Coupey (2006) 
attempts to provide a set of internal and external variables relevant to the entry mode 
decision, finally developing a framework to consider both entry mode and operation mode. 
This study advanced the understanding of entry mode decisions, linking these processes to 
the temporal context of the internationalization process.  
This final contribution from the Picot-Coupey study has become more significant as retail 
foreign expansion matures and, as previously discussed, knowledge transfer (through 
sourcing and web presence) have increased retail impact. The choice of entry mode at a 
specific point in time is influenced by multiple factors, such as the parent company’s 
structure and financial position, the foreign market’s legislative and economic environment, 
and the strategies of the business. Each of these factors is not static and may influence a 
change in operating mode for foreign operations.  
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3.6   Knowledge and Knowledge Transfer in Retail Internationalization 
The understanding that knowledge creation; sharing; and, transfer take place between 
retailers and a host country is embedded in the study of retail internationalization. For the 
most part, this essential component of the internationalization process has been overlooked 
in favour of studies into the success and failure of international retailers. In general, retailers 
are seen to learn throughout the expansion process, generating skills and ideas based on 
experiences in either the domestic or foreign markets.  
With few exceptions, the study of learning and knowledge transfer has taken place in the 
past twenty years. Earlier studies by Evans, Lane and O’Grady (1992), and O’Grady and Lane 
(1997) provided considerations to the role of knowledge in the successes and failures of 
American and Canadian retailers crossing their border. Similarly, the work of Sternquist 
(1997) and Treadgold (1990) identified the relationship of knowledge and learning to mode 
of entry and international growth. Yet more recent studies have benefitted from the 
improved understanding of the internationalization of retail processes, and as a result have 
explored the more relevant questions of the role of learning and knowledge transfer in 
foreign retail success. 
The work of Palmer and Quinn (2005) is a significant contribution to the study of retail 
learning. Using well-established institutional learning theories, Palmer and Quinn (2005) 
propose an exploratory framework for analyzing international retail learning, providing an 
in-depth understanding of the retail learning process. The study explores several types of 
knowledge acquisition, the diffusion of knowledge within the organization, and multiple 
contexts for learning within the retail internationalization process.  
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Further development of knowledge transfer has primarily been through specific case-study 
research. In their study of IKEA expanding into Russia, Jonsson and Elg (2006) provide 
important insights into the multiple levels that international retailers must engage with. The 
study suggests that, at the individual store level, specific knowledge creation and transfer 
will be required for a successful transition. Additional understanding of knowledge transfer 
within the internationalization process has also been provided through Palmer’s (2005) 
study of Tesco and Wrigley and Currah’s (2003) investigation of Ahold. 
3.6.1   The Early View 
The dominant perspective of retail internationalization has been from the firm’s viewpoint. 
It is therefore understandable that the study of knowledge has focused on the firm’s 
internal learning during internationalization. The foundational research assumed that the 
home country would generate the knowledge necessary to conduct business in foreign 
markets. The work of Treadgold in the early 1990s, while discussed in detail in Chapter 2, is 
worth reiterating in the context of the early research on knowledge transfer in foreign retail 
expansion.  
Fundamentally, Treadgold (1990) clustered retailers engaged in foreign business (or 
planning to engage in foreign expansion) from the perspective that experience creates 
learning, which affords the retailer the knowledge necessary to increase foreign expansion. 
His model further establishes that the pre-disposition to franchising by Treadgold’s cluster 
of ‘The World Powers’ establishes access to host-market knowledge with greater speed and 
at less cost than other forms of market entry. In addition, those retailers who were engaged 
in Treadgold’s ‘Aggressive Internationalists’ cluster, such as IKEA and Toys R’Us, are seen to 
enjoy the benefits of innovative propositions and first mover advantage. Using evidence 
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from the 1970s and 1980s of international expansion, it is reasonable to argue that the 
firm’s experience in foreign markets would be central to gain knowledge for future success 
in internationalization. Yet the mechanisms for knowledge transfer during the initial years 
were limited and managerial authority at the home office remained the dominant style of 
decision-making.  
3.6.2   Information and Communication Advancement 
Dawson (2007) asserts that the “latest stage of retailer internationalisation has been 
facilitated by the presence of the third major fundamental innovation in retailing since the 
1950s – namely, the convergence of information and communication technologies that has 
provided tools and concepts enabling effective management of large networked retail 
firms” (p. 1). As retail internationalization progressed at an increasing pace through the later 
part of the twentieth century, the advancements in information and communication 
technologies (ICT) enabled this growth – predominately through the capacity to transfer 
data, intelligence, and general knowledge in a timely and detailed system. ICT facilitated 
advances in decision-making across all levels of the organization, from supply chain and 
store operations to more informed strategic retail internationalization decisions based on 
factual data (instead of anecdotal reporting). In the past, local retailers in foreign markets 
had a home-field advantage on local market knowledge, but the advancement of ICT 
allowed foreign home offices to increasingly reduce that competitive advantage through 
improved merchandising and service management.  
While access to this information builds significant potential for retailers to elevate their 
impact on the host market, there is currently not enough research to suggest that retailers 
have taken full advantage of this opportunity. It is anticipated that this may be as much of a 
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gap in the study of international retailers as it is a weakness in corporate knowledge 
transfer. Overall, the understanding of the role of knowledge transfer in the impact of 
foreign retailers on a host market is limited and requires further investigation.  
3.7   Brand and Brand Transfer 
The study and application of brand within the retail context is a relatively recent topic of 
research. Product brands have been considered integral to the marketing and advertising 
strategies of manufacturing companies. Initially focused on image and the creative 
expression of a product’s packaging and messaging, more recently the concept of brand has 
encompassed the holistic elements of the product as a whole being. The work of Levitt 
(1983) has been widely referenced in the conceptual development of the brand as a more 
complex entity than originally conceived. As product branding evolved, the importance of 
brand position became a focus of study. Marketing specialists such as Ries and Trout (1981) 
have made significant contributions to this area, providing an analysis of product positioning 
within the broader brand concept. 
During the development of product brand theory in the 1990s, researchers began to 
examine the application of brand theory and concepts, applying their studies to corporate 
entities. Researchers were increasingly interested in the implications of global brand 
strategies as products such as Coke and Nike expanded into international markets. The 
evolution of brand development to corporate image and identity, as well as corporate 
reputation and responsibility, opened the more complex issues of managing the elements of 
brand to include employees, business relationships, and less tangible aspects of the 
corporate business. The work of Burt and Sparks (2002), Hatch & Schultz (2003), Harris and 
de Chernatony (2001), and Ind (1997) explored the concept and application of corporate 
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branding, which created a stable concept for understanding retail branding. While little 
reference is made to retailers in this research on corporate branding, Burt and Sparks (2002) 
draw from the discussion of corporate branding as an alignment of vision and culture to 
analyze corporate branding in retail. 
3.7.1   Retail Brand 
Research into retail brands at both the product and corporate level has been a recent area 
of interest amongst academics. As such, there are only a few studies that explore the 
concept of brand within the retail context. The work of Burt and Sparks (2002) provides an 
important analysis of the brand and corporate brand theory and its potential application for 
retailers. Their adaptation of prior work by Laaksonen & Reynolds (1994) and Dawson 
(2001) in the development of a typology of retail brands is exemplified in Table 3.1: 
 1st generation 2nd generation 3rd generation 4th generation 5th generation 
Branding form Generic; No 
name; Brand 
free; unbranded 
Own label; 
Unsupported 
own brand 
Supported own 
brand 
Extended 
retailer brand, 
i.e., segmented 
retail brands 
Corporate 
brand 
Strategy Generic Low price copy Me-too copy of 
major brands 
Value-added Corporate 
positioning 
Objective Increase 
margins; 
Provide choice 
in pricing 
Increase 
margins; 
Reduce 
manufacturers’ 
power by 
setting the 
entry price; 
Provide better-
value product 
(quality/price) 
Enhance 
category 
margins; 
Expand product 
assortment, i.e., 
customer 
choice; Build 
retailer’s image 
among 
consumers 
Increase and 
retain the 
customer base; 
Enhance 
category 
margins; 
Improve image 
further; 
Differentiation 
Produce strong 
positive 
identity and 
practice; First 
choice for 
consumers; 
Satisfy 
stakeholders 
Product Basic and 
functional 
products; 
Commodities 
Staple or basic 
lines with a 
large volume 
Big category 
products; Major 
sale items 
Image-forming 
product groups; 
Large number 
of products 
with small 
volume (niche) 
The 
corporation 
and its tangible 
and intangible 
attributes  
Technology Simple 
production 
process and 
basic 
technology 
Technology 
lagging behind 
market leaders 
Close to the 
brand leader 
Innovative 
technology and 
processes 
Stakeholder 
relationship 
management 
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Quality/Image Lower quality 
and inferior 
image 
compared with 
the 
manufacturers’ 
brands 
Medium quality, 
but still 
perceived as 
lower than 
leading 
manufacturers’ 
brands; 
Secondary 
brand alongside 
the leading 
manufacturer’s 
brand 
Comparable 
with the brand 
leaders 
Same or better 
than brand 
leader; 
Innovative and 
different 
products from 
brand leaders 
Quality and 
consistency 
throughout the 
organization 
Price position 20% or more 
below the 
brand leader 
10-20% below 5-10% below Equal or higher 
than known 
brand 
Focus on 
delivering value 
Consumers’ 
motivation to 
buy 
Price is the main 
criterion for 
buying 
Price is still 
important 
Both quality 
and price, i.e., 
value for money 
Better and 
unique 
products 
Trust 
Supplier National, not 
specialized 
National, partly 
specializing to 
own label 
manufacturing 
National, 
mostly 
specializing for 
own brand 
manufacturing 
International, 
manufacturing 
mostly own 
brands 
Innovative 
partnerships 
Table 3.1 – A typology of retail brands (Burt & Sparks, 2002: p. 198) 
 
This table represents a significant advancement of hierarchy and evolution for the product 
and corporate brand. Burt and Sparks (2002) highlight the fundamental differences between 
retail operation and other business types, and demonstrate how retail companies can make 
brand identity far more complex. Two significant statements from the 2002 study support 
the importance of branding and identity in retail: “We believe that such differences 
complicate corporate branding, in particular, by placing pressure on the ability to maintain 
consistency and coherence of the brand” (p. 197), and “Retailers are reliant on employees at 
the store level to portray the requisite identity and values of the business” (p. 201). There 
are significant challenges when a domestic retailer expands the retail brand into foreign 
markets, which cannot be adequately conveyed through product brand and corporate brand 
strategies. Thus, this study will attempt to examine retail brand transfer in the context of 
the retail internationalization research. 
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3.7.2   Brand Transfer 
The early academic studies on retail internationalization paid little attention to the idea of 
retailers transferring their brand identity into foreign markets, however, Waldman (1978) 
provides some preliminary observations based on his marketing theory approach to 
studying success and failure of internationalizing retailers. The process of brand transfer 
within the retail internationalization process was not properly understood until the studies 
by McGoldrick (1998) of Marks & Spencer’s internationalization, followed by Burt & 
Carralero-Encinas (2000) study of Marks & Spencer into Spain, and Burt & Mavrommatis’ 
(2006) research of Dia’s entry into Greece. These studies demonstrate the principles of 
Salmon & Tordjman’s (1989) standardization and adaptation strategic continuum: strategic 
decisions are evident in the overall process of internationalization, particularly in the 
transfer of brand from the home market to host markets. 
In the twentieth century, there are relatively few retailers that could be viewed as global 
brands. IKEA is one of the few original brick-and-mortar retailers to retain a highly 
standardized international expansion. Luxury high-end designer labels – as well as dominant 
brands such as Nike and Apple that built their businesses as product brands but eventually 
become corporate brands – added retail operations to their brand mix, which have had 
relative success in retaining their global brands (Moore, Fernie & Burt, 2000). While retailers 
such as Benetton, Body Shop, McDonalds, and the GAP have attempted to maintain a 
standardized brand in foreign countries, they have all learned that adaptation is required to 
be successful in different cultures and competitive environments. Certainly the challenges of 
brand transfer have not been lost on large multi-national players such as Walmart in 
Germany, Home Depot in Chile, and more recently Uniqlo in the UK and Tesco in the USA.  
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Research into international retail brand transfer has tended to focus on the elements or 
dimensions that constitute the overall retail brand. Specifically, image and positioning are 
identified as key factors in understanding the retail brand within the home market, which 
has a significant effect on whether a brand successfully transfers to foreign host markets. 
This process of brand transfer has relevance to this thesis, as the entry of a new competitive 
entity has the potential to impact the overall positioning of competitors in the market, as 
well as the position of the foreign retailer. The work of Davies (2001) provides useful 
insights when analyzing the importance of positioning and image within a market category. 
Furthermore, Burt and Carralero-Encinas (2000) provide a strong argument for 
understanding the role of tangible and intangible dimensions in the formation of a retail 
image.  
This study draws on the work of Lindquist (1974), which lists nine attributes of successful 
retail that comprise store image: merchandise, service, clientele, physical facilities, 
convenience, promotion, store atmosphere, institutional factors, and post-transaction 
satisfaction. In this early study, Lindquist was looking for gaps in public perceptions of these 
attributes, which pointed to differences between the home and host markets. Yet the 
significance of the brand transfer process would become more pronounced in the context of 
Burt & Carralero-Encinas (2000), which asserted that well executed retail image was a 
competitive advantage. As previously discussed, one of the primary motivators for retail 
internationalization is the firm’s belief that its innovative offering has a competitive 
advantage. Thus, successful brand transfer is necessary for successful internationalization. 
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3.7.3   Brand Image and Brand Positioning 
The subsequent work of Burt & Mavrommatis (2006) offers much needed insight into the 
role of image and positioning in the transfer of brand. Burt & Mavrommatis (2006) argue 
that brand image is a consumer perspective, while brand position is a management 
perspective: both are distinct but related constructs within the brand transfer process. They 
also claim that the consumer perceptions of image are relative to the competition and will 
change over time with the introduction of new formats. These are extremely relevant 
factors in the brand transfer process, as they speak to the dynamics of the market and the 
relative nature of the retail brand to its home and foreign host markets. Of significance is 
the important distinction these authors made between image and position: “whether to 
seek standardization in store brand image or to standardize brand position” (Burt & 
Mavrommatis, 2006: p. 410).  
Within the context of this study, this question of brand transfer has a direct role in the 
impact on the host market – a perspective not yet covered in the process of retail brand 
transfer research. To the extent that an international firm standardizes or adapts its brand 
to the host market, this research may have significant implications for the success of the 
firm and its impacts on the foreign host market. 
3.8   Retail Continuity and Discontinuity 
To advance research on the retail internationalization process, researchers began to 
examine more specific mechanisms and processes for decision-making, motives, market 
entry, mode of entry, knowledge transfer, and brand transfer. Burt, Dawson and Sparks 
(2003) state that there are obvious reasons why the study of retail foreign expansion, and in 
fact business internationalization in general, has focused on looking at success: “failure itself 
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is difficult to ‘pin-down’” (p. 357). Often taking the form of divestment or the sale of foreign 
operations to other companies, the mechanisms that cause a company to divest, 
restructure, or ultimately exit an unsuccessful foreign market are as complex as the 
internationalization process itself.  
Although early researchers such as Hollander (1970) and Goldman (1978) make reference to 
international retail failure, research tended to be more interested in understanding and 
predicting the contributors to success. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, several 
significant international retailers had either proactively or reactively reversed their foreign 
expansion – such as Ahold pulling out of China, Marks & Spencer closing their international 
stores, Toys R’ Us withdrawing from France, Walmart from Germany, and Home Depot from 
Chile – which resulted in research that focused on understanding the what, why, and how of 
these regressive moves.  
An understanding of the process of continuity and discontinuity in retail internationalization 
has been advanced in the research of Burt, Dawson and Sparks (2003), Alexander, Quinn 
and Cairns (2005), Bianchi and Arnold (2004), Benito (1997), and Jackson, Mellahi and 
Sparks (2004) amongst others. Just as early studies of internationalization focused on 
describing, explaining, and eventually conceptualizing the mechanics and processes for 
foreign retail expansion, the more recent study of discontinuity has followed a similar 
trajectory: the challenges and threats that deter retail expansion can be recognized and 
addressed to achieve internationalization success, helping companies reassess the processes 
and strategies employed by retailers in initiating foreign expansion.  
The complexity of activity during retail expansion – amplified by the lack of formal business 
structure and decision-making strategies – has been one of the major challenges to 
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constructing theories and predictive models in the internationalization process. The 
potential weaknesses of these omissions are made apparent in the outcomes once foreign 
expansion has taken place. In their study of international divestment activity between 1987 
and 2003, Alexander, Quinn and Cairns (2005) observed an accelerated rate of divestment 
by companies operating in a market for less than three years (from 34.9% to 65.1%) (p. 12). 
This study of divestment provides relevant data to the understanding of discontinuity, 
highlighting the variances across countries, size of business, and sector, as well as identifying 
some of the characteristics of the complex nature of failure. 
3.8.1   Learning from Those Who Have Gone Before 
During the past ten years, a few significant studies have attempted to provide insights into 
the cause for retail failure. In much the same way that early research focused on studying 
the activities of a group of retailers, the early research on failure has also tracked specific 
cases. Burt, Dawson and Sparks (2004) studied the European Grocery retailers and provided 
important insight into the extent of failure (44%), time frames for failure (4 to 6 years), and 
the relationship of failure to mode of entry, which was also examined in the work of 
Sternquist (1998), Gielens & Dekimpe (2001) and Palmer and Quinn (2007) in their 
investigation of Ahold. Specifically, the case-study example of Ahold helped identify the 
complexity of the international failure process and the role of market conditions on retail 
performance and managerial decision-making. Bianchi and Ostale (2006) add further insight 
into the role of market conditions, as well as supplier responses and pressures from 
domestic firms versus the foreign retailer.  
As a case-study example, Marks & Spencer has received considerable attention by Jackson, 
Mellahi and Sparks (2004), Mellahi, Jackson and Sparks (2002), and Alexander and Quinn 
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(2002). As a high-profile participant in retail foreign expansion, Marks & Spencer’s exit 
decisions, causes for failure, and pre- and post-withdrawal strategies have provided 
important perspectives on the study of international discontinuity. A comparatively 
aggressive and early mover into the internationalization game, Marks & Spencer’s exit is 
particularly significant for the role that a struggling developed company played in decision-
making on both the domestic and foreign fronts. Studied in depth by Mellahi, Jackson and 
Sparks (2002), the internal failure of the organization to meet external realities led to the 
ultimate divestment of much of Marks & Spencer’s international operations. Mellahi, 
Jackson and Sparks (2002) summarized the failure succinctly in their study:  
We believe that the crisis was triggered by external factors, in particular the changed 
environment of the 1990s. Overall however, our findings provide evidence for the 
importance of the internal factors. The crisis was a result of the company’s 
vulnerability, created both by management’s misperceptions of their capabilities and 
the situation, and also their improper response to external forces. Management had 
neither the vision nor the will to respond to external forces and thus initially avoid 
decline or later to reverse the downward spiral. These findings lend credence to the 
OS perspective that the way management react to and manage external changes are 
key in understanding the causes of crisis (Mellahi et al., 2002: p. 25). 
Alexander and Quinn (2002) provide further evidence of the Marks & Spencer failure of 
management in its strategy of retail foreign expansion. The expansion strategy of Marks & 
Spencer – first into Canada from 1972 to 1999, followed by the entry into Europe, the U.S., 
and Asia through the 1980s and 1990s – was too repetitive, creating similar outcomes and 
eventual divestment that are important lessons for any company engaged in retail 
internationalization. The inability of Marks & Spencer to understand their operations and 
brand as they related to the host markets is a textbook example of the standardization-
adaptation strategy debate. 
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More recent examples of the challenges in foreign expansion continue to highlight the 
efforts by retailers to sustain foreign operations while weighing the options of discontinuity. 
Tesco’s entry into the U.S., long anticipated and by most accounts strategically well 
considered, has not met the performance expectations set by the company. Tesco has since 
taken a period of reassessment to consider the viability of future expansion. In recent years, 
other well-established international retailers such as the GAP and Starbucks have 
undertaken renewal and repositioning of their brands and operations. While external 
economic factors have been in play, in both cases the relationship of these companies 
within their domestic markets and foreign markets have changed – and not necessarily in 
unison. The GAP and Starbucks represent the companies that are working through the 
issues of discontinuity in order to avoid exiting their foreign operations completely. 
3.8.2   The Continuity-Discontinuity Continuum 
Discontinuity in the retail internationalization process has been studied from a different 
perspective in Dawson’s (2007) work on conceptualizing retail foreign expansion. While his 
focus is not directly on the issue of divestment, Dawson (2007) makes an effort to follow 
“the strategy of expansion into many countries [where] there is increasing evidence of the 
very large firms seeking to consolidate their positions and build market share in key 
markets” (p. 381-382). The strategic decision by some retailers to exit foreign countries 
where returns do not meet expectations represents a different type of divestment than 
previously observed. As retail internationalization continues to escalate and companies 
become more knowledgeable and experienced in the process, it is reasonable to anticipate 
greater attention to resource allocation decisions for return on investment. This would 
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naturally lead to exiting less productive operations in much the same way as retailers now 
exit less productive domestic stores and markets. 
3.8.3   The Process of Opportunity and Discontinuity 
These insights into individual retailers and their divestment of foreign operations have led 
academics to better understand the processes of international opportunity and 
discontinuity. To date, there is relatively limited study of this topic due to the view of 
internationalization as a static event rather than a dynamic process, which was asserted by 
Jackson et al. (2004). However, other recent research has begun to define and conceptualize 
what failure in retail internationalization looks like as a process. The work of Burt, Dawson 
and Sparks (2003) represents a turning point in the academic research into retail failure. In 
an effort to bring stability to the subject matter and open the discussion for further study, 
Burt et al. (2003) laid the foundation for contributing studies by Alexander et al. (2005), 
Palmer and Quinn (2007), Bianchi and Ostale (2006), and Etgar and Rachman-Moore (2007, 
2008).  
Building from the work of Benito (1997), the research of Burt, Dawson and Sparks (2003) 
sets out a framework of the factors for failure in retail internationalization operations, as 
shown in Figure 3.3: 
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Figure 3.3 – Framework for failure in international retailing (Burt et al., 2003: p. 365) 
 
This framework attempts to conceptualize the relevant factors of external, environmental, 
and macro causes for corporate failure, as well as the internal, organizational, and micro 
causes that may also contribute to failure. While the framework is designed as a platform 
for further research into these complex issues, it is able to synthesize the prior work of 
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Benito and Welch (1997) and the broader business perspective of research in the areas of 
Industrial Organization and Organizational Studies. 
Two additional contributions from the Burt et al. (2003) study were the focus on failure as a 
non-linear process and the improvement of terminology to better define the process. The 
study provides definitions of failure, divestment, closure, organizational restructuring, and 
exit from the retail internationalization process. These definitions are important in 
understanding the complexity and iterative nature of retail foreign expansion success and 
failure: the definitions show that all failures, i.e., under-performance as defined by Burt et 
al. (2003), do not necessarily lead to exit, and all exits are not always as a result of failure, as 
shown in Figure 3.4: 
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Figure 3.4 – Factors for exit in international retailing (Burt et al., 2003: p. 359). 
 
Reflecting on the multiplicity within the failure process, Burt, Dawson and Sparks (2003) 
concluded: “We believe it is more useful to see failure and its constituent components, as a 
discontinuous and non-linear process. Timings of actions and relationships amongst actions 
will therefore be as important as identifying the actions themselves” (p. 361). This is a 
significant contribution to the study of the retail internationalization process over time, 
which will help researchers understand the complex and reiterative nature of retail 
continuity and discontinuity in the relationship between the retailer and the host markets. 
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Unlike most of the research into foreign expansion processes previously discussed, which 
take the dominant perspective of the firm, failure in foreign markets demonstrates the 
significance of the relationship between the firm, the host market, and the home market. 
Subsequent research has contributed to a more nuanced understanding of the host market 
perspective, but the extent of academic study is limited and leaves many questions that 
need to be researched further. 
3.9   What is the Impact of Retail Internationalization? 
At the start of this chapter, there was a discussion of the interest in and need for a 
conceptualization of the retail internationalization process, led by academics such as 
Alexander & Myers (2000), Dawson (1994), Sternquist (1997), and Vida & Fairhurst (1998). 
This work brought both debate and some consensus to the strategic issues in the 
internationalization process. A review of the academic study of this process and its many 
dimensions – from motives for retail foreign expansion to strategic decisions around 
continuity and discontinuity – further substantiates what the dominant strategic issues are 
in the internationalization of retail business. This study suggests that these dominant 
themes are: 
1. Innovation (whether at the retail concept level or at the detail of execution) plays an 
integral role in the retail internationalization process. Generally speaking, successful 
retailers engaged in long-term international trade have demonstrated a consistent 
commitment to innovative strategies, such as IKEA, Zara, Body Shop, Aldi, and 
Metro. 
2. The strategic decision for where a retailer positions itself on the standardization-
adaptation continuum has also been identified as integral to the retail 
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internationalization process. Since the research of Salmon & Tordjman (1989), 
subsequent studies have only added to the recognition of the complexity of the 
global versus multi-national positioning. This is exemplified in the research on brand 
transfer where image and positioning of a retail company may be executed on 
different points of this continuum. 
3. An understanding of what is being transferred in the retail internationalization 
process: with the benefit of a temporal perspective on retailers operating in foreign 
countries, it has become clear that not all internationalization processes are the 
same. In fact, this is one of the fundamental arguments for the distinction between 
retail and manufacturing internationalization. Recent studies by Dawson (2008) and 
Evans, Bridson, Byrom and Medway (2008) have addressed this issue to better 
understand the tangible and intangible aspects of what is transferred. 
Overall, early research adopted the dominant perspective of the firm, which has remained 
consistent throughout the literature; however, with few exceptions, contemporary 
academics have attempted to extend their focus beyond the firm to take a different 
viewpoint in the research. The complexity and non-linear nature of retail 
internationalization and its economic impact implies that there are always active 
participants involved beyond the firm. Currently, a research gap still exists: there has been 
little study of the impact that expansion has had on the host country and the domestic 
retailers within those markets. 
The early writing of Hollander (1970) and Goldman (1978) viewed economic impact from 
the perspective of developed countries entering developing countries, assuming that retail 
innovation and more advanced consumerism played a role in international economic and 
social development. Although this view became less important in the study of retail 
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internationalization, there continues to be an underlying assertion that internationalizing 
retailers come from more developed and competitively advanced countries that will export 
their innovative successful concepts to less competitively evolved countries. Whether the 
host countries are classified as developed, emerging, or developing (i.e., under-developed) 
has tended to depend on the different styles of execution within the retail 
internationalization process. Academic research has tended to focus on retail 
internationalization into emerging or developing countries, even though much of the 
activity has been developed to developed, such as the U.S. retailers entering into Canada 
and the interplay of UK and Western European countries, as well as cross Atlantic expansion 
dominating much of the foreign expansion in the past thirty years. The more recent 
internationalization into Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC countries) and the territorially 
related countries has revealed retail sectors that have developed differently but not 
necessarily less competitively, or with less innovation, or less willingness to adapt to protect 
their domestic market position and share. As previously noted, entry into these markets has 
not always guaranteed dominance or success by the retailer from the “more developed 
country”. It is within this context that Dawson (2003) and Coe and Wrigley (2007) put forth a 
call for further research into the impacts of retail internationalization on the host country.  
3.9.1   From the Firm to the Market Perspective 
As the study of retail internationalization evolved through the later part of the twentieth 
century, academic research had paid considerable attention to the why, where, and how of 
the internationalization process (Dawson, 2003). With this knowledge came understanding 
of the complexity of the process and, while research proved useful in explaining many of the 
dimensions of retailer foreign activity, it also identified a significant gap in the research. The 
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dominant perspective of the firm in academic research had left little insight into what 
impact retail internationalization had on the host country. 
In 2003, Dawson proposed a framework for the study of the impacts of retail 
internationalization. The model (shown in Figure 1, Chapter 1) proposes six broad categories 
which capture the types of impacts that a retailer expanding into a foreign country might 
experience. Dawson’s model provides a tentative proposition of what types of impacts 
might exist within each of the six categories. He further demonstrates that “The different 
types of impact involve different processes of interaction between the foreign retailers and 
the host country” (Dawson, 2003: p. 199). Dawson also identifies a scale of intensity and 
impact within the model, suggesting that the degree of impact will be different depending 
upon the type of entry.  
Dawson’s framework is particularly valuable because it does not limit its conceptual 
grounding. It is neither focused on developed or developing countries; global, multi-
national, or international retailers; or the retail category and varying strategies employed by 
retailers in foreign expansion. This structure makes it an extremely useful model for the 
study of impacts on the host country in both empirical and qualitative analysis. 
Since 2003, there have been minimal contributions to the study of impacts on the host 
country in the retail internationalization process. Work by Uusitalo (2004) in the Finnish 
grocery industry and Bianchi & Ostale (2006) on Home Depot’s failure in Chile have looked 
at the roles of the domestic retailers in responses to the entry of foreign retailers. The more 
recent study of Boyd and Bresser (2008) on delayed U.S. retail responses to foreign 
competition, and the work of Bhattacharya & Michael (2008) on the increasing 
sophistication of domestic retail champions, have both offered some new perspectives of 
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the retail internationalization process beyond that of the internationalizing firm. Compared 
to the more longstanding studies from the firm’s perspective, these studies are relatively 
few and provide limited insights into the domestic market impacts and responses to 
internationalizing retailers. 
In 2007, Coe and Wrigley offered an application of the Dawson (2003) model in their study 
of Western European transnational retail companies (TNC) expanding into East Asia, Latin 
America, and Central and Eastern European markets. The entry of large grocery and general 
merchandise retailers from developed markets to these emerging markets is assessed in this 
study on a seven-dimension typology that adds some additional perspective to the impacts 
discussion, as shown in Figure 3.5: 
 
Figure 3.5 – Host market impacts (Coe & Wrigley, 2007: p. 348) 
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Coe and Wrigley (2007) include the role of the home country and other foreign markets as 
part of the retailer’s impact on a specific host country. Their typology draws heavily on the 
importance of network relationships and on the expectation of knowledge transfer to be a 
contributing factor to the impact. Coe and Wrigley see the concept of embeddedness, both 
territorial and societal, as fundamental to retail internationalization success, factoring 
significantly in their view of how a firm impacts the host country. The remaining dimensions 
of this typology are built upon from the Dawson (2003) model: within the specific context of 
the companies and markets, Coe and Wrigley’s study is seen to advance the work of 
Dawson. However, their focus continues to take the dominant perspective of the firm and 
seems potentially biased toward the situational issues of developing countries. For these 
reasons, this study utilizes the Dawson (2003) model – also taking into account some of the 
findings from Coe and Wrigley (2007), but not limited by their constraints. 
3.9.2 The Dawson Model’s Application in this Study 
In recent research, the retail internationalization process is seen to be inherently complex, 
which Dawson’s model attempts to capture through the proposed six categories of impacts. 
The ability to effectively apply the full model to an internationalization process and provide 
both adequate analysis of the impacts and assessment of the framework’s applicability 
would be beyond the reasonable scope of one study. Therefore, the decision to focus on 
Dawson’s category of changes in sectoral competitiveness is based on the view that it is 
fundamental to market theory that any new entry into a given market will have some 
impact on the competitive structure of the sector; change will result whether the new entry 
is foreign or domestic.  
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Since this study aims to contribute to both the understanding of the retail 
internationalization process and to the application of the Dawson model, it is considered 
important to focus on the more universal category of horizontal competitiveness. This study 
focuses on changes in sectoral competitiveness, excluding the other categories for the 
following reasons: 
• Changes in the effectiveness of demand chains: This factor is viewed as still mostly 
firm-centric and developing-country-centric. Much of this impact may in fact occur 
well before a company actually enters the foreign market. For example, it is difficult 
to imagine that American clothing retailers were not aware of Zara’s fast fashion 
strategy before Zara opened physical stores in the U.S. By contrast, many 
sophisticated supply chain retailers have had to modify their processes when 
entering developing countries in order to function within the different market 
structure. For these reasons, it was considered that the changes in the effectiveness 
of demand chains would be secondary to the assessment of the Dawson model and 
the broader retail internationalization process. 
• Performance of the firm: Similar to demand chains, this also limits studying 
internationalization from the firm perspective and will not contribute to a better 
understanding of the market impacts.  
• Changes in socio-cultural values: While not specifically stated, any analysis of 
changed values and transfer of culture implies that foreign retailers will influence (or 
impose itself on) the developing country perspective. There has been considerable 
research into this area with mixed findings on what degree of impact retail entry has 
on socio-cultural values. Given the aim of this study to look at developed-to-
 
 
92 
developed expansion, it was considered that this had limited impact in this study of 
retail internationalization processes. 
• Public policy reaction of national and international agencies: As discussed 
previously in this study, most developed countries were actively engaged in free 
trade agreements by the later part of the twentieth century, which again makes this 
category more applicable to the developing countries. Certainly there are countries 
still maintaining barriers to entry, but even by 2007 the global movement has built 
momentum in removing these limits. It is suggested that reactive policies will 
provide less relevance to subsequent studies of retail internationalization. 
• Increased consumer literacy: This is potentially the most interesting of Dawson’s six 
categories, but it is challenging to determine any direct correlation between retail 
foreign entry and literacy. This is an area that deserves study, but is less grounded in 
physical retailing and consumption than the rest of the Dawson framework. 
In summary, the study of the changes in sectoral competitiveness provides the most 
relevant and universal impacts within the retail internationalization process, allowing 
research to advance beyond the firm perspective and to identify some form of market 
structure change. In addition, the other five impact categories have the potential to 
incorporate change that occurs through anticipation of foreign entry in advance of the brick-
and-mortar entry, which makes the study of their impact from operational entry more 
difficult. Thus, this study will focus on what occurs post-entry to the host country and the 
domestic retailers and, through the process foreign expansion, what occurs to the 
expanding retailers over time.  
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Chapter 4 – Research Methodology 
4.1 Overview 
As the previous chapters have shown, the academic study of retail internationalization has 
progressed into investigations of the processes involved in foreign expansion. Given the 
accelerated pace of international expansion, recent research has shifted the focus from pre-
entry considerations to the study of what happens post-entry; however, the dominant 
perspective in this research has continued to be that of the internationalizing firm, focusing 
on the impact that expansion has had on a retailer’s home and foreign retail operations. To 
address this limitation, the study of post-entry retail internationalization must provide a 
greater understanding of what happens to the host country when foreign companies enter 
its territory – specifically the impact on the domestic retailers and their response to the new 
competition. Dawson (2003) proposed the need for this research and provided a framework 
to study what happens to host market sectoral competitiveness in the retail 
internationalization process.  This framework will be tested in this study. This chapter 
outlines the theoretical framework, the research design and methodology, the research 
objectives, and the scope of this study. 
4.2 Theoretical Framework 
Dawson (2003) proposed a framework that categorized the impacts of retail 
internationalization on the host country. At the time of this study, only Coe and Wrigley 
(2007) have offered an alternative framework, but their model focuses on developing 
countries. Therefore, there was little guidance from existing academic research on how to 
measure the impacts of retail internationalization in developed countries. In the absence of 
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existing research, it was important to pursue a research design and establish a methodology 
that would produce not only additional knowledge of the impacts, but also data that could 
validate both the types and degree of impact observed.  
The internationalization process is inherently complex. Thus far, the multiplicity of the 
processes involved in retail foreign expansion has not been fully explained through 
traditional business theory or constructs. Researchers have therefore begun to specifically 
focus on retail processes to fill this gap. Given its broad context, the Dawson (2003) model 
provides the most relevant framework for the study of retail internationalization impacts. In 
Chapter 3, the Dawson framework was further refined for the purposes of this study, to 
focus on one of the six proposed categories of impact: change in sectoral competitiveness. 
Therefore, the aim of this study is to address the question: What is the impact of foreign 
retailers on sectoral competitiveness of the domestic sector of the host country? The 
impacts proposed by Dawson are specifically based on the foreign expansion of store 
operations, which is visible through competitive effects at the local level. This relationship 
between retail operations as a local business and companies expanding on an international 
level has guided the research design and methodology used to analyze both the cause and 
effect relationships between foreign and domestic retailers, and also to test the Dawson 
framework’s propositions and perspectives on the internationalization process.  
4.3 Research Design and Methodology 
Using the Dawson model as the theoretical framework for this study, a two-stage approach 
was designed:   
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1) The first stage involved the collection and analysis of  quantitative data to identify 
the changes that occur in sectoral competitiveness when foreign retailers enter a 
host country.  
2) The second stage focuses on gathering qualitative data, primarily from industry 
experts, to further understand and explain the impact of foreign entry on the 
domestic retailers, and the response of domestic retailers to the changes. 
With a limited number of existing empirical studies to draw from, it is important to establish 
a broad research framework to demonstrate the efficacy of the methodology of this study. 
4.3.1 The Positivist School 
This study is firmly grounded in the positivist tradition, combining both quantitative and 
qualitative data in an effort to describe and explain phenomenon. Blaikie (2010) asserts that 
“Positivism regards reality as consisting of discrete events that can be observed by the 
human senses. The only knowledge of this reality that is acceptable is that which is derived 
from experience” (p. 97).  As set out in Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) book Sociological 
Paradigms and Organizational Analysis, social research had been established around 
assumptions about the nature of social science, as evidenced in Figure 4.1: 
 
Figure 4.1 – Four assumptions on the nature of social theory (Burrell & Morgan, 1979) 
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While a two-by-two matrix invariably over-simplifies social research, the axes of the diagram 
allows the study to consider the assumptions about reality (objective versus subjective) and 
the purpose of the research (studying the status quo or effecting change). Given the 
utilization of the Dawson (2003) framework and the generation of quantitative data in the 
research design, the study is consistent with traditional positivist ideals of structured 
deductive approaches to empirical research. Although the qualitative data of the second 
stage might generally be characterized as following the interpretivist tradition of 
constructing reality from the perspective of different stakeholders, the utilization of the 
Dawson framework is consistent with the positivist approach as it provides a more detailed 
exploration of the causal factors. While stage one may have adequately identified and 
categorized the phenomenon occurring in the retail internationalization process, the 
qualitative approach helps address the managerial decisions during the process of retail 
expansion. Traditional social science research design would view these two stages as 
separate studies, however, the use of both qualitative and quantitative data in a single study 
has become more common recently, e.g., the technique that Creswell and Plano Cook 
(2007) presented as mixed methods. 
4.3.2 Mixed Methods 
In what Blaikie (2010) and others refer to as the paradigm wars of the 1960s and 1970s 
between positivism and interpretivism (or the quantitative versus qualitative approach), the 
opposing sides are distinctive and incompatible in their ontological and epistemological 
assumptions, research strategies, and ultimately methodology. With such entrenched 
worldviews, the possibility of combining methods in a single study or series of studies was 
deemed impossible; however, by the mid 1960s the concept of triangulation had been 
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introduced into the social sciences by Webb et al. (1966) in order to effectively validate 
theoretical concepts. Sieber (1973) furthered the development of multiple methods as a 
way of building upon data collection in a staged process. Blaikie (2010) provides an 
important review of the mixed methods approach, listing the four major types in Creswell 
and Plano Clark’s (2007) classification of mixed research: triangulation, embedded, 
explanatory, and exploratory. For the purposes of this study, the explanatory mixed method 
has been applied, which means that a quantitative phase produces results that need to be 
elaborated upon or explained through a follow-up qualitative phase (p. 225). Blaikie (2010) 
is a strong proponent of mixed methods research, but cautions researchers that combine 
deductive and abductive strategies for different methods in the same study. Thus, the 
consistency of the deductive method in both the quantitative and qualitative stages has 
allowed an integrated and progressive analysis of the two sets of data in order to meet the 
research objective. 
4.4   Research Aim and Objective 
The aim of this research is to contribute to the understanding of the impacts of the retail 
internationalization process on the domestic sector of the host country when foreign 
retailers enter the market – specifically related to changes in sectoral competitiveness. 
Utilizing the Dawson (2003) framework, there are specific research questions that must be 
addressed to accomplish this aim, namely: 
1) What are the impacts of foreign retailer entry and how can they be measured over 
time and by degree of impact? 
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2) What are the changes in sectoral competitiveness that can be measured and 
interpreted? 
3) What processes are used when responding to the changes in sectoral 
competitiveness? 
4) What gaps in the Dawson model are identified from this application? 
In summary, this study will contribute to the understanding of the retail internationalization 
process and to the further development of the Dawson host market impact model as a 
framework for the study of these processes. 
4.5   Defining the Scope of the Research 
In order to meet the principal aim of this research, the study was limited to the apparel 
sector in Canada during the period of 1989 to 2007. The Canadian market context at this 
time was discussed in Chapter 1 and will be built upon in this chapter.  
4.5.1 Country and Retail Sector Selection 
It is essential to study the impacts model in a context that will allow for the isolation of 
identified changes in sectoral competitiveness. Therefore, it is necessary to identify a 
market where significant foreign entry has occurred in a defined retail category that has 
multiple domestic and foreign companies engaged in competition. In addition, reliable data 
must be available for an extended period of time.  
To address the research requirements, the following market characteristics were considered 
necessary for the study: 
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1. The pre-entry market structure should be sufficiently stable to provide a basis from 
which to measure change. 
2. The other impact categories identified in the Dawson model should be isolated, or 
be considered to have limited influence upon the observed change.  
3. The retail sector should have a sufficient volume of domestic and foreign activity to 
observe numerous impacts and responses over a reasonable period of time.  
4. Reliable performance data should be available for stage one of the study and 
knowledgeable industry experts for stage two to help explain the data. 
In summary, the Canadian apparel sector was selected because it met these criteria.  The 
market structure is described in Chapter 1 and the level of retail internationalization activity 
illustrated in Appendix 2. These features meet the conditions stated above.  
In addition, the selection of the Canadian market will add to our understanding of the 
impact of companies from developed countries entering other developed countries. As 
previously discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, it is developed-to-developed expansion where 
most of the foreign internationalization activity has occurred, yet much of the research has 
tended to focus on the expansion of companies into the large emerging markets such as 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) (Bianchi & Arnold, 2004; Burt, Johansson & Thelander, 
2011; Goldman, 1974; Jonsson & Elg, 2006). While much has been learned about the 
challenges of expansion into emerging and developing markets, the future of retail 
internationalization will predominately consist of expansion into developed markets; given 
the rapid development of retail in these ‘BRIC’ countries, it is likely that they will be re-
classified to developed status in the not-too-distant future.  
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The apparel sector was selected for this study after a thorough review of all retail 
categories. For many categories, it was found that one or two retailers dominated the 
sector: for example, the Canadian consolidation of Indigo was well underway in the book 
retail market, and in the office supply market, Business Depot, Staples, and Grand & Toy had 
captured most of the market. By comparison, the clothing categories provide a diverse 
collection of formats and formulas, both domestic and foreign, to incorporate into the 
study. Initially the focus was to be solely on women’s apparel, however, the structure of the 
market and the available data guided the research to a broader scope that includes 
women’s wear, menswear, and unisex. Given the number of foreign retailers reported in the 
unisex category, it was essential to the data collection and analysis that they be added to 
the study. The term unisex applies to those retailers that offer both women’s and menswear 
in the same physical store location; it does not imply that all merchandise sold is 
appropriate for both sexes to wear, which was the original meaning of the term when it 
came into prominence in the 1960s. Men’s apparel was added to explore all of the 
categories in the apparel sector. 
4.5.2 Time frame 
 In Chapter 1, the Canadian retail sector was presented as a relevant context to study the 
impacts of foreign entry into a host market. The activities leading up to 1989 were 
considered not only in the specifics of the retail sector, but also in the broader context of 
free trade, democratization, and rapidly changing technology and communication networks. 
Once the decision to study the apparel sector was made, 1989 was demonstrated as the 
beginning of a significant change in the North American retail market, starting with the 
entry of the Gap into the Canadian market.  
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The level of foreign entry activity into Canada has experienced peaks and lows since 1989, 
variously the subject of macro and micro factors affecting the economies and the retail 
companies. Unlike the start date of 1989, there has been a less self-evident end year for the 
study; however, two inter-woven factors of a generally pragmatic nature guided the 
decision to stop at the end of 2007. 
1. Once the research proposal had been developed and a research methodology was 
established, the collection of data was initiated in 2008. This established the original 
gathering of data to the end of 2007. 
2. The recession of 2008 had a universal affect on all economies, particularly in the 
developed markets. Specific to this study, 2008 marked a point where decisions were 
delayed, deferred, or cancelled for both businesses and consumers. The 
pervasiveness of the recession through 2008, 2009, and 2010 would have 
contributed to anomalies in all retail data during that time, making cause and effect 
analysis of foreign retail impact difficult if not impossible. There is also evidence that 
the sources of the quantitative data had little interest in continuing to share 
information during this difficult trading period. 
For these two reasons, the 2007 end date for the study provided a clear end date to a 
period of retail internationalization activity that was unprecedented in Canada.  
4.5.3 Unit of analysis 
One of the acknowledged facts about the retail industry is that it operates at the local level, 
particularly in regard to the bricks-and-mortar component of the business. Thus, in early 
research on foreign expansion, internationalization was often seen as a contradiction to the 
local business nature of retail competition. Other forms of internationalization – such as 
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knowledge and management transfer, foreign sourcing and licensing, and more recently e-
commerce – were not considered in retail expansion, as experts thought these factors were 
more relevant to other industries involved in global expansion. The study of retail impacts as 
proposed by Dawson is specifically based on the foreign expansion of store operations 
through competition at the local level. From a quantitative analysis perspective, collecting 
data that will reflect the impact at the local level can be challenging for an academic study, 
recognizing that the data typically generated at the national level by entities such as 
Statistics Canada will not capture the detail of localized competitive activity. It was therefore 
determined that an alternative source for the data should be found at the local level.  
 Since most retail expansion occurs over a long period of time, there would be very few 
scenarios in which the impact of a foreign retail entry could be measured on the aggregate 
level for the total host country market. For example, a company such as the Gap opened 
three stores during its first entry point into Canada: one in Vancouver, one in Toronto, and 
one in Montreal. The retail revenue data collected by Statistics Canada would potentially 
capture the revenues of those three stores, but supply no statistics that measure the impact 
on the total retail sales of the country. This study acknowledges  that by the late 1980s the 
apparel business in Canada was primarily conducted in the major malls by either specialty 
chains or department stores. Based on this feature of the market structure, it was decided 
that the study of foreign entry impacts could be most effectively studied at the mall level.  
It is important to declare the limitations of using mall data as a microcosm for the 
marketplace.  However, the richness of the data and its contribution to understanding the 
changes in the sectoral competitiveness for the apparel categories is considered to offset 
the limitations. For clarification, these limitations are stated here: 
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1. Department store data within the mall is unavailable. Under the leasing agreements 
between department stores and mall landlords, the role of shopping centre anchor 
generally assumed a rent-free operation with little formal requirement to report on 
business performance to the mall owners. This limits the measurement of the total 
mall market size and the analysis of the specific impact of foreign entry on the 
department store apparel categories. While there is general consensus that their 
share of market declined between 1989 and 2007, it would have been useful to 
evidence the degree of impact..  
2. As not all apparel business is accounted for in shopping centres, it must be 
recognized that totality of activity in the market is not captured. During the period of 
this study, Walmart’s entry had a dramatic effect on the total retail market structure, 
which affected the apparel categories over time. According to Trendex by 2000 
Walmart accounted for 4.7% of the apparel market and 10% by 2007. This leaves a 
gap in the understanding of the non-mall competitive changes in the market. 
3. The changes in the mall format due to competitive re-structuring should be 
considered as reflecting the impact of foreign entry on the domestic sector at its 
most intense. It is therefore likely to provide an over-statement of the degree of 
impact on sectoral competitiveness that may be experienced elsewhere. For 
example, many of the foreign retailers will not enter secondary malls or markets, so 
the impact would not be the same on these formats.  
4. There is no attempt in this study to stretch the impact that is identified in these malls 
to any other markets. Although the research method could certainly be applied 
elsewhere – as this addition to the knowledge about the change to sectoral 
competitiveness due to foreign entry could be most beneficial – the types and 
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degree of change that would occur elsewhere cannot be predicted from this study 
due to the specifics of each individual host market. 
4.5.4. Site selection 
In order to study the impact of foreign store entry, it was important to select malls that have 
significant populations of both domestic and foreign apparel retailers. Since most foreign 
retail entrants wish to locate in top performing shopping districts, it is realistic to select 
major shopping centres that would be high on the priority list for store locations. On this 
basis, two major shopping malls in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) of Ontario, Canada were 
selected. Both malls have been early entry points for foreign apparel retailers and have 
reliable data available for the time period under consideration. By 2007, both malls had over 
100 apparel stores in operation, representing a mix of domestic and foreign operators that 
was consistent with the overall market.  
For the purpose of this study, some additional decisions were made regarding inclusion and 
exclusion of retailers that sell apparel: 
1. All retailers reporting in the three categories of women’s or ladies wear, menswear, 
and unisex were included in the analysis. 
2. Apparel sales in department stores were not included because they do not report 
their sales to mall landlords. Other sources for department store sales trends are 
utilized to provide comparisons. 
3. Children’s wear was not included, as sales data is reported in a separate category. It 
is recognized that some unisex retailers would encompass children’s wear as well as 
women’s and menswear. Since it is impossible to gather a breakdown of these 
revenues within a store, this study acknowledges that a relatively small portion of 
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children’s wear revenue (compared to women’s and men’s categories) will be 
captured in this analysis.   
4. The category of sports stores was not included. Even though there are apparel sales 
in their merchandise mix, it was impossible to isolate this category from equipment 
and other product sales. 
5. Categories such as accessories, jewellery, and shoes were not included, even though 
some of the retailers included would have sales in these categories. It was decided 
that the overall percentage of such sales would be small relative to the clothing 
assortments and these additional categories may have unique characteristics that 
could distort the findings. 
As a result of these exclusions, total gross sales and square footage for the total apparel 
category in each mall will be understated. However, the parameters are consistent in both 
malls so that comparisons are considered to have sufficient validity for the purposes of this 
study.   
4.6 The Quantitative Study 
Major shopping centres collect performance data on an on-going basis for internal usage. 
Therefore, the data analyzed in this study is strictly limited by confidentiality restrictions. 
Throughout the study, the malls will be referred to as Mall 1 and Mall 2, and individual retail 
companies will not be identified. The performance data on the overall apparel market and 
the domestic retailers within each shopping centre was collected from the two malls in hard 
copy versions only and was manually transferred to electronic spreadsheets for purposes of 
analysis.  
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Performance data for Mall 1 was available from 1991, and data for Mall 2 from 1995. For 
comparative purposes, the period of 1995 to 2007 has been taken as the targeted time 
frame for the quantitative analysis, however, where it is relevant to the analysis, the period 
from 1991 to 1995 has been referenced for Mall 1. It will be seen that the majority of 
foreign entry into these malls occurred from 1995 onward – the obvious exception being the 
entry of the Gap to Canada in 1989. The mall reports are detailed and comprehensive of the 
performance measures for retail activity, providing not only the specific categories studied 
here, but also all other categories and services within the mall. 
The mall reports provide both monthly and annual performance data for each individual 
retail store, which are then grouped by category. As previously noted, the three categories 
analyzed are: 
• Women’s wear (or ladies wear) 
• Menswear 
• Unisex 
The specific performance data analyzed for each store and category in each mall included: 
1. Number of stores 
2. Square footage 
3. Sales  
4. Sales per square foot 
This data was entered in spreadsheets and analyzed based on annual performance over the 
scope of the time period. In addition to the category groupings, the retail companies were 
clustered by domestic and foreign, and a further sub-group was created for sales volume. 
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Given the large number of retailers involved across multiple formats and over several years, 
the sub-groupings provided more meaningful comparative analysis of the data. For example, 
it is more relevant to compare the performance of stores of a similar size than comparing a 
15,000 square foot store to another that is 1,500 square feet.  
Given the structure of the reports, it was also possible to track movement of retailers in 
terms of date of entry and, in some cases, date of exit from the mall and changes in store 
size. However, it was not possible from the performance data alone to determine if a 
retailer’s change in store size was also a change in location in the mall, which required 
further investigation.  
The data analysis was intended to measure the impact of foreign retail entry on the overall 
size of the market, and the effects of market share on foreign and domestic retailers’ 
competitiveness over time. Market share was measured on the basis of number of stores, 
square footage, and sales. The results of the Quantitative Study are presented in Chapter 5. 
4.7 The Qualitative Study 
In the second stage of the study, interviews were conducted with a cross section of industry 
experts in order to gain further insight into the impact of foreign entry on the apparel 
sector. The results of these interviews were coded and analyzed, and are presented in 
Chapter 6. 
4.7.1. Industry Expert Interviews 
While the quantitative analysis provided evidence of trends and impacts, it does not explain 
the reasons for these patterns. As previously discussed, the mixed method approach to this 
study allowed for both the study of what happened to the host country in the 
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internationalization process and also why the impacts occurred and how the domestic 
responses affected this expansion. The industry expert interviews facilitate an 
understanding of the underlying issues for the outcomes observed in the malls. They also 
provide insight in matters that the shopping centre data does not reveal, such as the impact 
on department stores and the retail activity outside of the mall environment, which helps 
the study to address some of the gaps in the quantitative data as discussed earlier.  
4.7.2 Interview Methodology  
Applying the traditional method of in-depth interviews, the researcher conducted twenty-
one interviews during a four month period between July and October 2011. The 
interviewees were selected on the basis of their industry expertise and knowledge, 
specifically during the period of study: 1989 to 2007. Two broad criteria were utilized to 
form a list of potential interviewees: 
1. The individual was engaged in the Canadian retail apparel sector during the time 
frame of 1989 to 2007. 
2. The individual has a balance of industry involvement between those directly involved 
in the apparel business, those who served as retail-related industry partners, and 
those who consulted to or researched the industry. 
A list of 25 people was selected based on these two criteria and were contacted by e-mail 
requesting their participation in the study. Appendix 4 includes a copy of the e-mail and the 
letter. Twenty-one of the prospective interviewees agreed to participate. The final make-up 
of the industry experts was as follows: 
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• Seven retail executives: all active in the Canadian apparel sector during some portion 
of the period of study (three of the seven had experience with both domestic and 
foreign retailers) 
• Eight executives in retail-related businesses: landlords, marketing executives, 
analysts, and accountants 
• Six retail researchers and consultants: academics and professionals 
This balanced cross-section of industry experience and knowledge facilitated the 
opportunity to explore the full range of proposed impacts and processes identified in the 
Dawson model. Interviewees were assured anonymity and are referenced as Industry Expert 
A through U in the results of the Qualitative Study. Appendix 5 provides brief profiles for 
each of the industry experts to add context to their comments. The findings from these 
interviews will be presented in Chapter 6.  
4.7.3 Interview Guide and Interviews 
Once a participant agreed to the interview, they were sent the Interview Guide (see 
Appendix 6) as well as a confirmation of the date, time, and location of the interview. 
Eighteen of the interviews were conducted in person – primarily at the offices of the 
participant – and three interviews were conducted by telephone due to the location of the 
participant outside of Toronto. The in-person interviews were audio taped with the 
agreement of the participant. A third party transcribing service was used to prepare the 
written interview reports, and the telephone interviews were not recorded for technical 
reasons. All participants accepted the confidentiality agreements for the study and all 
interviews were conducted by the author. 
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Interview Guide   
When conducting interviews that ask participants to recall and reflect on a specific period in 
the past, the interview must be structured in a manner that will facilitate accurate 
recollections. Therefore, the interview guide was designed to prompt recollection of the 
time being studied without using leading questions. At the same time, the interview guide 
was structured to test the proposed impacts and processes from the Dawson model. Please 
see Appendix 6 for a copy of the Interview Guide.  
Since the Qualitative Study was intended to both utilize and test the Dawson framework, 
the Interview Guide was developed from both the framework and the mall analysis results. 
The first five questions in the interview guide are drawn directly from the Dawson model, 
providing a general statement and then prompting the interviewee for an interpretation. 
The sixth question was generated from the results of the quantitative analysis in order to 
identify some specific impacts that required further understanding than found in the 
empirical data alone. Finally, a general open-ended question was presented to capture any 
further thoughts that the interviewee’s unique perspective might add to the study and the 
model.  
In Dawson’s model, he proposes the following five types of impacts related to the broader 
category of change in sectoral competitiveness: 
1. Catalyst for sectoral restructuring 
2. New competitive behaviours 
3. Improved productivity of assets 
4. Additional investment 
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5. Innovation in competitive activity 
The first five interview questions were structured to specifically address each of these 
proposed impacts in order to gather expert insight into their legitimacy, potential impact on 
the domestic retailers, and the response of the host country. Since Dawson (2003) 
presented his framework as a proposed model for further investigation, the interview 
questions were presented through the use of the wording ‘may be or may cause’ in order to 
avoid attributing cause and effect that may not exist. Reference to the time frame under 
study was built into the Interview Guide to maintain as controlled a discussion as possible.  
The sixth question addressed specific impacts and responses that had been identified in the 
Quantitative Study, however, the actual data from the two malls was not presented in detail 
to the interviewees because it may have influenced their insight into the findings. There was 
also an opportunity for the interviewee to add points that they considered important to the 
subject, which had the potential to add different perspectives on the impacts of retail 
internationalization beyond those proposed by Dawson’s model. The Interview Guide was 
submitted as part of the Ethics Review process at Ryerson University and approved in June 
2011. See Appendix 7 for the letter of approval from the Research Ethics Committee.  
4.7.4 Analysis of Interviews 
In addition to the relatively recent acceptance of qualitative research methods in social 
research, there has also been a considerable expansion in the study of methodology. Blaikie 
(2010) summarizes the extent of this literature and the advent of software such as 
Ethnograph and NVivo, which gives many examples of the advances in qualitative data 
analysis, and notes that “there is no one dominant method” (p. 210). Contributions by 
Turner (1981) to offer a nine stage system for qualitative data analysis is one amongst many, 
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all of which state the need for special kinds of coding to facilitate description and enhance 
analysis. Dey (1993) formulated a process comprised of three activities: describing, 
classifying, and connecting. Within the context of this study, the principles of a structured 
methodology for the analysis of the qualitative research were applied, but were modified to 
allow for the utilization of the Dawson model as the structure for the analysis. Similar to the 
Dey (1993) process, a three step approach was used: 1) cluster the data based on the 
interview questions, which followed the Dawson framework proposed impacts, 2) coding for 
continuity and dis-continuity of themes within each of the impacts, and 3) an analysis of 
connectivity across the impacts, generally driven by the retailers involved in the process. 
The three steps in the coding of the industry expert interviews are described in more detail 
below.  
The transcribed interviews were first coded utilizing the five types of impacts that the 
Dawson model proposed. Within each impact, the interviews were coded for common 
themes that were repeated by multiple interviewees. These themes were organized as sub-
sets of the five impacts and analyzed for evidence of foreign impact and the domestic sector 
response to the impact. The five types of impacts and the sub-themes have formed the basis 
for the model used for analysis (presented in Chapter 6).  
The second step in coding was to identify industry expert content that did not fit into the 
five types of impacts or was inconsistent with the majority view of the interviewees. This 
content was analyzed for its relevance to the change in sectoral competitiveness, as well as 
its potential to either add new perspectives to the Dawson model or challenge the types of 
impacts and processes proposed in the model. Discussion of these findings is presented in 
Chapter 6.  
 
 
113 
A final stage of coding was conducted to assess the retailers, both foreign and domestic, 
who were referenced by the industry experts. This was done to capture the dominant 
companies involved in the process of change to the market structure. The result of these 
three stages of analysis of the interviews provides a significant degree of insight into the 
what and why of retail internationalization, identifying specific impacts on the sectoral 
competitiveness in the apparel industry in Canada between 1989 and 2007. 
4.7.5 Limitations of the Industry Expert Interviews 
While adding a significant contribution to the study of retail internationalization, there are 
some limitations to this method of research that have been taken into consideration in the 
analysis: 
1. As with any research requiring the participants to recall events from a prior time, 
there is the potential for some level of over-statement or under-statement of the 
events. Thus, the analysis attempted to reflect the general norm of recollection.  
2. The stop date of 2007 proved somewhat challenging, since considerable foreign 
entry has taken place in the subsequent years and is more readily recalled. The 
interviewer attempted to keep these events out of the interviews and, where more 
recent expansion did form part of the interviewees’ responses, these references 
were eliminated from the analysis.  
3. Given the diverse orientations of the interviewees, some topics had variation in the 
scope of knowledge. For example, not all interviewees would have had access to 
productivity data and so were limited in their observations on such matters.  
4. The very nature of interview studies must assume that there will be some personal 
bias in the perspectives and recollections of the industry experts. For example, it has 
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been well documented in trade publications and the general media that landlords 
and domestic retailers have been opposed over the role that landlords played in 
bringing foreign retailers into the market. Generally speaking, the interviewees were 
quite open in declaring their biases on this and other topics; thus, the analysis looked 
to isolate bias or find the majority consensus on key points. 
Even with these limitations, the insights from industry experts were invaluable to 
understanding the impact of foreign retailers on the host country, enhancing and 
challenging the Dawson model propositions and elaborating on the mall performance 
analysis. The full results of the Qualitative Study are presented in Chapter 6. 
4.8 Summary of Research Methodology 
In order to fully test the Dawson model and meet the research objective for this study, a 
two-stage mixed strategy was employed. The first stage was the Quantitative Study 
conducted on two major shopping malls data, which helped to identify the impact of foreign 
entry on the domestic market. This Quantitative Study is an important contribution given 
the limited empirical studies in this area of academic research. The second stage was the 
Qualitative Study, which elaborated on the findings of the first stage, providing further 
understanding of the propositions in the Dawson model and identifying gaps in the 
proposed impacts. While each method would have independently advanced the 
understanding of this topic, this study uses the combined findings from the two methods to 
provide a significant contribution to the understanding of the process of retail 
internationalization from the change in sectoral competitiveness in the host country.  
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Chapter 5 – Analysis of Shopping Centre Data 
5.1 Overview 
As established in Chapter 1, the Canadian market had become increasingly accessible and 
vulnerable to foreign retail entry by the early 1990s. Prior to this time, there had been a 
comparatively small number of foreign retailers setting up business in Canada – specifically, 
companies such as Sears, Levis, Benetton, and C&A were amongst the early entrants into 
the clothing sector. It was during the 1980s that the pace of foreign entry escalated with the 
expansion of big box retailing and the establishment of power centres in the suburban 
markets; however, most of these new retailers operated in business categories other than 
apparel and had little direct impact on the domestic clothing sector. It was not until the 
purchase of Woolco by Walmart in 1994 that a significant share of foreign-owned clothing 
retail would begin to grow outside of the traditional domains of apparel retail, specializing in 
the suburban shopping centre and urban high street. The importance of Walmart as a 
competitor in apparel retail in Canada grew consistently however in 2007 it remained 
second to Sears Canada for market share in clothing (Trendex, 2007). Despite Walmart’s 
growing market share, the timeline of retail activity in Appendix 2 illustrates that the 
majority of foreign entry of clothing retailers was taking place in the shopping centres and 
on the high streets, which had a direct impact on sectoral competition between 1989 and 
2007. Even within the process of retail internationalization, the operational competitiveness 
of retail continues at the local level which in Canada would be the newly established 
suburban shopping centres.  
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5.2  The Shopping Centre as a Microcosm of the Competitive Structure of the 
Retail Clothing Sector 
The competitive structure of the apparel market within a mall provides a dynamic 
environment to analyze the cause and effect relationship in retailer activity. In contrast, the 
typical macro aggregation of data at the national level makes the impact of a specific cause 
and effect practically unobservable. As proposed in Chapter 4, there is justification for 
conducting the empirical analysis of the Dawson model at the micro level, as Dawson’s 
framework recognizes both the value of studying specific impacts in a mall and the 
limitations of the shopping centre data. Despite the individuality of each shopping centre’s 
tenant mix and customer base, the expansion of malls that occurred in Canada leading up to 
the 1990s generated a fairly homogenous profile of a shopping centre. 
A portrait of a typical major shopping centre is useful to demonstrate how the competitive 
environment looked during the early 1990s. The Centre for the Study of Commercial 
Activities’ (CSCA) annual reports from 1994 through to 2009 provide an appropriate 
framework for defining the various types of malls. Within this lexicon, the two malls in this 
study would qualify as Super-Regional, i.e., larger than 750,000 square feet by 2006. Given 
the growth and expansion of existing malls through the 1990s and early 2000s, these two 
malls would have been ranked in the top tier based on size, sales performance, and quality 
of tenants throughout this time frame.  
Consistent with the North American model for major malls, the portrait of a Super-Regional 
Mall consists of two or more major store anchors and multiple in-line stores with specialized 
offerings across most retail categories. In 1989/90, the retail tenants would look something 
like the following, as based on Mall 1 of this study: 
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Mall Anchors  
• 2 Department Stores, occasionally 3 in the largest of the Super-Regionals 
• Some combination of Eatons, Simpsons, The Bay, Sears, Woodwards (in Western Canada), 
Olgivys, or Simons (in Quebec) 
• In a few locations, a major discounter such as Zellers or K-Mart would hold an anchor location, 
generally as a result of a long-standing lease 
  
In-line Retail Tenants by Category and Percentage of In-line Square Footage for Mall 1 
• Apparel, Footwear, and Accessories  62%  
• Food     10% 
• Gifts, Cards, and Stationary   10% 
• Health and Beauty      7% 
• Electronics and Music   6% 
• Other     5% 
 
Canadian and Foreign Clothing Retailers 
Within Mall 1 apparel categories in 1989/90, 100% of the women’s wear retail stores and 
100% of the menswear retail stores were Canadian owned. Within the unisex clothing 
category, 63.5% of the square footage was Canadian owned, and the foreign ownership was 
held by Marks & Spencer out of the UK and Levis from the US. Given the comparatively large 
size of the Marks & Spencer store, the percentage of foreign square footage is over-stated 
compared to the number and volume of foreign stores in the early 1990s. 
Canadian Clothing Retail Oligopoly 
Within the apparel categories in Mall 1, one Canadian company named Dylex Limited – 
operating under banners such as Fairweather, Tip Top Tailors, Suzy Shier, Braemar, Town & 
Country, Harry Rosen and Thrifty’s – comprised 48.5% of the total square footage. It has 
been well documented in the studies from CSCA and other research on Canadian retail that 
once a new mall location and the department store anchors were established, the next 
leasing discussion would be with Dylex Limited. Once its retail banners were signed for 
leases with prime spaces allocated in the mall, the remaining Canadian clothing retailers 
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would be able follow into the mall. Companies such as the Reitman’s group of women’s 
wear chains, Laura’s banners, and the tightly held smaller chains from Montreal and 
western Canada would constitute the remaining apparel store tenant mix. By 1989/90, with 
most new mall development completed, the mall floor plan of the major shopping centre 
tenants was well established and fairly predictable in most major malls.  
In summary, the portrait of a major shopping centre in Canada in 1989/90 can be 
characterized as the following: 
1. Significantly skewed to apparel both in-line and within the department stores 
2. Predominately Canadian owned retail 
3. Anchored by increasingly weakened department stores 
4. An oligopoly of Canadian clothing retailers dominated by Dylex Limited 
5.2.1 Analyzing the Mall Data 
This chapter will analyze the performance data from the two malls, illustrating how the 
market structure in these malls changed between the early 1990s and 2007. Given the 
extensive data available from standard mall performance reports (see Appendix 4), it was 
necessary to create a structure for analysis that would: 
1. Track both foreign and domestic apparel retailers over the reporting time to isolate 
impact points such as entry/exit to the mall, changes in square footage, temporal 
relationships between foreign retail entry and domestic changes, and the key 
performance measures. 
2. Structure the analysis so that relevant comparisons could be isolated. After 
reviewing the data, it was evident that stores should be clustered by domestic versus 
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foreign and by large sales volume versus lower sales volume, which would enable 
the researcher to isolate top performers and performance change over time. In 
addition, stores that exited the mall prior to 2007 were also categorized separately 
in order to analyze this activity relative to foreign entry. Appendix 10 provides 
examples of the detailed and summary analysis structure for the analysis of the data.  
3. Monitor changes in market share for number of stores, square footage, and sales 
between domestic and foreign retailers. As previously noted, the data for Mall 1 was 
available from 1991 and these earlier years are included in analysis for that shopping 
centre when there are relevant findings. 
4.  Identify any significant competitive changes in the shopping malls.  
The empirical evidence within this chapter will identify the impact that foreign clothing 
retailers have had on domestic retailers and the competitive re-structuring of the apparel 
retail market at the specialty store level. The final analysis, which looks at a measurement of 
productivity in sales per square foot for both foreign and domestic retailers, demonstrates a 
further aspect of impact: how successful domestic retailers have strategically positioned 
themselves to compete against the best of foreign apparel retailers. 
5.3 Summary of the Changes to Market Structure in Mall One and Mall Two 
It is important to provide an overview of the changes that occurred between 1995 and 2007 
in the competitive market structure in each mall to assess the degree of foreign retailer 
impact. Changes to market structure are presented in Figures 5.1 to 5.6 for Mall 1 and 
Figures 5.7 to 5.12 for Mall 2, providing the number of foreign and domestic stores, as well 
as square footage and sales. Each figure presents the total percentage of Canadian retail 
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and the percentage of foreign retailers, which are categorized by format. Note that the 
menswear category does not apply to foreign retailers because there were no pure foreign 
menswear retailers entering Canada during this time; however, the domestic menswear 
retailers are included in the Canadian percentage numbers.  
This summary shows that foreign retailers were extremely successful in Canada between 
1995 and 2007, increasing their share of stores, square footage, and sales by over 200%. 
Although a degree of foreign entry had occurred prior to 1995 in each mall – such as the 
entry of Marks & Spencer, Levis, Benetton, and more recently the entry of the Gap, Banana 
Republic, and Guess during the early 1990’s – the overall percentage of stores, square 
footage, and sales escalated throughout the seventeen years of this study. This is 
particularly true for Mall 1, a mall that expanded and transitioned its tenant mix in the 
1990s, compared to the expansion and transitioning that occurred later in Mall 2 during the 
mid-2000s. This is believed to account for the smaller increase in sales in Mall 2 since many 
of the new foreign entries were just prior to 2007 and in the early stages of growth.  
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A detailed analysis of the mall data revealed that this increase in foreign growth came at the 
expense of a portion of the domestic apparel retailers. However, it should be noted that this 
has not been a zero-sum game, as both malls experienced significant growth in their apparel 
retail categories. Mall 1 expanded its clothing retail sales by nearly 150% over this period 
and Mall 2 had a slightly higher increase of 157% in sales from 1995 to 2007. For both malls, 
this growth can be attributed to square footage expansion and productivity performance 
improvement in the apparel categories. Statistics Canada trade data for clothing retail 
illustrates that the two malls experienced significantly greater rates of growth during this 
time period, as illustrated in Table 5.1. 
 Canadian Apparel Market Mall 1 Mall 2 
Year Total $ (in 
thousands) 
Annual growth (%) Annual growth 
(%) 
Annual growth 
(%) 
1991 12,810.00 N/A Base Year N/A 
1995 15,156.60 4.6% 63.4% Base Year 
2001 18,783.70 4.0% 8.7% 10.0% 
2007 23,846.80 4.5% 10.1% 10.1% 
Table 5.1 – Growth in apparel for total Canadian Market, Mall 1 and Mall 2 
 
Prior to 2004, trade data for Statistics Canada combined clothing and accessories, which is a 
significant limitation when making a direct comparison to the mall data. To clarify these 
statistics, Appendix 11 gives data on clothing sales as reported by Trendex, a North 
American company that tracks trends as well as the performance of retailers. However, 
while both the Statistics Canada and Trendex data contribute to an understanding of the 
macro clothing market, their methodologies demonstrate the challenges of gathering 
relevant data at a national level, which highlights the benefit of analyzing retailers at the 
micro level in the immediate or local market. Notably, both Statistics Canada and Trendex 
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show a comparatively slower growth in clothing than reports from the two major shopping 
centres. 
The micro perspective of mall apparel retailing shows that the foreign retail companies have 
had a direct impact on the growth of the market and have also contributed to a change in 
the sectoral competitiveness of the market, diminishing the domestic share. The impact of 
this development and the response from domestic retailers will be examined in the 
remainder of this chapter. 
5.4  Foreign Apparel Retail Entry as a Catalyst for Market Growth and 
Changes in Market Share 
In analyzing the two shopping centres, this study assessed the impact of foreign retail entry, 
evaluating their capture of Canadian market share. As previously discussed, the total size of 
the market for apparel business in the two malls grew significantly between 1995 and 2007, 
providing opportunity for all retailers, domestic and foreign, to potentially share in this 
growth. The following discussion will identify how market share was analyzed, what the 
outcome was for domestic and foreign retailers, and what this meant for the re-structuring 
of competition in the clothing sector. 
Market share has been traditionally calculated on the basis of dollar share of the total 
relevant market. Established initially as a key performance measure for brand 
manufacturers and tracked by third party firms such as A.C. Neilsen, a product such as 
Colgate toothpaste would be monitored for share of the total toothpaste market, both in 
dollar and unit sales. Historically, retailers have been less concerned with tracking market 
share, instead focusing on their own revenue growth based on the key performance 
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measure of comparable store sales growth, which is defined as the change in sales for the 
current year compared to the sales in the same stores last year. This performance measure 
factors out revenue growth from new store openings at a chain level and provides an 
important measure of productivity improvement for existing assets, which will be analyzed 
in more detail later in this chapter. Generally speaking, domestic retailers were less 
concerned about what percentage of market share they captured as long as they were 
achieving annual profitable growth. As previously discussed, the oligopolistic nature of the 
Canadian apparel sector was built on continuous chain growth through the rapid expansion 
of new shopping centres in the 1970s and 1980s in a generally stable and healthy economic 
environment. At the time, there was limited foreign threat to create disruption in the 
market, place, however, this would change from 1989 onward and the increasingly 
competitive marketplace forced domestic retailers to keep pace with increased market 
expansion, particularly when the total market growth slowed or declined during 
recessionary periods. Therefore, one of the fundamental impacts of the foreign retailers on 
the host country was to disrupt the oligopoly. 
From a retail perspective, assessing the impact of foreign retailers on domestic retailer 
market share essentially has three available measurements: number of stores as a 
percentage of the total number of competitive stores, square footage as a percentage of the 
total competitor store square footage, and the store’s sales as a percentage of the total 
competitive market sales. The share of sales is an important measure of the percentage of 
consumer dollars that the retailer is able to capture, yet if average sale information were 
available it would provide a more accurate calculation of the share of customers being 
captured in the market. The share of customers should be considered the most important 
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market share measurement, as it is most relevant in the financial performance of the firm, 
however, the other two measures also have significance in reflecting the overall shift in the 
marketplace from domestic to foreign retailers. As the number of stores in a mall owned by 
foreign retailers increases and the number of domestic retailers deceases, the stories of 
Canadian retailers that are displaced are important to help understand the impact of foreign 
entry on the sectoral competitiveness of existing retailers. In addition, the square footage 
owned by foreign or domestic retailers helps researchers measure the potential decline of 
Canadian retail presence in the mall. In much the same way that shelf facings are a critical 
factor for product presence, mall frontage for a store plays a key role in market presence of 
the retailer. The fact that retailers operate in different formats and with differing formulae 
also makes square footage a relevant measure of market share. The following analysis of the 
three values of market share will clarify the impact that foreign apparel retailers had on the 
host (Canadian) market. 
5.4.1  Number of Stores 
Change in the market share of stores can be an indication of overall growth in the number 
of stores and/or the cannibalization of store locations from competitors. The change in the 
market structure of foreign and Canadian stores can be seen in the increase of the number 
of foreign stores both through growth and through a decrease in the number of domestic 
locations. The overall change in the two malls can be summarized as follows: 
• Mall 1: the total number of clothing stores decreased by 10% from 1995 to 
2007, which allowed the number of foreign stores to increase by 130% as the 
number of Canadian stores decreased by 32%. 
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• Mall 2: the total number of clothing stores increased by 32% between 1995 
and 2007, which allowed the number of foreign stores to increase by 320% as 
the number of Canadian stores decreased by 20%.    
Within this context, as shown in Table 5.2, the percentage of foreign apparel stores in both 
Mall 1 and 2 increased significantly between 1995 and 2007. 
 Mall 1 Mall 2 
Year Total Stores Foreign Total Stores Foreign 
1995 72 14% 66 15% 
2001 67 21% 57 25% 
2007 65 35% 74 48% 
Table 5.2 – Percentage of foreign stores for Mall 1 and Mall 2 
 
One of the underlying factors to consider in analyzing changes in a mall’s tenant 
configuration is the mall renovation and expansion that took place: in the case of both Mall 
1 and 2, major renovation projects were undertaken during this time period. These 
renovations included both the addition of new mall space and the re-configuration of 
existing space, such as reducing department store space and converting it into in-line space. 
The variances in how new space was utilized in malls will have an impact on how the 
number of stores changed during this period. Figure 5.13 illustrates the year by year change 
in number of stores in Mall 1 and Figure 5.14 provides the same data for Mall 2. 
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Figure 5.13 – Mall 1 Number of Foreign and Canadian Apparel Stores by Year 1991 to 2007 
 
Figure 5.14: Mall 2 Number of Foreign and Canadian Stores by Year 1995 to 2007 
 
Both malls underwent accelerated growth during the period of 1995 to 2007. In the case of 
Mall 2, this is reflected not only in increased square footage, but also in the total number of 
apparel stores in the mall. The growth in total number of apparel stores was 12% between 
1995 and 2007. Therefore, the foreign retailer share of market can be seen as growing as 
the Canadian apparel market was renovating. In Mall 1, the total number of apparel stores 
actually declined between 1995 and 2007 by 10%. This is consistent with the findings of the 
CSCA 2009-07 report Tracking the Evolution of the Canadian Mall, which demonstrates the 
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switch to fewer but larger stores. The growth in Mall 2 is primarily a function of a larger 
increase in the total mall footprint. 
The number of Canadian apparel stores peaked in both malls in 1996: in Mall 1, 63 of 74 
apparel stores were Canadian, which declined to 42 of the 65 apparel stores in 2007. In Mall 
2, the peak number of Canadian stores in 1996 was 58 of 68, which declined to 45 of 74 in 
2007. The churn of Canadian retailers exiting these malls will be examined more closely later 
in this chapter as it represents an important understanding of the re-structuring that 
occurred in the clothing sector during this period. There were also a small number of foreign 
retailers that exited the market during this period (most notably Marks & Spencer).  
Analysis of the specific retailers entering the market in the two shopping centres revealed 
that the 1990s were dominated by the Gap Inc. group of companies, which include the Gap, 
Banana Republic, and Old Navy. A succession of other American retailers would follow, as 
well as the major European multi-nationals such as Zara and H&M in the first decade of the 
twenty first century. Most of the entry would be done through organic store growth, with 
foreign companies taking prime locations from domestic retailers as their lease terms were 
expiring, or as part of a larger mall expansion project. In a few cases, the foreign retailer 
would purchase assets of a domestic retailer, allowing them to gain immediate access to 
prime locations in multiple shopping centres. These methods of entry will be discussed later 
in this chapter to detail the impact that each foreign entry had on the competitive structure 
in the two malls.  
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5.4.2  Square Footage 
In analyzing the shift in market share of square footage, it can be seen that the foreign 
retailers contributed to and benefited from the overall growth of clothing retail space in the 
two malls. This can be summarized as follows: 
• In Mall 1, the total clothing square footage grew by 55% between 1995 and 
2007: during this time, the foreign square footage grew by 270% and the 
Canadian apparel square footage decreased by 11%. 
• In Mall 2, the total clothing square footage grew by 69% between 1995 and 
2007: during this time, the foreign square footage grew by 248% and the 
Canadian apparel square footage increased by 22%, which represented less than 
one-third of the new foreign square footage.  
Within this context (and consistent with the increase in number of foreign apparel stores, 
see Table 5.3), foreign retailers significantly increased their market share of square footage 
in the apparel market in the two Malls. 
 Mall 1 Mall 2 
Year Total Sq. Ft. Foreign Total Sq. Ft. Foreign 
1995 220,174 24% 236,073 21% 
2001 282,068 38% 262,183 25% 
2007 342,161 56% 399,553 43% 
Table 5.3 – Percentage of foreign square footage for Mall 1 and Mall 2 
 
By 2007, the share of square footage in both Mall 1 and Mall 2 had more than doubled since 
1995, with foreign clothing retailers in Mall 1 surpassing 50% share of square footage in 
2006. A review of the data illustrates that Mall 1 started the escalation of foreign store 
expansion in the second half of the 1990s, doubling the square footage between 1995 and 
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2001. This is consistent with the time lines for mall renovation and re-configuration of 
space, which started earlier in Mall 1 than Mall 2. Canadian apparel store square footage 
peaked in 1999 in Mall 1, which then declined or remained constant. Between 2004 and 
2005, foreign retail square footage surpassed total Canadian square footage for apparel 
stores in Mall 1. 
With Mall 2’s major expansion and renovation occurring in the mid-2000s, the accelerated 
growth of foreign clothing retailers can be linked to this time frame: although foreign retail 
entered Mall 2 later than Mall 1, the foreign retailers nearly tripled their square footage 
between 2001 and 2007. By 2007, foreign apparel stores accounted for 43% of the square 
footage in Mall 2. Figures 5.15 and 5.16 show the yearly change in square footage for each 
mall, highlighting the accelerated growth of foreign space domination in the 2000 to 2007 
period.  
 
Figure 5.15 – Mall 1 Square Footage for Foreign and Canadian Apparel Stores by Year 1991 to 2007 
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Figure 5.16 – Mall 2 Square Footage for Foreign and Canadian Apparel Retailers by Year, 1995 to 2007 
 
To a large extent, the profiles of Mall 1 and Mall 2 provided earlier in this chapter will 
explain some of the difference between these locations. Mall 1 allocated more space for 
foreign expansion based on the re-configuration of department store space. On average, 
foreign clothing retail space is 133% larger per store than Canadian stores, and there has 
been 61% growth in the size of the foreign store average in Mall 1 from 1995 to 2007. 
During the same period, Canadian clothing stores also increased their average size, but only 
at a 31% increase in average store size. The entry of H&M, Zara, Abercrombie & Fitch, 
Hollister, and the Gap in Mall 1 were significant contributors to foreign retailers capturing a 
significant share of the mall square footage. 
By comparison, the Mall 2 had a different trajectory for growth in foreign store square 
footage. Although similar foreign apparel brands entered Mall 2, they were allotted less 
square footage on average. In addition, there were several foreign brands such as Miss Sixty 
and Under the Belt that entered Mall 2 with significantly smaller footprints in the mid-
2000s, which lowered the average store size for foreign retailers. It should also be noted 
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that the foreign retailer average store size did not escalate in Mall 2 as it did in Mall 1, with 
the average store size only increasing by 20% between 1995 and 2007.  
 Mall 1 Mall 2 
Year Foreign Canadian Foreign Canadian 
1995 5,177 2,716 4,957 3,330 
2001 7,605 3,313 4,740 4,554 
2007 8,339 3,578 5,947 5,047 
Table 5.4 – Average size of store comparing foreign and Canadian retailers 
 
As seen in Table 5.4, the average Canadian apparel store size was larger in Mall 2 than Mall 
1 – closer to the size of foreign retailers. In fact, two stores in Mall 2 distort the average 
store size: if factored out of the comparison, the average store size for Canadian clothing 
retailers would be 3,824 square feet in 2007, which is still 7% larger than the average in Mall 
1 but overall more reflective of the typical clothing store in Mall 2. In summary, large 
footprints in and of themselves do not necessarily guarantee proportionately larger share of 
retail sales, which has been demonstrated through the deteriorating performance of the 
Gap and Old Navy through the 2000s. The impact of the store size would be a significant 
point of discussion in the interviews with the industry experts and would certainly become a 
factor in the role of the larger stores in mall renovation and expansion in the later years of 
this study. 
5.4.3 Sales 
With new store openings and the additional square footage in apparel stores the impact on 
distribution of sales across new competitors is the natural extension of changing sectoral 
competitiveness. The analysis of the two malls provides an understanding of the impact on 
the overall size of the market and on the individual retailer’s share. To provide a context for 
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analyzing the change in market share of domestic and foreign clothes retailers, it is useful to 
summarize the overall changes in the apparel market in each mall: 
• In Mall 1 the total clothing sales increased by 144% between 1995 and 2007: 
during that time, foreign apparel sales increased by 568% and domestic retail 
sales increased by 30.4% at a dollar growth rate of one-fifth that of the 
foreign retailers. 
• In Mall 2 the total clothing sales increased by 157% between 1995 and 2007: 
during that time, foreign apparel sales increased by 391% and domestic retail 
sales increased by 102% at a nearly identical dollar growth rate.   
With significant growth in number of foreign apparel stores entering the two malls and the 
increase in the foreign share of square footage, the share of clothing sales captured by 
foreign retailers would have dramatic growth between 1995 and 2007, as shown in Table 
5.5:  
 Mall 1 Mall 2 
Year Foreign Foreign 
1995 21% 19% 
2001 41% 26% 
2007 58% 36% 
Table 5.5 – Sales of foreign apparel retailers as a percentage of total apparel sales 
Major malls are ideal sites for studying the impact of foreign clothing retailers on the 
domestic retail sector because malls demonstrate what has happened to the total apparel 
market in major shopping centres and how the share of this market has been divided 
between foreign and Canadian retailers. The following performance measures highlight this 
growth: 
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• In Mall 1, Total Apparel Sales have increased 144.5% between 1995 and 2007, 
averaging more than 10% annual growth over 13 years. This is substantially better 
than the Canadian average growth rate of 4.0% as reported by Statistics Canada (see 
Table 5.1 for comparisons). 
• Foreign retailers have accounted for 83.1% of that growth, increasing sales by 
567.9% from 1995 to 2007. Canadian retailers also grew during the same period but 
at a much slower rate of 30.4%, which is an average of 2% annual growth over 
twelve years, accounting for the remaining 16.9% of total market growth in apparel 
sales in Mall 1. 
• By comparison, Mall 2 has seen similar total clothing sales growth of 157.2% from 
1995 to 2007, averaging just slightly better than the annual growth at Mall 1. 
• At Mall 2, foreign retailers also out-paced their Canadian competition in growth, 
increasing sales by 390.5% from the 1995 foreign store base. However, this growth 
only accounts for 47.2% of the total Mall 2 sales increase in apparel over twelve 
years: Canadian clothing stores retained a significantly greater share of market and 
market growth in Mall 2 than in Mall 1. Canadian retailers realized growth of 102.4% 
from their 1995 base, which accounted for 52.8% overall growth in the Mall 2 
apparel sales. 
These results show a significant capture of market share by foreign retailers, accumulating a 
58% share of Mall 1 and a 36% share of Mall 2 by 2007. As illustrated in Figure 5.17, the 
amount of square footage allocated to foreign retailers in Mall 1 allowed them to dominate 
market share in sales. This is consistent with the finding that foreign retailers overtook 
Canadian retailers in both share of square footage and sales in 2004/05. The situation in 
Mall 2, shown in Figure 5.18, reflects a more gradual increase of foreign retailer market 
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share, however, foreign retail share accelerated in the more recent six-year period (from 
26% in 2001 to 36% in 2007).  
 
Figure 5.17 – Mall 1 Sales (normalized) by Foreign and Canadian Apparel Stores by Year, 1991 to 2007 
 
Figure 5.18 – Mall 2 Sales (normalized) for Foreign and Canadian Apparel Stores by Year, 1995 to 2007 
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5.4.4 Summary of Change in Market Structure 
In summary, the entry of foreign retailers has been significant in the re-structuring of the 
apparel market. Through the study of two major malls as a microcosm for the apparel 
market, it can be demonstrated that the entry of foreign apparel retailers has had the 
following impact on the domestic clothing retailers: 
1. The total market for clothing in major malls has grown significantly faster than the 
total apparel market in Canada. 
2. The addition of square footage devoted to apparel in these malls has contributed to 
this growth. 
3. The foreign retailer’s share of market has grown substantially and at significantly 
greater rates than Canadian clothing retailers in measurements of number of stores, 
square footage, and overall sales. 
4. Although Canadian retailers have also experienced sales growth, it has happened at 
a slower rate than the foreign retailers. As a result, the total market has been re-
structured to reduce the percentage share of domestic retailers in these two malls, 
allowing a continuous trend toward foreign dominance in the major malls. 
At the beginning of this chapter, the apparel sector in a “typical” top tier Canadian mall was 
described to set  the context for the changes that would occur through the 1990s up to 
2007. The performance data from two major shopping centres has been analyzed and can 
be summarized to show how the apparel sector has changed during this time: 
Mall Anchors 
• 2 Department Stores: in 2007, only Sears Canada and The Bay remain (both under US 
controlling ownership) 
• Mass Merchandisers such as Walmart and Zellers are typically located near but not in 
the major shopping centre as an anchor 
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In-line Retail Tenants by Category and Percentage of In-line Square Footage for Mall 1 with 
comparison to 1989/90  
                     2007      1989 
• Apparel, Footwear, and Accessories   65%  62% 
• Food      10%   8% 
• Gifts, Cards and Stationary       2% 10% 
• Health and Beauty        6%   7% 
• Electronics, Music        5%    6% 
• Sporting Goods and Toys       5%   3% 
• Household Goods        3%   2% 
• Other         4%    2% 
 
By contrast to the decline in most other major product categories in the mall, the 3% 
increase in total square footage for apparel and related products reflects the importance 
that landlords have placed on the clothing sector to generate traffic and revenues. The 
mall’s overall square footage for in-line retail has more than quadrupled between 1989 and 
2007 and, in addition to this substantial growth, the apparel and related categories have 
experienced further expansion. With the exception of menswear-only retail, which remains 
100% Canadian owned, the foreign square footage has exceeded the growth of the market 
and now dominates the mall with 56% of the total apparel square footage. This has come at 
the expense of Canadian retail square footage, which has also grown but not at the same 
pace as foreign retailers.  
5.5 Competitive Changes in the Shopping Centre 
The entry of foreign retailers affected significant competitive changes in the Canadian 
apparel sector, re-structuring the market share for apparel retail in the two malls under 
study. From the data analyzed for the shopping centres, there are three major competitive 
changes that can be identified: 
1. The growth of Unisex apparel formats 
2. The re-configuration of major shopping centre space allocations 
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3. The churn of domestic retailers 
These competitive changes represent the causes for much of the shift in market share from 
domestic to foreign, as well as the effects on the Canadian clothing retailers that would 
unfold over the 1989 to 2007 period. Having established that retail internationalization had 
a direct impact on the sectoral competitiveness in the two malls, the remainder of this 
chapter will address the processes that led to this change. 
5.5.1  The Growth of Unisex Apparel Formats – Foreign Apparel Retail Entry as a Catalyst 
for Change in Format Dominance 
The entry of foreign apparel retailers has been marked by one dominant characteristic: they 
arrived in a unisex format. This is particularly the case among the early entrants: companies 
such as the Gap, Banana Republic, Eddie Bauer, Levis, Benetton, Mexx, Old Navy, and 
American Eagle all entered the market by 2001 and all catered to more than one gender. 
Talbots and Bebe proved to be the only women’s wear foreign retailers to enter during the 
same period with a lasting impact, and no pure foreign menswear retailers have entered 
Canada at any time during this study. Toward the latter part of this study, companies such 
as Mango and BCBG have entered the market, but with limited success. Therefore one can 
conclude that the entry of foreign apparel retailers has been a catalyst for change in market 
positioning through an increased dominance of unisex retailers. 
The unisex format is predominately an offering to both female and male customer 
segments, with a heavier emphasis on the female merchandise in keeping with the 
proportionately larger market for women’s apparel than men’s apparel. In some cases, 
children’s wear is also part of the offering to target the full range of family apparel within 
their consumer segments – most notably in H&M and Old Navy. American retailers in 
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particular often began with merchandise focused on denim. The Gap was an early adaptor 
of this model and developed a unisex product line to serve both female and male 
consumers. In contrast, European retailers can be seen to have evolved from a specialty 
department store mentality. In both scenarios, the evolution and growth of unisex retail 
formats in the later part of the twentieth century was further embedded in significant shifts 
in consumer attitudes and behaviours, such as the acceptance of more casual dress in the 
workplace and the increasing role of the female as the dominant and influential consumer. 
Both the European and American apparel retailers are seen to have seized on these 
consumer and competitive changes to their advantage. Further rationale for the 
predominance of the unisex format was extrapolated in the interview questions for industry 
experts and will be addressed in Chapter 6. 
In Table 5.6, the growth of the unisex format in the two major malls is clearly demonstrated. 
From this table, it can be concluded that the performance of the unisex stores has clearly 
out-paced that of either women’s wear or menswear stores. Since sales growth has 
exceeded the growth in square footage, the unisex retailers are more productive in revenue 
generation from their stores. In addition, the physical dominance of the unisex format is 
evidenced by the significantly greater growth in square footage.  
 Mall 1 Mall 2 
Year 1995 2007 1995 2007 
Unisex % of 
apparel stores 
37.5% 46.2% 32.3% 47.9% 
Foreign % of 
unisex stores 
29.6% 56.7% 33.0% 62.9% 
Unisex % of 
apparel sq. ft. 
45.1% 64.9% 46.0% 63.6% 
Foreign % of 
unisex sq. ft. 
47.0% 76.1% 39.8% 59.0% 
Unisex % of 
apparel sales 
47.2% 69.5% 46.3% 67.6% 
Foreign % of 
unisex sales 
42.0% 76.4% 34.7% 45.9% 
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Table 5.6 – Growth in unisex retail and foreign share of unisex retail 
By all measures – number of stores, square footage and sales – the period from 1995 to 
2007 marked the growth and eventual dominance of the unisex format within the apparel 
sector. In both malls, the share of market by unisex format rose from less than 50% of the 
square footage and sales in 1995 to over two-thirds of the square footage and sales by 
2007. The rise of unisex among specialty chains would facilitate a further re-structuring of 
the market by landlords through the redistribution of space away from traditional anchor 
stores to a new form of mini-anchor.   
Canadian apparel retailers have also operated in a unisex format, however, as clearly 
demonstrated in Table 5.7, the domestic retailers have not been able to hold their market 
share in the unisex category. The number of Canadian unisex stores peaked in 1995 in both 
malls: 19 in Mall 1 and 14 in Mall 2. In 2006, the number of foreign unisex stores had 
surpassed the number of domestic stores in Mall 1 – in Mall 2, this transition occurred 
earlier in 2003. As of 2007, both malls had 13 Canadian unisex retail stores still operating. Of 
the 19 domestic unisex retailers operating in Mall 1 in 1995, nine stores had closed by 2007. 
In Mall 2, the mix of domestic retailers was slightly less at 38% of the 1995 domestic unisex 
stores. 
 Mall 1 Mall 2 
Year Canadian Foreign Canadian Foreign 
1995 70% 30% 67% 33% 
2001 59% 41% 48% 52% 
2007 43% 57% 37% 63% 
Table 5.7 – Percentage of unisex stores, Canadian and Foreign 
 
As the impact of the foreign entries shifted the market to a dominant unisex format, the 
number of domestic retailers exiting the malls the Canadian increased, although not always 
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in a hasty desperate manner. Instead, Canadian retailers have proven to be successful by 
creating well-defined niche unisex concepts. Three very successful Canadian unisex 
operators are: 
1. Lululemon: the concept originated as a yoga apparel specialist for women and has 
evolved into a unisex niche specialist. Stores are typically 5000 square feet or 
smaller, with a focus on service and consumer loyalty. In 2006, a private US equity 
firm acquired the company and eventually took it public. Lululemon is now 
expanding internationally with stores in the US and Australia. Their unisex formula is 
based on a lifestyle segmentation, which differs from the more demographic- and 
fashion-profiled American and European unisex formulas of Zara, H&M, and the 
Gap. 
2. Danier Leather: a specialty leather apparel retailer operating in mall stores and 
power centres. The company is publicly traded on the TSX. The formula is built on a 
niche, highly specialized market; in this case, targeting dominance in a narrow 
category of leather goods across a range of fashion and price points. Leather 
products have not been a focus of any of the foreign entries.  
3. Roots: started in 1974, Roots has adapted over the years to the changing 
competitive market and, while wandering occasionally from its strong Canadian 
heritage, it has returned to that niche and services a loyal customer segment. 
Privately held, the company has still managed to expand internationally with stores 
in Taiwan. 
These three companies have been the most successful Canadian unisex retailers. They have 
remained competitive because they chose not to compete on size, preferring to optimize 
their store footprint and focus on productivity to generate profitability.  
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Other domestic retailers have chosen to compete on a fashion-value offering comparable to 
some of the foreign unisex retailers, but the challenges have been greater and the results 
mixed. A retailer such as Le Chateau, often considered the ‘Canadian H&M’, has continued 
to compete directly with foreign retailers as they enter the market, but with erratic results. 
Le Chateau and many others have attempted to chase the larger store size of the foreign 
entries, but eventually to retreat to smaller square footage and focus on profitability 
through productivity. For example, RW&Co is a new format (introduced by Reitmans in 
2001) that markets itself as a value-based product to carve out a share of the market, 
keeping itself distinct from the fashion-forward unisex formula. However, it is difficult to 
judge the success of this approach, as the profitability of RW&Co is not public information.  
Alternatively, many Canadian retailers have taken a different competitive strategy and 
stayed either pure women’s wear or menswear. Choosing not to compete directly in the 
unisex formulae, retailers such as Aritzia and LaSenza have proven to be highly successful 
competitors in the Canadian market. LaSenza has also experienced dramatic growth 
internationally, representing one of the few Canadian retailers to achieve success outside of 
the domestic market. In menswear retail, the domestic market has been dominated by the 
Harry Rosen chain of stores at the upper end and chains such as Tip Top and Grafton Fraser 
in the middle market. External to the mall environment, Moore’s was purchased by the 
American company The Men’s Wearhouse Inc. in 1999 and continues to dominate the 
domestic value position in menswear. Given the high cost of occupancy in Canada, many 
women’s apparel retailers have decided not to expand into menswear, which is relatively 
easy to understand as menswear has historically lower margins and a much smaller total 
market. In addition, despite the dominance of the unisex format, the ladies market 
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continued to grow in the two malls studied. The entry of foreign women’s wear competitors 
has been minimal and proven to be much weaker competition than the foreign unisex 
retailers.  
For Canadian menswear retailers, the structure of the market has looked somewhat 
different. There have been no foreign stand-alone menswear entries into these two major 
malls, yet there has been considerable expansion in the number of competitors in 
menswear due to the unisex format expansion. This has put competitive pressure on the 
younger-focused menswear retailers, which causes considerable churn in this category. By 
contrast, men’s retailers see the women’s category as appealing due to higher margins and 
faster turnover, however, attempts by market leader Harry Rosen and long-established 
Grafton Group to enter the women’s wear category have been hugely unsuccessful. As a 
result, the re-structuring of the Canadian market between 1989 and 2007 forced menswear 
retailers to focus on strengthening their category position, leaving the women’s category to 
other competitors. The domestic success that came with focusing solely on women’s wear 
or menswear would suggest that business acumen for one format does not necessarily 
transfer to another – in this market, it is better to focus on one or the other. 
5.5.2 Major Shopping Centre Re-configuration of Space Allows Entry of Large Format 
Foreign Apparel Chains as Mini-Anchors   
Traditionally, the position of ‘anchor’ in a major mall was the domain of the department 
store. As previously discussed, the demise of Canadian department stores such as Eaton’s, 
Simpsons, and other regional stores in the 1990s accelerated the need to find alternatives 
for the retail space to draw customers to malls. As a result, a further re-structuring of the 
apparel market took place in Canada between 1989 and 2007: mall landlords reconfigured 
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large spaces and created mini-anchors with the foreign unisex apparel stores. This new role 
for a specialty chain had advantages in both market positioning and financial impact on the 
domestic clothing sector. 
There has been much debate whether the landlords of retail spaces enticed foreign retailers 
with preferential leasing offers or if foreign retailers negotiated deals. Regardless, the 
impact of foreign retailers on the configuration of the major malls and the response of 
Canadian retailers portray a significant re-structuring of the mall landscape. In both Mall 1 
and Mall 2, what was once prime department store space was given to H&M, Zara, the Gap, 
and Old Navy. With square footage exceeding 15,000 per unit the landlords created a new 
category of lease that didn’t quite meet the no-rent clauses of the department stores, giving 
preferential rental rates and reduced ancillary costs to large foreign retailers. The only 
Canadian retailers that could compete in the mini-anchor role are Holt Renfrew and Harry 
Rosen, however, both of these companies target the high end of the market and are located 
in relatively few malls and high streets across the country.  
From a Canadian retailer perspective, the creation of these mini-anchors with foreign unisex 
retailers completely changed the competitive structure of the mall market. The Canadian 
clothing retailers were no longer in-line stores between two weakened department stores: 
previously favourable mall locations held by the legacy Canadian clothing retailers were 
weakened depending upon how the mall re-structured its layout to accommodate the new 
mini-anchors. Of greatest significance was the impact on leasing structures: with large 
square footage being leased to the foreign retailers at reduced rents and landlords incurring 
significant costs to renovate space, the renewal leases for existing domestic retailers were 
priced at much higher costs. As many domestic leases had been originally negotiated in the 
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1970s and 1980s and were well under prevailing market value, this made the shock of the 
new competitive market even more difficult for many legacy Canadian clothing retailers. 
Many Canadian retailers were faced with the task of generating large sales increases to 
maintain their current space at higher rents, or down-sizing their space and moving to less 
prime locations in the mall. As noted in several retail expert interviews, the relationship 
between landlord and retailer was now tougher to negotiate, as it became clear that many 
mall owners were pro-foreign and anti-domestic.  
The creation of the mini-anchor brought a new pecking order to the apparel industry, even 
for the foreign retailers. The Gap, Old Navy, H&M, and Zara were used to operating in large 
format stores either in malls or on street locations. These companies were also used to 
strong competition from other specialty retailers and department stores: their business 
model was based on lower occupancy costs – typical in the US and European markets – as 
well as the ability to establish a brand position. The foreign retail entry into Canada created 
a unique positioning in the market, as the dominant apparel retailers had experience and 
were courted by the mall landlords to draw consumer traffic. The creation of the mini-
anchor elevated their market positioning and created a multi-tiered structure within the 
apparel sector. Due to smaller store footprints and different financials, Canadian clothing 
retailers would need to find new ways to compete in this tiered structure. 
5.5.3 Attrition/Churn – The Impact of Foreign Retail Entry on Domestic Retailers 
Between 1989 and 2007, the attrition of Canadian retailers in the two malls was 50%. During 
the same period, the attrition for foreign retailers who entered and exited the two malls 
was 14%. This degree of turnover in the malls highlights the impact that competitive change 
can have on a domestic sector as foreign companies enter the market. Although foreign 
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retailers became dominant in these two malls, these numbers highlight that not all foreign 
retailers were successful, at least in specific mall locations –the discussion section of this 
chapter will identify who were the foreign casualties in the competitive battle. The attrition 
that followed foreign retail expansion takes on several different outcomes and scenarios, 
not only resulting from another retailer closing shop and going out of business. For this 
reason, the term churn is considered more appropriate for expressing the effects that 
competitive change had on these two malls.  
Within the context of business, the churn rate measures the movement of various elements 
of the business – often used to assess the turnover of employees or customers by a 
company, it is generally viewed as synonymous with the term attrition. To analyze the 
degree of change in retail stores in the two malls, a churn rate was calculated for each mall 
to compare the Canadian rate to the rate of comparable foreign retailers. The results of this 
analysis are shown in below: 
 Mall 1 Mall 2 
Formula Canadian Foreign Canadian Foreign 
Unisex 14 of 28 3 of 19 10 of 23 1 of 20 
Women’s 25 of 49 1 of 7 27 of 51 3 of 10 
Men’s 6 of 11 N/A 5 of 11 N/A 
Total 45 of 88 4 of 26 42 of 85 4 of 30 
Percentage 51% 15% 49% 13% 
Table 5.8 – Total stores by formula and number of churn between 1989 and 2007 
 
Table 5.8 illustrates the period 1989 to 2007, demonstrating each formulae for the number 
of retail stores operating in the mall and the number of stores remaining. For example, in 
Mall 1 there were 28 different unisex Canadian apparel retailers that operated for some 
portion (or the entirety) of that time period. Of those 28, 14 retailers were not operating as 
Canadian unisex retailers by 2007; therefore, the attrition was 50%, or a churn rate of 1:2. 
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For Canadian retailers, there is not a wide variation between formulae: unisex, women’s and 
men’s domestic retailers have all been susceptible to attrition. As a result, the largest 
numbers for attrition have been in the women’s apparel category where the largest number 
of Canadian retailers operated, but menswear has also undergone churn at a similar rate. 
Appendix 12 provides an examination of the movements for all retailers tracked in Mall 1 
and Mall 2. This clearly demonstrates the overall degree of churn among domestic retailers 
and the increasing entry of foreign retailers in the final years of this study. 
Foreign attrition can be summarized as one major foreign retailer (Marks & Spencer) exiting 
the market in 1999 and a few small designer and brand retailers – such as Laura Ashley, 
Mondi and Acquascutum – opening and exiting in a short time frame. It is not surprising that 
there has been some churn in the foreign retailers, however, the low ratio of 1:7 compared 
to the domestic 1:2 demonstrates that internationalizing foreign retailers have been 
successful against previously more established competition.  
For domestic retailers, there are three different types of churn that have been identified 
and a fourth type of movement that, although separate from the ratio of attrition, reflects 
the impact of re-structuring in the mall. The three types of churn and the fourth movement 
are: 
• Closing of the Business 
• Re-formulating the Business 
• Proactively Selling the Business 
• Re-location within the Mall 
 
Closing the Business 
A large percentage of the churn in both Mall 1 and Mall 2 resulted from small companies 
going out of business, forcing them to close their stores. Some of these companies were 
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independents attempting to succeed in the mall environment, e.g., Robin Kay. Others would 
be second or third banners of a retailer operating under a different concept in the mall, e.g., 
Sirens as a separate banner from the primary banner Stitches. And some were concepts that 
had too many players, such as maternity or lingerie stores. In most cases, these companies 
were only able to stay in major malls a relatively short period of time, usually less than 5 
years. 
Between 1989 and 2007 the re-structuring of the apparel market would have one 
particularly high-profile victim: Dylex Limited, which was once the dominant specialty chain 
company in Canada. Unfortunately, this corporation would divest of its various retail 
banners during bankruptcy proceedings: divisions such as Fairweather and Tip Top Tailors 
would be sold to other Canadian retail companies and continue to operate under these 
banners. Two other divisions, Braemar and Thrifty’s, would not survive the divestment and 
their real estate leases were sold to American Eagle Outfitters (AOE) in 2000, opening the 
door for another American retailer to enter the market with quality real estate locations. It 
should be noted that part of this transaction would see AEO sell some of these locations to 
Canadian retailer YM Inc., resulting in the creation of the Bluenotes chain. While the demise 
of Dylex Limited was certainly the most high-profile re-structuring in the apparel sector in 
Canada, other consolidation would occur: Reitman’s was an active purchaser of smaller 
chains such as Dalmy’s, and YM Inc. would purchase Suzy Shier as part of the Dylex break-
up. It should be noted that not all churn was amongst domestic retailers. During the period 
of 1995 to 2007, foreign retailers such as Esprit would enter, exit, and re-enter. In addition, 
Mondi, Dockers, Benetton, and Marks & Spencer would all exit during this time frame.  
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Re-formulating the Business 
Churn can also be seen in retailers that re-formulated their concept by exiting the major 
malls for alternative locations. Domestic companies such as Dalmy’s, Northern Reflections, 
and Tabi are examples of such legacy retailers who expanded aggressively through the 
1970s and 80s and then exited major shopping centres as the competitive environment 
changed. These domestic retailers abandoned the escalating rents and internationalizing 
competition of the major malls for the lower-cost power centres and second tier malls.  
The typical path of re-formulation was initiated in the late 1980s as new mall development 
slowed and power centre development ramped up. These retailers developed strategies to 
operate in these new centres and for a period of time operated two formulas that often 
became blurred in their differentiation. As leases came due in the major malls, domestic 
retailers were faced with dramatically higher rents and the prospect of being moved to less 
desirable locations in the major malls. These increasingly discount-driven companies started 
to prefer the power centre locations, as the re-structuring of the competitive environment 
in the major malls forced out many domestic retailers that had previously been mainstays of 
the major mall competitive set. Notably, only a select few domestic apparel retailers were 
able to take advantage of the new power centre expansion and simultaneously sustain 
successful operations in major shopping centres. For example, Roots launched Roots ’74 as 
its off-price offering and Danier Leather opened stores with merchandise skewed to the 
value end of its merchandise offering. As previously noted, these are two Canadian retailers 
that have found their competitive niches in the changed market structure of malls and have 
also built well-defined chains for the secondary and discount markets. Their success is 
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considered unique in the market, with only a small number of other domestic retailers (such 
as LaSenza) able to sustain their primary business and re-formulate a second business. 
Proactively Selling the Business 
As the re-structuring of the apparel sector in Canada continued through the period 1989 to 
2007, some domestic retailers seized the opportunity to sell their business. Unlike those 
domestic retailers discussed previously, these were not always companies facing closure, 
but were sometimes successful companies who determined that they either required 
additional investment to compete or would benefit from new ownership. Most notable of 
these companies are: 
• Club Monaco: sold to American retailer Polo Ralph Lauren in 1999 and continues to 
operate under the Club Monaco banner in Canada 
• Aritzia: entered into a partnership with American private equity firm Berkshire 
Partners LLC in 2005 to attain sufficient capital for international expansion 
• LaSenza: sold in 2006 to The Limited Brands, owner of the Victoria Secret chain of 
lingerie stores. LaSenza had successfully expanded internationally through the 2000s 
and was seen as a effective acquisition for Limited Brands to gain foreign retail 
experience. 
• Lululemon: sold 48% in 2005 to Advent International, in partnership with American 
private equity firm Highland Capital. In 2007, Lululemon became a publicly traded 
company with plans for international expansion. 
• Hudson’s Bay Company: sold in 2006 to American businessman Jerry Zucker and his 
company The InterTech Group. With little challenge from the Canadian government 
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or public, the oldest Canadian (and North American) retailer moved into foreign 
ownership.  
Research has demonstrated that these retailers represent some of the very best of Canadian 
apparel retail companies. The fact that their ownership no longer resides in Canada poses 
the question: what constitutes a domestic or foreign retailer? For the purposes of this study, 
the following decisions were made to distinguish domestic and foreign status for these 
specific retailers: 
• Club Monaco was classified as Canadian until the end of 1999 and then included in 
the foreign data from 2000 to 2007. After 2000, the company was deemed American 
because the management of the company was closed in Canada and transferred to 
the US. 
• Aritzia and Lululemon were classified as Canadian throughout the analysis because 
their management remained in Canada and they continued to operate solely as 
Canadian operations throughout the time frame of this study. 
• HBC and La Senza are outside the scope of the data used for this study and were not 
part of the direct analysis. 
The domestic-foreign debate is complex, raising important considerations of the 
international and local nature of the retail business. However, the location of a company’s 
origin, financial ownership, and primary management decision-making seems relatively 
straightforward to establish home country, regardless of how many other countries have 
stores. H&M would be a prime example of such retailers. On the other hand, although 
Inditex’s banner Zara is very similar, during the time of this study its licensing agreements in 
foreign countries, including Canada, makes it less clear on whether Zara is a foreign or 
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domestic retailer. For purposes of this analysis it was deemed foreign, as Reitman’s took 
little active involvement in the business. The Lululemon and Aritzia examples are perhaps 
the most complex, as financial ownership imply governance and control, suggesting that 
these retailers became foreign in 2005; however, the operations themselves did not change, 
which suggests that they are still fundamentally domestic retailers. If operational processes 
or the local nature of the retail business were considered to be most relevant to this debate, 
then Hess’ (2004) study of embeddedness would raise the contrary view: he believes that 
once a company becomes part of the market structure, its origin is of less relevance to the 
competitive environment. The need to clarify the issue of foreign and domestic will become 
increasingly important as the rate of retail internationalization progresses. Within the 
context of studying the impacts of foreign entry on the domestic retailers, this factor will be 
discussed further in Chapter 6, as it has significant implications for how one interprets the 
internationalization process.  
Re-location within the Mall 
Tracking the activity of domestic and foreign retailers in the two major malls between 1989 
and 2007 revealed considerable changes in the square footage of stores as well as intra-mall 
movement of stores. This was primarily identified through reports showing stores increasing 
or decreasing the store footprint from one year to another. Although the specific details of 
the moves within the mall could not be tracked by the data available, it is possible to 
conclude that the profile of a Canadian mall as defined at the beginning of this chapter 
changed dramatically during this time period. Early in the Canadian retail market, prime 
locations were once the domain of Dylex Limited, however, the prime locations in renovated 
malls would eventually be reserved for new foreign entrants. At the same time, top 
 
 
154 
performing stores, including Canadian retailers, would be given the adjacent prime spots, 
which began the ‘in mall shuffle’ that sees on-going churn within the ‘prime-location 
ladder’.  
There are many examples of this movement within major malls, but the re-location story of 
Fairweather in one of the major malls best illustrates the changing fortunes of a formerly 
best-in-class Canadian clothing retailer. When the mall opened in a prime location in 
Toronto, Dylex Limited (parent of Fairweather) was still the leading chain operator of 
clothing stores. Through its dominance, Dylex acquired a lease for Fairweather immediately 
outside of the Eaton’s department store at the main hub of the new mall. With 
approximately 7500 square feet, the store was considered a flagship for the Fairweather 
chain and a top performer. However, by the 1990s the competitive position of Fairweather 
had begun to decline and, due to a re-configuration of space in the mall, it would be re-
located from the top floor hub location to a second floor in-line space of 9,000 square feet. 
Fairweather remained a pure women’s wear operation, but was caught in the financial 
demise of Dylex Limited and eventually sold to International Clothiers Inc. During this 
period, the women’s wear chain continued to lose its share in the market. The final move 
for Fairweather came after years of deteriorating performance, exiting from the mall in late 
2007. For all retailers, this internal churn can become a self-fulfilling prophecy: the better a 
company performs, the better the location it receives, which allows it to keep performing 
well. Yet when a retailer starts struggling, the churn rates show that Canadian retailers 
move down the ladder to less prime locations, which is often the first step toward exiting 
the major mall. 
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5.6 Key Performance Indicators – Market Share and Asset Productivity  
As important as market share may be to a retailer, productivity of mall space is the primary 
measure for landlord’s to gauge success, reflecting the ability of the developer to manage 
their space to maximize the total revenue output of the mall. The pressure to increase the 
return on investment for the Canadian mall owners would escalate as the major developers 
were purchased by large pension and investment funds. The fund managers were solely 
focused on ROI and would set standards for mall performance accordingly, increasing the 
pressure on the mall management to focus on productivity. The data from these two malls 
clearly show the importance placed by the majority of foreign retailers on maximizing 
market share through large productive stores. In most cases, this has proven to be a 
successful strategy, although by 2007 the burden of large square footage was beginning to 
show its impact on the Gap. As the company struggled to find its position against new 
European competition, the productivity of its large stores was declining, negatively affecting 
measures of sales per square foot. Other companies such as Club Monaco and the Canadian 
retailer Roots had chased the larger store concept during the time frame of this study, but 
also struggled with the burden of profitability. By the mid-2000s, these companies would re-
structure, returning to smaller yet more productive square footage models.  
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Figure 5.19 – Mall 1 Comparative Sales per Square Foot (normalized) for Foreign and Canadian Apparel 
Retailers by Year, 1991 to 2007 
 
Figure 5.20 – Mall 2 Comparative Sales per Square Foot (normalized) for Foreign and Canadian Apparel 
Stores by Year, 1995 to 2007 
 
Figures 5.19 and 5.20 illustrate the relative performance of the foreign and domestic 
retailers in the two malls. In particular, the domestic companies would find it difficult to 
competitively position their retailers in this changing market, and would expand almost 
exclusively on a model of smaller and highly productive store formulas: by 2007, using this 
strategy, the top performing stores in the two malls based on productivity would be 
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Canadian retailers. Although their total market share was nowhere near the larger foreign 
retailers, strong sales per square foot would make these domestic clothing retailers the 
darlings of the landlords and provide them with access to centre court and high traffic hub 
locations in the major shopping centres. As previously discussed, these Canadian retailers 
would be niche formulas with a well-developed focus on their consumer. Based on the 
empirical evidence from the two malls, the period of 1995 to 2007 would see a re-
structuring of the domestic clothing market into a group of highly productive niche retailers 
who fought to stay competitive in good mall locations. 
5.7 Summary – The Empirical Evidence of Foreign Retailer Role as Catalyst for 
Re-structuring of the Apparel Sector 
The analysis of the two major malls has illustrated that the entry of foreign apparel retailers 
was a catalyst for re-structuring of the competitive environment. In this time period, market 
share has shifted to the foreign retailers, traditional mall anchor structures have changed, 
and the dominance of unisex over pure women’s wear and menswear retailers has 
prevailed. Notably, each of these changes can be directly linked to the role of the foreign 
retailer’s entry into Canada. Foreign retailers have purchased many of the prime real estate 
locations in Canada, as well as purchasing failing companies and investing in successful 
domestic retailers, which has resulted in a re-structured apparel retail market with much 
greater foreign market share. The empirical data from the two malls have consistently 
supported these findings, however, foreign retailers cannot be held fully accountable for the 
full extent of the churn in the domestic portion of the market. From the broader perspective 
of the underperformance associated with much of the churn amongst domestic retailers, it 
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is equally attributable to the vulnerability and accessibility of the Canadian retail apparel 
sector, which allowed a relatively easy entry for these foreign retailers.  
This study has begun to address Dawson’s appeal for empirical data to assess the impact of 
foreign retailers on the host country. The mall data has provided measurable change in both 
market share and the types of competitive activity that contributed to and resulted from the 
change in sectoral competitiveness. The study of the two malls has also identified points of 
impact that contribute to an understanding of what occurs when foreign retailers entry a 
host market, however, the data alone cannot fully explain many qualitative points, such as 
why the impact occurs, when it occurs, and where and to whom. Yet the quantitative 
analysis does provide a solid picture from which interpretation of what happened and when 
can be further examined. It is this deeper understanding that is sought through the 
interview of industry experts and reported on in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 – Analysis of Industry Expert Interviews 
6.1   Overview 
As defined in the Dawson framework, the change in sectoral competitiveness will be used to 
examine the impact of international retailers on the Canadian retail market. In order to 
identify and analyze the types of impacts that occurred between 1989 and 2007, interviews 
were conducted with twenty-one retail industry experts. Their experience and insights into 
the competitive behaviours of both the foreign entrants and the domestic incumbents are 
reported here. This Qualitative Study will support many of the findings presented in Chapter 
5 and elaborate on why the entry of foreign retailers into the Canadian clothing sector was 
able to change the competitive structure of the market. The industry experts also provide 
evidence that the domestic retailers were a contributing factor in these structural changes, 
both as positive forces and as victims of their own complacency. 
The structure of this chapter will provide an overview and discussion of each of Dawson’s 
(2003) five impacts, as well as sub-factors that are exemplified in the quotes drawn from the 
twenty-one interviews. This analysis of twenty-one interviews will result in the identification 
of significant sub-factors within each of Dawson’s (2003) model. The interview analysis will 
also integrate expert insights into the structural changes identified in the Quantitative Study 
(addressed in the question six of the interview). Collectively, the industry expert 
perspectives offer significant insights into the impact of foreign entry on the domestic 
clothing sector between 1989 and 2007. With few exceptions, which will be noted 
throughout, the experts were in agreement on: 1) the impacts that foreign retailers made in 
Canada, 2) what effect these had on the domestic clothing retailers, and 3) the responses of 
the Canadian retailers to the changing competitive environment. By 2007, the structure of 
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the retail clothing sector was dramatically different than 1989. As one interviewee stated: 
“Frankly, I don’t think a lot of people know who’s Canadian and who’s not anyway.” 
(Interview L: p. 19)   
6.2  The Dawson Model of the impacts of retail internationalisation in host 
country – Change in sectoral competitiveness 
The Dawson model proposes that there are five types of impacts within the broad category 
of Change in Sectoral Competitiveness, which detail the ways that foreign retailers might 
affect institutions and structures within the host country. Interviews with industry experts 
sought to demonstrate the legitimacy of the Dawson framework in an interpretation of 
foreign retailers entering the Canadian market. Specifically, the interviews provided insight 
into: 
a) Understanding what the impacts of foreign retailers were; 
b) Understanding what effect the impacts had on the competitiveness of retailers in 
the domestic market; and 
 c) Understanding what the responses of the domestic retailers were to these new 
forces in the marketplace. 
The outcome of the interview analysis can be best illustrated through the following diagram 
(see Figure 6.1), which extrapolates the five impacts identified by Dawson and the 
significant sub-factors that were identified in the industry expert interviews: 
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Figure 6.1: The 5 Types of Impacts and their Sub-Factors in Sectoral Competitiveness 
 
Change in Sectoral 
Competitiveness 
Type of Impact 1: 
Innovation in 
Competitive Activity 
Retailer as Brand and 
Product Brand as 
Retailer 
Experienced Multi-
nationals: The European 
Invasion 
Location Diffusion 
Type of Impact 2: 
Catalyst for Sectoral 
Restructuring 
Foreign Retailers bring 
Unisex Format into the 
Market 
Landlords need to Re-
configure Space 
Competition for Finite 
Space 
Type of Impact 3: 
Additional Investment 
Sophistication and Size 
of Foreign Formulas 
Foreign Investment not 
Made 
Type of Impact 4: 
Improved Productivity 
of Assets 
Niche versus Dominant 
Positioning 
Type of Impact 5: New 
Competitive Behaviours 
Marketing Activity 
Merchandising Strategy 
Foreign Everyday Value 
Pricing v. Domestic 
Promotional Pricing 
Vertical Integration 
The Global Perspective 
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The remainder of this chapter will expand upon this framework, addressing the processes 
and intensity of impact that Dawson identifies in his paper.  
6.3  Type of Impact 1 – Innovation in Competitive Activity 
The Dawson framework proposed that the establishment of a foreign retailer in the market 
would result in the “introduction and diffusion through the existing retail structure of new 
retail formats or retail formulae” (Dawson, 2003: p. 195). In other words, any new entrant 
into a market, whether foreign or domestic, will impact the existing competitive structure. 
However, the interviews clearly illustrate that the retail innovation from foreign retailers 
was particularly different and disruptive, which caused an impact throughout the entire 
apparel market structure. As prior research has identified, companies engaged in retail 
internationalization have been highly successful in their home market and therefore bring a 
proven best-in-class business concept to the host market (Williams, 1992; Alexander, 1990; 
Wigley, Moore & Birtwistle, 2005). Regardless of target demographic – such as Walmart at 
the low end, a luxury brand such as Hugo Boss on the high end, or the majority of foreign 
clothing retailers, such as the Gap and Old Navy, that compete in the middle segment of the 
market – these companies arrive with a formula that is new to the host market and will 
disrupt the competitive structure.     
6.3.1 Defining Retail Innovation in the context of Retail Internationalization 
Industry Expert S provided a perspective on what constitutes innovation in retail: “A whole 
set of levers and dials makes retail innovation more interesting… allowing for a richer set of 
possibilities”. For context, this comment compared the limitations of purely commercial and 
consumer product innovation to the range of innovation ‘levers’ that are possible within 
retail, such as: format, formula, presentation, design, service, product, on-line, etc. The 
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consensus across interviews was that foreign retailers brought retailing to a new level of 
business sophistication and the resulting competitiveness increased their performance 
across the multiple ‘levers’ of their business. This manifests most prominently when a 
consumer physically meets the retailer, described as follows: 
I think whenever you are in an environment that speaks to you, that to me is 
innovation... understanding your customer, understanding your brand, ensuring that 
all of that gets communicated very clearly so that when the consumer gets in they 
have the full experience. When they have the full experience they’ll reward you by 
buying from you. That’s innovation. That’s true innovation. That’s really hard to do. 
That’s way harder to do than people [can] even imagine (Interviewee H: p. 11/12). 
 
In general, the industry experts defined retail innovation as a complex process in terms of 
the number of levers that can and must be managed through continuous improvement. The 
sources of innovation and motivation, however, were seen to come from different places at 
different times, as expressed in these comments: 
“Retail innovation is stepping outside of your comfort zone and what you’re known 
for” (Interviewee J: p.15). 
“Sometimes you fall on innovation. Sometimes you’re forced to innovate and 
sometimes it’s a thought process” (Interviewee G: p. 15). 
As will be evident in the analysis within this chapter, innovation was never considered solely 
the domain of foreign retailers, however, foreign companies tended to do it better and 
more consistently.  
Industry Expert L brings these thoughts about retail innovation together on a more 
pragmatic note:  
A brand new look, a brand new style, a brand new fit, that’s very hard to do because 
most retail is derivative... innovation is how to better service a customer, how to 
really understand what the customer is looking for, get the right product on the shelf 
at the right time, knowing their customer (p. 10). 
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All of the industry experts agreed that better service for consumers is an essential factor to 
successful innovation in retail. As the process of retail internationalization would introduce 
innovative foreign retail to new consumers with more success than many embedded 
domestic retailers, this factor is at the core of understanding the changes in sectoral 
competitiveness.     
From the discussions with experts, three over-arching innovations surfaced that help 
determine the impact of foreign retailers on the Canadian retail sector. These three 
innovations in competitive activity have been identified as follows: 
1) Retailer as Brand and Product Brand as Retailer 
2) Experienced Multi-nationals: The European Invasion 
3) Location Diffusion 
These three innovations in competitive activity provide the overarching structural impacts 
of foreign entry. This relationship between each individual innovation and the relevant 
effects will be clarified through this discussion. 
6.3.2  Innovation in Competitive Activity – Retailer as Brand and Product Brand as Retailer 
The entry of foreign retailers between 1989 and 2007 would see the evolution of retailers as 
brands and product brands as retailers. Based on the discussion with the industry experts, 
the impact and response to these innovations can be categorized as follows: 
6.3.2a The impact of the Gap on the concept of retail brand 
• The impact of the Gap on the Competitive Structure of the Canadian 
Apparel Sector 
• The Domestic Response to the Gap – Trajectory of Success or Trajectory 
of Complacency 
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6.3.2b The Sustained Waves of U.S. Retailers as Brand Entrants 
• Gap Inc. 
• U.S. Followers 
• The U.S. Radicals 
• The Domestic Response to Foreign Retailers as Brands - Proactive or 
Reactive 
 
6.3.2c The Product Brands as Retailers 
• The Domestic Response - Decline of the Canadian Department Store and 
beginning of Churn among Specialty Stores 
6.3.2a The Impact of the GAP on the concept of retail branding 
The entry of the Gap in 1989 marked the first foreign impact on the clothing sector that 
came, stayed, and forever changed the way that clothing retail would operate in Canada. 
Throughout the 1980s, the Gap was on the radar of every major Canadian clothing retailer, 
monitored closely through store visits and periodic exchanges at industry conferences. 
Despite the familiarity with its evolution from a jeans store to the ‘Gap’, its entry into 
Canada caught most Canadian clothing retailers unprepared for the impact it would have on 
their business and the competitive environment of the clothing sector. As one interviewee 
stated: 
The Gap was the archetype for a new game – it had built its business in a large 
competitive marketplace, had talent to draw from, the resources to advance systems 
and technology, and in general aspired to perform at a higher level (Interview S). 
In the work of Evans and Cox (1997), the Gap was identified as one of the early foreign 
innovators into Canada. They entered in 1989 and by 1995 had 97 stores north of the 
border. Evans and Cox have described the evolution of the Gap prior to its international 
expansion: “Private brand merchandise gradually replaced national brands, and the 1980s 
saw a change in company positioning. Stores were upgraded, designing and sourcing 
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became international, and the company created a strong point of view from the 
merchandise side, while still managing to provide good value at regular prices” (1997). By 
the late 1980s, the Gap believed it had the retail strategy to take on foreign markets.   
In the contemporary apparel market, the concept of retail brand has been well established. 
Through the academic study of Burt (2000, 2006) and the more applied writing of Floor 
(2006) and Torella (2009), a cross section of retailers who exemplify the retailer as brand 
have been thoroughly analyzed, and the fundamentals are broadly practised within the 
industry today. However, from a 1990s perspective, brand was still considered a product 
attribute rather than a company or store attribute. Within this context, the broad use of the 
term retail brand to describe the Gap when it entered Canada would attribute a label that 
would not have been utilized in 1989. The term does, however, capture the essence of what 
the Gap represented when it entered the Canadian market; thus, for purposes of this study, 
the concept of retailer as brand will be applied to the Gap and other retailers, keeping with 
the terminology utilized by the interviewees. 
The retail experts repeatedly used terms such as integrated, consistent, dominant, and 
positioning to describe the Gap’s entry into Canada: 
• The Gap conducted extensive research of every mall in Canada to identify the 
best real estate decisions before making any deals 
• Entered Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal simultaneously, clearly signalling that 
the Gap was in Canada to take a dominant market position, taking on the 
challenge of the French language and business requirements of Quebec. 
• The Gap was a disciplined merchandising machine with everyday value pricing, 
and turned new fresh inventory every six to eight weeks.   
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• The merchandise was all private label and went beyond a typical jeans store to 
offer fashion at an accessible price point.  
• The offering catered to both women and men, creating a unisex format that 
maximized traffic and spoke to the changing consumer attitudes of the 1980s 
and 1990s.  
As noted by Industry Expert B: 
The stores were larger than the majority of domestic clothing specialty retailers 
and they were better designed and merchandised than most of the competition. 
This innovation happened at a time when most Canadian clothing retailers still 
believed in a merchandising philosophy of ‘pile it high and watch it fly’, with all 
kinds of different mark down strategies and promotions and signage (p. 2).  
Ultimately, it was the integration of every aspect of the business – including the vertical 
integration of the supply chain, the look of the stores, the service delivery, and the 
marketing –  consistently delivered fifty-two weeks a year that positioned the Gap as a 
differentiated retail concept, bearing considerable resemblance to a fully developed product 
brand. Referencing the Salmon and Tordjman (1989) study of typologies for standardization 
versus adaptation, the Gap clearly established itself on the standardized end of the 
continuum with a strong belief there would be acceptance of its retail brand beyond the 
United States home market. This positioning would prove to be successful – from 1989 
onward, the Gap would have a significant impact on the Canadian domestic clothing sector.  
Gap came in and it was really the first specialty clothing retailer that in fact had an 
edge. [The Gap] changed the way consumers in Canada looked at apparel retailing 
forever... But what Gap did is create excitement in the marketplace and it took an 
enormous amount of market share away from a lot of other conventional apparel 
retailers. It went after a segment that was spending money. So the impact of Gap 
was felt very quickly (Interview D: p. 1). 
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The Impact of the Gap on the Competitive Structure of the Canadian Clothing Sector 
With only two exceptions, the industry experts identified the entry of the Gap as the first 
major impact of foreign retail on the clothing market in Canada. The two exceptions, 
industry experts O and T, didn’t necessarily disagree that the Gap had a significant impact, 
but for different reasons identified the earlier entry of Benetton as having an important 
impact on segments of the market, which will be discussed further in this chapter. Yet the 
receptiveness of the Canadian consumer to the Gap had a more immediate and lasting 
effect on the domestic retailers. The degree of impact on both competitors and consumers 
is reflected in the following statements: 
“[The Gap] made everyone’s life in this business more complicated” (Interview T: p. 
2).  
 “It was like an awakening for Canadian consumers. That’s what Gap did. It just 
raised the bar” (Industry Expert D: p. 3). 
The impact on the domestic retail sector was swift and permanent. As summarized by 
Industry Expert L: 
But the whole focus of trying to be all things to all people was failing because people 
really wanted to go where they could recognize brand, and brand has continued to 
be the strength behind a lot of retailers, whether Canadian or American. But now 
they’re fighting against an American brand, so they have to develop the Canadian 
brand in a much stronger way in order to compete… I think it is again a direct 
response to the competition (p. 5/6). 
The effects were pervasive across all of the processes and behaviours that Dawson 
conceptualized in his framework. In particular, discussions on investment, productivity, and 
restructuring highlight the effectiveness of the Gap’s entry.  
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The Domestic Response to the Gap – Trajectory of Success or Trajectory of Complacency 
Despite the previous discussion on the significance of the Gap as a dominant foreign retail 
brand in 1989, there were in fact a handful of comparatively advanced domestic retailers 
who were establishing their own presence as integrated retail brand concepts. These would 
include Danier, Club Monaco, Aritzia, Lululemon, LaSenza, and Roots Canada, along with a 
few others, who would form the group of domestic retailers that would continue to succeed 
and grow their business. As early adaptors to the innovation of well-defined retail brands, 
these companies would eventually develop the strategies and tactics necessary to remain 
competitive in the changing marketplace.  
The scope and scale of the Gap enterprise distinguishes it from these domestic retail brands 
and defines it as a disruptive innovation to the competitive activity of the market. The Gap 
had honed its business in a highly competitive retail market and had the resources to 
develop a supply chain and systems that would be considered best-in-class. As Industry 
Expert H stated: 
All of a sudden you had an American player come in and Canadians automatically 
viewed the American player as superior. They thought the Gap had great basics, 
cheaper than us even though in fact they weren’t. So again you know, it’s a lot like 
Walmart, you know trying to beat Walmart at price. You’ll never do it because it’s so 
ingrained in the consumer’s mind... We decided to take a leadership role and 
reposition ourselves. So for us, having an American retailer come in was pretty 
significant. It changed our business completely. I think it made us a better retailer 
quite honestly. What we found was that wherever they did locate our business 
actually went up (p. 2). 
This statement substantiates some of the findings presented in Chapter 5: as domestic 
retailers reacted to the entry of a foreign retailer such as the Gap, they had the potential to 
adapt to its strategies and remain successful, or stay complacent in traditional strategies 
and lose market share.  
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The Domestic Response to Retailer as Brand - Trajectory of Complacency – Taking the Low 
Road of the Status Quo 
For the majority of Canadian clothing retailers, the entry of the Gap was tracked and 
monitored in much the same manner as it had been previously from across the border. In 
other words, the entry of the Gap did not stimulate an immediate call to action. For most 
domestic retailers, the perception was: “[Foreign retailers] come in and they’re hot [but] 
over time they tend to cool off” (Interview C: p.2). 
This attitude would cause most Canadian retailers to view the Gap as one more player in the 
marketplace, not recognizing the beginning of a competitive restructuring of the clothing 
sector.  Interview N summarized the comparison of the Canadian versus American business 
model: 
…again I want to go back to the legacy or embedded [(Canadian]) companies. They 
were buying- driven companies, not selling- driven companies. It was all about the 
buy. But man when we saw these big unisex guys [companies] come in, they were 
focused on the customers and they were set up so that if item A wasn’t selling, 
they’d go on item B really quick right. Whereas the buyer is trying to push item A on 
the customer continually because they knew they were right, thank God I made that 
buy… ‘I’m going to find a way to move item A’. And you got [Canadian companies] 
married to the product instead of getting married to the customer (p. 6). 
It was the foreign companies’ focus on the consumer as the driving force for branding that 
differentiated them from the offerings of domestic apparel retailers. Perhaps the best way 
to understand the complacency of most Canadian retailers is to recognize how the industry 
functioned in the late 1980s. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, the state of Canadian apparel 
retail pre-1989 was a picture of complacency; a sort of entrenched world-order prevailed 
within the competitive structure. Several industry experts would confirm this observation, 
such as Interview A:  
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My view would be before 1989 there was a fairly comfortable competitive 
environment in Canada, particularly in the shopping centre environment. It 
approached almost an oligopoly… there were few players controlling massive 
amounts of retail space… (p. 2). 
These traditional merchants’ retailing strategy was in stark contrast to the well-developed 
brand concept of the Gap. The comfortable and controlled Canadian oligopoly in the early 
1990s is best described in Interview B:  
…the retail apparel industry in Canada has been dominated by established, 
owner/operator/family founders primarily based in Montreal. So it was a very close-
knit, closed sort of community that did things [in a] very old-fashioned way in terms 
of merchandising. It’s the way that Quebec and the Quebec customer like to shop 
and they started expanding across the country with variations of success. Some of 
them were successful and some of them weren’t successful because it all depended 
on how far they were willing to bend. When the Gap opened, [Canadian retailers] 
sort of looked at them like they were from Mars because they merchandised 
completely differently than any of the others… (p. 1). 
The differences between the iconic brand of the Gap and the established Canadian apparel 
merchants would prove a major chasm for some retailers to bridge in order to compete 
successfully in this new competitive environment.  
The industry experts acknowledged that much of the impact of the Gap could be attributed 
to its first mover advantage: the Gap had a significant four- to five-year lead on other 
foreign retailers entering the market. This raises an interesting perspective on the concept 
of first mover advantage: although there were other specialty foreign retailers operating in 
the Canadian clothing sector prior to 1989, none of them had capitalized on their early entry 
position. As proposed in the Dawson model, there needs to be some consideration of the 
degree of impact. The Gap’s commitment to expansion in the market – setting up 95 stores 
in six years – complemented their innovative retail brand concept, which suggests that the 
degree of impact from a retailer may be as relevant as first mover advantage. 
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6.3.2b  The Sustained Waves of U.S. Retailers as Brand Entrants 
Gap Inc. 
The entry of the Gap as an innovative retail brand in 1989 through early 1990s created a 
significant disruption in the Canadian clothing market, but the subsequent entry of Banana 
Republic in 1995 and Old Navy in 2001 ensured that the Gap stable of brands had a 
dominant position for the majority of consumer segments. In the early ‘90s, the Gap was 
firmly established in the young-middle accessible market, and Banana Republic would 
establish a brand in the working professional segment and Old Navy would capture the 
cheap chic segment. The introduction of Gap Kids and Gap Baby would solidify the 
positioning across gender and age demographics. Only the luxury brand market, which was 
just starting to grow, and the older consumer segments with declining buying power would 
be exempt from the Gap brand strategy. In slightly more than ten years, these three brands 
would hold dominant positioning in the clothing market and force nearly all domestic 
retailers to compete head-on and respond to the impact of their brand power. The ability of 
one company to bring new formats and formulas to market with such clarity of offering was 
remarkable at the time. 
The U.S. Followers – Waves of American Entrants between 1989 and early 2000s 
While the Gap led the entry and held a dominant role throughout the 1990s and into the 
early 2000s, other American brands began to enter the market. As Interviewee Q stated: 
“the one thing that we’ve learned over the years, particularly with stronger brands, is they’ll 
follow each other. They’ll follow each other into real estate for sure” (p. 1). 
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It was a consensus among the retail experts that as the news of the Gap’s success spread, 
other American retailers began strategizing for expansion north of the border into Canada. 
It is worth re-stating that during the 1990s shopping centre development and retail 
expansion in the United States continued at a strong pace. Most American retailers were 
finding sufficient growth at home to keep their stakeholders satisfied. The determination to 
expand into a foreign market would be driven more by international vision, or possibly a 
me-too strategy, than being pushed out of the U.S. market. 
By the mid-1990s, retailers such as Talbots and Eddie Bauer were opening stores across 
Canada, followed by American Eagle Outfitters in 2000. As with the Gap, these retailers had 
developed a well-defined brand concept that catered to a specific market segment within 
the much larger and more competitive U.S. market. Their entry into Canada would also have 
an effect on the competitive structure, but in a more limited and narrow scope: although 
each company took its share of the market, the impacts of these American followers on the 
Canadian domestic retailers were more comparable to the ripples that follow a tidal wave. 
The market structure continued to change and increased in competitive intensity, but not to 
the same degree as the impact from the Gap. 
The Radicals – The Wave that Rode the Consumerism of mid-2000s 
The later American entries of Abercrombie & Fitch and Hollister in 2006 would prove to be 
the final wave of innovative American retail entry that impacted the Canadian market within 
the time frame of this study. Abercrombie & Fitch (A&F) and Hollister brought a new 
approach to the young consumer segment. As Interviewee C notes: 
One of the things I always find interesting is the U.S. players… come up in Canada 
and become so successful out of the gates and the last one in is the hottest new 
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product” (p. 11).“I mean, [A&F and Aeropostale] are rising stars and then one fall the 
pants aren’t very good, bang it’s over. The shiny new thing is right (Interviewee N: p. 
10). 
These observations by the experts speak to two significant aspects of the apparel sector and 
the role that foreign entries played in the changing competitive structure during this period. 
The first point is that, for the younger segment of the market, the fashion element of the 
clothing sector experienced an accelerated deterioration in brand loyalty. In other words, as 
described by expert N, ‘the shiny new thing’ played an increasingly important role in the 
performance of apparel companies in the 2000s. This would keep the pace of change at a 
much higher level than any other retail sector, creating a more fluid competitive 
environment for retailers to position themselves within. The second point is that the foreign 
retailers were leading players in this dynamic, not only because of their well-developed 
brand strategies, but also because the Canadian consumer considered all things foreign in 
the world of fashion as superior to the Canadian offering. The significance of these two 
factors cannot be under-estimated in the analysis of the impact of foreign retailers on the 
Canadian apparel sector. 
The Domestic Response to Foreign Retailers as Brands – Proactive or Reactive 
If the initial response to the Gap had been general complacency amongst many of the 
Canadian clothing retailers, the second and third waves of entry would get their attention. 
Referencing the mid- to late-1990s, Industry expert L stated: 
…one of the very first things that came to the Canadian retailers that they really had 
to deal with was the war for space. So the entries were coming at a faster pace than 
the mall base was expanding. I think a lot of Canadian retailers were pretty 
complacent until they actually went to negotiate their renewals and realized that 
there was competition for space, even for the good stores (p. 1).   
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A review of stores from Mall 1 and 2 was conducted in the Quantitative Study, which 
explores the cumulative response of domestic retailers to the entry of American retail 
brands. Those who have succeeded are well located within the malls, while the others have 
been downsized and/or moved to less prime locations. In many cases, these companies 
could only get locations in tier two malls or power centres to profit off of the legacy 
domestic clothing model. As clearly articulated by Industry Expert I: 
…I look at Dylex… it was still running and now [its] completely gone. You’d have to 
say that two or three pieces of the Dylex operation are still here. But the strength of 
those individual brands, even though at one time they were the absolute best in 
their field, [is gone]. You could put Fairweather up against The Limited it would win, 
and you could put Le Chateau up against The Limited and it would win. I think that 
speaks to the fact that brands have a life and have a lifespan (p. 6/7). 
I think competitively that one of the things that always surprises me is when the 
American guys come in [and it] isn’t the Canadians or the incumbents who are there 
to compete and do better. They kind of retreat – it’s like [they] give up and that’s 
always a little discouraging to me. It does not encourage… typically, competition is 
supposed to encourage, everybody jumps to it, more investment, let’s do it right, 
let’s do it better, let’s beat them up. It doesn’t happen maybe because there isn’t 
any money to invest (Interviewee E: p. 25). 
As expert E points out, many of the Canadian retailers in the 1990s and the 2000s were not 
establishing brand identities that positioned them successfully in the market. For some 
domestic retailers, the transformation was too great: it was unrealistic for family-run 
merchant business that depended upon price promotions to become a company that 
generates enough sales to re-create itself as a brand in the popular foreign concept. For 
most of these merchant businesses, there was neither the size nor finances to make such a 
competitive move.   
6.3.2c  The Product Brands as Retailers 
Historically, clothing product brands and designer labels have been predominately within 
the domain of the department store, and to a smaller extent through specialty chains. In the 
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early days, the dominance of the department stores was a relatively safe haven where the 
products sold at regular pricing until end of season. There would be the occasional sales 
promotion, but planning would be done in collaboration between retailer and 
manufacturer, working primarily with the goal of protecting their brands. This stable market 
changed with the growth of discount retailing and the increasing threat to department 
stores at the more value-sensitive end of their market. As promotional activity escalated, 
many manufacturers determined that developing a retail position would give them greater 
control of their brands and help them remain competitive. This move from manufacturers 
coincided with the move by many specialty stores to private labels and a vertical integration 
of their supply chain, which would give them greater control and differentiation over their 
merchandise offerings. These moves resulted in product brands expanding into retail 
formats in an attempt to secure distribution and protect the product’s image. 
The early apparel entrant to this format was Levi’s. By 1989, they had already established an 
extensive store base in the United States and were operating in-line shopping centre stores 
in Canada. The impact on the competitive activity within the clothing sector was significant, 
as it forced the department stores and specialty chains to re-structure their product 
offering, in particular the jeans stores and casual work wear stores. Canada companies such 
as Thrifty’s, Pantorama, Jean Machine, and Bootlegger would no longer carry the Levi brand, 
as the Canadian consumer would have the full selection of Levi products available through 
the corporate stores. Brands such as Dockers, Tommy Hilfiger, Esprit, and Mexx would 
follow the lead of Levi and open in-line stores in malls during the 1990s. Notably, all of the 
product brands that turned to retail were non-Canadian, which shows the dependence that 
domestic retailers had on foreign merchandise. Even though Canada still had a clothing 
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manufacturer base into the 1990s, it was not brand-focused and would eventually fail due 
to the full impact of retail internationalization and the era of free trade.  
There is little evidence to indicate that the product brand innovation met with the same 
success as the in-coming foreign apparel retailers as brands. A tracking of the 
aforementioned companies would show that only Levi’s and Mexx have sustained their 
retail presence, and these companies are not dominant players in the Canadian retail 
market. However, the impact was less about these particular retailers, as the impact on 
competitive retail behaviour is far more significant: domestic retailers struggled to adapt to 
this new mode of entry, as these companies had depended upon these (primarily American) 
product brands to fill gaps in their merchandise assortments. For the Canadian department 
stores, it represented a renewed assault on their position in the market, and the loss of 
control of these brands further weakened their consumer base. Industry Expert I supplied a 
summary of this new threat: 
[Brands] like Hugo Boss and Michael Kors opened a lot of stores here. A lot of the 
designer brands… chose to come here [and open] their own stores because there 
wasn’t any other route into Canada. That’s quite interesting (p. 6). 
...in the US, there are at least seven department store chains that fill the gap 
between Sears as a discount department store and something [high-end] like Holt 
Renfrew... So I think people [considering a move to] Canada either look at the 
number of department store opportunities and say ‘oh, there aren’t very many 
vendors and brands’… [or] look at the department store scenario and say ‘well I can’t 
really do what I’m doing in the U.S. [by] entering the market as a department store’ 
(p. 2). 
The specialty clothing retailers were forced to differentiate their merchandise and either 
seek out new product brands or move to private label and vertical integration. In either 
scenario, this competitive structure caused domestic clothing retailers to change their 
behaviour to respond to this disruption in a formerly stable sector. 
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Domestic Response to Product Brands as Retailers – Decline of the Canadian Department 
Store and beginning of Churn among Specialty Stores  
For the Canadian department stores, the exodus of brands such as Levi’s, Tommy Hilfiger, 
and Mexx took away sales from the younger consumer segment. As previously discussed, 
department stores had become associated with older generations, which meant this format 
was not fashionable enough for younger customers. Interviewee G describes the exodus of 
young consumers to shop in specialty stores: 
...kids didn’t want to buy from department stores because they were being 
influenced by either what was coming into Canada or what they were reading in 
Seventeen or any fashion magazine. So they certainly didn’t want a label from Sears, 
and yet in the 70s and early 80s it was sort of a non-issue (p. 1).  
The department stores saw little value in allocating prime selling space to a brand that had a 
store down the mall corridor, and this further eroded their market position with the 
younger fashion consumer. At the same time, the discount retailers saw an opportunity to 
promote these brands when possible to the value-oriented customer who didn’t need the 
most current style but wanted the label. In the end, the department store was being 
squeezed from both the price scale and the continuum for fashion, which would result in 
the closing of legacy retailers such as Eaton’s and Simpsons. 
The Canadian specialty retailers would be equally challenged as they were also feeling the 
effects from two sides: threatened by the retailer as brand, who had clearly differentiated 
themselves through private label, and the product brand as retailer, who had taken away 
the merchandise foundation which Canadian retailers had built. In addition, only some 
Canadian retailers would have the resources and scale to engage in the off-shore resourcing 
for private label product that the American retailers were able to access. This would result 
in significant churn in the domestic retail sector by the later part of the 1990s and early 
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2000s, as was evidenced in the Mall 1 and 2 data. This challenge has been listed under the 
Type 5 Impact: Changes in Competitive Behaviour. 
In summary, the evolution of innovative consumer-focused apparel brands was lead by 
foreign retailers at both the retail and product level. The industry experts provided 
significant insight into the impact of differentiated retail brands, which was initiated by the 
Gap, that would change the competitive structure of the market and force the domestic 
retailers to respond in order to retain a competitive position in the market.   
6.3.3  Innovation in Competitive Activity – Experienced Multi-nationals: The European 
Invasion 
Unlike the majority of American retail brands that had proven themselves in the highly 
competitive U.S. marketplace, European-based clothing retailers had much more experience 
out of their home country. For H&M entering Canada in 2004, this was the 22nd country 
where they had established foreign retail operations. H&M had become a seasoned retailer 
with a multi-national infrastructure to support its success. The entry of innovative European 
retailers to Canada is in fact a two-part story: the early entrants prior to 1999, and those 
companies that set up operations between 1999 and 2007. Both groups had an impact on 
the competitive activity of the clothing sector, but the scope and scale were substantially 
different. 
The analysis of this innovation in foreign retail activity will be categorized as follows: 
6.3.3a Early European Entrants 
• The Domestic Response of a Narrow Group of Retailers 
 
6.3.3b Multi-national European Entrants – Raising the Competitive Bar for Everyone 
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• The Domestic Response – Thrive, Re-formulate, or Perish 
 
6.3.3a  Early European Entrants – Further Context 
In 1989, there were three European retail companies operating in the clothing sector in 
Canada: Marks & Spencer from the UK, the Brenninkmeyers’ C&A (with head offices in both 
Belgium and Germany), and the Benetton Group from Italy. Each of these companies 
charted diverse entry strategies and had different impacts on the competitive activity in 
Canada. 
Marks & Spencer expanded through acquisition and then through organic growth. Entering 
Canada in 1973 through the purchase of D’Allairds and then Peoples stores, the company 
struggled through most of its nearly 30 years in Canada. By 1989, the company was 
operating under its own banner with stores in most major shopping malls and high streets 
across the country. As the industry experts comments will reveal, Marks & Spencer never 
found a viable position in the Canadian market and they exited as the competition escalated 
in 1999. As Industry Expert E states: “...in 25 years of operations in Canada they only had 
three profitable years, hard to believe. It was shocking.”  
The Brenninkmeyers also entered through acquisition of the companies Irene Hill in 1979 
(rebranded Cleo in 1994), Bootlegger in 1980, and Ricki’s in 1982. Through the privately-held 
company Comark, the three retail banners have operated with a Canadian head office and 
the support of an international relationship with C&A. The three divisions were still actively 
operating in 2007, predominately in second tier and power centre locations. Their impact on 
the domestic retail structure could be summarized as minimal: many of the experts view 
C&A as not fully adjusting to the changes in the competitive structure of the market.  
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Benetton Group entered Canada in the mid-1980s as part of a strategy to expand into the 
North American market in the same manner as they had done in Europe. Known for their 
multiple formats and banners, Benetton expanded rapidly through Western Europe, 
opening stores with a strategy that looked more like a Seven-Eleven convenience store 
location strategy: one on every corner. By contrast, Benetton’s progress in North America 
was surprisingly limited: they had only a few stores opened by the 1990s and struggled to 
translate a street level format into a mall retail environment. In addition, the Canadian 
expansion was impeded by two additional underlying factors, as stated by Retail Expert E: 
the Benetton stores… absolutely they’re all over, there are posters and billboards 
and then all the magazines. Then it fizzled. Part of that is due to the exchange rate… 
the prices were too high and the ordering mechanism [was flawed]… you got your 
order all at once and if you wanted to reorder it [took] two months. So it was too 
long. That model didn’t work. There was also FIRA was in place at the time, 
[Canada’s] Foreign Investment Review Agency. So that had an impact because these 
people had to have a 50% Canadian ownership of their store. They could either 
[have] 50% of the Canadian company or 50% of every store which was tantamount 
to a franchise.  
Ultimately, the environment for foreign investment within Canada changed by the end of 
the 1980s to allow for direct foreign ownership. However, the early limitations on 
Benetton’s entry impeded its store expansion and, as noted by Interviewee E, once you miss 
that first mover opportunity it is difficult to recover and gain the consumer’s interest.  
Despite the limited impact that Benetton had on gaining consumer share, it did make an 
impact on the industry. As noted in the interviews, particularly Industry Expert O, Benetton 
was recognized for its innovative concept and its early impact on fashion merchandising in 
the Canadian market. For those domestic retailers who saw Benetton as a potential 
competitive threat, the experts believe they responded by focusing on the fashionability of a 
select group of women’s wear retailers.  
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Many of the early entrants to the Canadian markets were not considered serious 
competitive threats. If anything, these three early entrants were also victims to the changes 
that occurred with foreign entry. In the case Marks & Spencer, it is difficult to imagine that a 
company that had 40 stores at one time in Canada could have so little impact on the 
marketplace. On the other hand, companies such as Aritzia, Dynamite, and LeChateau had a 
more immediate impact – not in the pervasive impact of the Gap, whose influence stretched 
across a much larger segment of the apparel market, but in more measured effects such as 
the levels of fashion expected by their consumer.  
6.3.3b  Multi-national European Entrants – Raising the Competitive Bar for Everyone 
The more recent multi-national companies of Zara in 1999, and FCUK and H&M in 2004 
brought innovation in competitive activity to a new level. The statement of this impact is 
clearly illustrated through the 33,000 square foot store that H&M built at the north end of 
the Toronto Eaton’s Centre, which has secured a street entrance at the corner of Yonge and 
Dundas Streets – the Toronto equivalent of Times Square in New York City. This location 
would have traditionally been occupied by a department store as an anchor draw to the 
urban mall. In fact, the Sears flagship store is located immediately behind the H&M store 
and takes a secondary position to the visibility of the European retailer. As stated by expert 
H: “Even some of these American retailers are starting to look small relative to some of the 
big international [competition]” (p. 10). 
Much has been written about the business models for Zara and H&M (Leknes & Carr, 2004; 
Barnes & Lea-Greenwood, 2006; Bhardwaj & Fairhurst, 2010; Bhardwaj, Eickman & Runyan, 
2011), which confirm that their business models are built on fast fashion, superior supply 
chain management, and fashion-forward cheap chic. These three factors have had an 
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immediate and lasting impact on the domestic retail clothing sector in Canada. In addition, 
both Zara and H&M had a broad range of international experience over many years prior to 
their entry in 1999 and 2004, respectively. As noted by Industry Expert K: 
...but some of [the European apparel retailers] were involved in so many different 
countries that they’ve got this absolute formula for going in, [and] they [know how 
to] vary from one country to the next (p. 10). 
Zara set a new retail standard in 1999, integrating a level of currency to the fashion offering 
not seen previously in Canada. 
The one thing European retailers have done, like Zara as you know, is they’re used to 
expanding… [that’s] their advantage over the Americans… the Americans are getting 
a bit better, but [the European] advantage is they accept the fact that it’s a different 
culture... What they brought to Canada and to North America in fact is their ability to 
turn that merchandise around so quickly… Their supply chain was unheard of. I mean 
people were stunned, retailers. I still remember [colleagues] sitting around the table 
saying: ‘it’s impossible, they can’t be changing their merchandise every two weeks or 
three weeks.’ ... Gap brought that kind of cool fresh… consumer expertise to Canada. 
Guys like Zara brought, you know, la fin point of technology (Industry Expert D: p. 7). 
In addition, when H&M entered in 2004, it brought the combination of forward-fashion, 
speed-to-market apparel and more accessible price points to target a larger segment of the 
consumer market. As observed by Industry Expert C: 
…H&M was able to bring in fashionable product much quicker than we’ve been able 
to see the Canadian retailer do before... with H&M, one of the things they pride 
themselves [on is being] able to turn it from finding a concept, designing it and 
manufacturing it, and having it in stores very quickly (p. 13).  
Not only did domestic retailers need to keep pace with continual four- to six-week 
refreshing of inventory, but the merchandise needed to be fashion-forward and reflective of 
the most current trends coming out of global fashion centres. The relative scale of 
fashionability of all clothing retailers operating in Canada shifted with the entry of Zara and 
H&M, which is summarized by Industry Expert D: 
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So [H&M targeted] younger women, mostly 16, 17, 18 [years old], who may not have 
the money to spend at Zara… So it was still cheap chic. What was amazing about 
H&M though, [which] I think is different, is that they truly introduced [a product that 
customers] don’t care if it lasts. They introduced that concept of not just cheap chic 
but ‘I won’t get pissed off if in two weeks, you know, the bra strap comes off,’ which 
is an amazing phenomenon (Interviewee D: p. 10). 
It is worth noting that the entries of Zara and H&M undertook different strategies, which 
would ultimately be reflected in the impact they each had on the competitive activity of the 
domestic clothing sector. Industry Expert Q notes: 
I noticed Zara were very slow to roll out their expansion in Canada. They took a store 
in Montreal. They took a couple of stores in Toronto. They didn’t really get into the 
shopping centres in a big way, but they started to roll it out more recently (p. 2). 
In fact, Zara entered Canada as a partnership with the Canadian clothing retailer Reitmans in 
1999, and by 2007 had 14 stores in Canada. As has been the practice in other countries, 
Inditex bought out the partnership during this period. There is some indication that the slow 
growth of the Zara operation in Canada has accelerated since the transfer to corporate 
ownership. By comparison, H&M had 35 stores in Canada in 2007, which occurred in a much 
shorter time frame than Zara: the first Canadian H&M store opened in 2004. Although Zara 
has thus far had a smaller impact in the market due to slower store expansion, H&M has 
been challenged in other ways, as observed by Industry Expert Q: 
I saw [H&M] open the flagship store in the Eaton’s Centre. [Then they] went into 
Yorkdale. [Then they] went into a number of malls, and then they started to branch 
out into some secondary properties and secondary markets and weren’t that 
successful. I think the reason they weren’t that successful is because people never 
heard of them and this wasn’t like a U.S. brand. This was a European brand. [But 
they’ve been] accepted in the major markets because people obviously travel to 
Europe and would have seen their brand (p. 2). 
In Dawson’s framework, he identifies the need for the foreign entrants to also adjust to 
market conditions: “The development of a retailer in a foreign market involves adjustment 
to cultural and competitive condiditons, a form of organisational learning associated with 
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the management of intellectual capital” (p. 192). For the European multi-nationals, there 
were some significant adjustments that needed to be made to be successful, as Industry 
Expert M observes: 
For instance, [European retailers were] not used to expanding in malls. I mean in 
America and Canada there is a mall culture, [but] not so much in Europe. [They have 
more] street locations [with] smaller stores. There was always high traffic [on the 
streets]... so coming to that whole mall world was definitely something that H&M 
had to get used to, [as well as things like the nearly] 24-hour economy, different 
opening times, etc. (p. 1). 
Domestic Response to Multi-national European Entrants – Thrive, Re-formulate or Perish 
The domestic response can be categorized in three ways: 1) those who thrived, 2) those 
who survived, but struggled or adjusted by re-formatting or down-sizing, and 3) those who 
perished. By 2007, the foreign retailers expanding into the Canadian market had changed 
the competitive structure of the market forever. The statistics used to track domestic 
retailers and foreign retailers between 1989 and 2007 can be found in Appendix 12, which 
details the opening and closing of apparel stores in Mall 1 and Mall 2. Although not 
exhaustive, the following list identifies the notable domestic retailers who resided in each of 
these categories by 2007: 
1) Thriving – Aritzia, Lululemon, Danier, LaSenza, Harry Rosen, Roots, Jean Machine, Club 
Monaco 
2) Surviving – LeChateau, RW&Co, Smart Set, Reitmans, Fairweathers, Stitches  
3) Perish – Braemar, Thrifty’s, Dalmy’s 
Later in this chapter, in the discussion of Type of Impact 2: Catalysts for Re-structuring, the 
churn of domestic retailers is discussed more fully with observations from the industry 
experts interviewed. 
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In summary, the Industry Experts’ insight into the second innovative factor from foreign 
retailers collaborates what was identified in the study of Mall 1 and Mall 2: that early 
European retailers had little impact on the competitive structure of the apparel market. 
However, the large multi-nationals from Europe had a dramatic impact on changing the 
sectoral competitiveness, not only for the domestic retailers but also the embedded foreign 
retailers.  
6.3.4  Innovation in Competitive Activity –  Location Diffusion 
From 1989 to 2007, it would be reasonable to argue that the focus of retail apparel 
innovation was happening in the shopping centres. In fact, the influx of foreign retailer as 
brands and the European multi-nationals occurred predominately in the major malls across 
Canada. The limited number of ‘high streets’ in Canada were also location destinations for 
many of the foreign entrants, but as North America is a mall culture, the major shopping 
centres were the primary focus of business expansion. The impact of several new categories 
– such as Retailer as Brand and Product Brand as Retailer and the Experienced Multi-
nationals: The European Invasion – set in motion responses from the domestic retail apparel 
sector that led to the third over-arching innovation in competitive activity: Channel 
Diffusion.  
The exodus of domestic apparel retailers from the major shopping centres cannot solely be 
attributed to the entry of foreign clothing retailers into the major malls. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the evolution of the retail environment in Canada accelerated through the 1990s 
and into the 2000s, facilitating the movement of clothing retailers to best-fit markets for 
their business model. In some cases this was proactive, but in many others it was a reactive 
response to the competitive activity of the market. During this period, mall expansion was 
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non-existent until 2004, and new location growth was occurring in new retail formats. The 
shopping behaviour of consumers was also changing and their more eclectic approach to 
shopping across multiple formats was further discussed by the industry experts. 
Within this context, location diffusion as an innovative competitive activity can be analyzed 
within two sub-factors: 
6.3.4a Chasing the Walmart Effect 
• Domestic Response – Repositioning in the Marketplace  
 
6.3.4b Seeking out the White Space in an increasingly competitive apparel market 
• Mark’s Work Wearhouse – An Iconic Canadian Brand 
• Joe Fresh – The Upstart 
 
The Industry Experts observed that the heightened competitive environment across all 
categories of retail elevated the need for retailers to innovate in order to stay competitive. 
The on-going influx of foreign retail had initiated and sustained the changes in competitive 
structure, but over time the source of innovation would arise from both foreign and 
domestic retailers. The interviews provided extensive insight into how the entry of Walmart 
would not only bring a new competitive force into the market, but would also facilitate the 
pursuit of profitable location distribution within the apparel sector. 
6.3.4a  Chasing the Walmart Effect 
By 2007, Walmart was the second largest clothing retailer in Canada with 10.2% share of 
market (Trendex, 2007) and would eventually surpass Sears, who had 12.6% share in 2007 
(Trendex, 2007) and had held the dominant position in Canada for many years. Having only 
entered the market in 1994, purchasing the Woolco stores and then undertaking a retail 
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brand conversion that is still considered one of the great retail success stories, Walmart 
Canada became the focal point of non-major shopping centre growth. Since financial 
reporting for the Canadian company is not conducted separately, it is estimated by Trendex 
(2007) that apparel sales in Walmart Canada were $2.04 billion, or 10.2% of the $20 billion 
dollar apparel industry. Industry Expert R saw Walmart as a impactful innovator in retail 
because it changed the strategy on gross margin. Based on the observations by industry 
experts, there is reason to believe that Walmart’s growing dominance was not only on the 
pricing: 
There’s a lot of fashion, not fashion... there’s a lot of soft goods in [Walmart]. I mean 
that’s been a huge impact and so you certainly can’t ignore it. It changes...for the 
real estate world, the shopping centre developer world… Walmart changes the 
entire centre of gravity in any town, no question about it. The whole world changes 
(Interviewee E: p. 20).  
...one of the other major things that happened to Canadian retailing in this point in 
time was the impact of Walmart coming in and [developing] their brand of George. 
So Walmart comes in with some special offers as well [and] that creates another 
competitive challenge for the lower- to middle-income consumer. So [your] 
Canadian retailer is being sort of caught at both ends. The lower end is being 
swallowed up and the upper end is disappearing as you lose things like Eaton’s and 
those types of things which [had] a presence in some of the higher end sectors 
(Interviewee A: p. 3).  
What most experts agreed on was that, in spite of Walmart’s overall success in the Canadian 
market and its increase in locations, they had still not gotten the apparel side of the 
business to the level of performance they wanted. Although Walmart would pass them 
within two years, in 2007 Sears was still the largest apparel retailer in Canada. Industry 
experts R, S, and A all spoke about this relative weakness in apparel from a retailer that is 
known for dominating product categories through well-developed assortments at hard 
discount pricing.   
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For many, the weakness in Walmart’s strategy was to introduce the UK line of George in 
2004 (ladies wear) and 2005 (menswear) without editing for the Canadian market. As 
Interviewee L states: 
I think in North America it was kind of dumped into the stores. I don’t think it was 
ever really a profile or anything like that and they didn’t leverage on the fact that 
George had exposure in the U.K. It doesn’t mean a lot in North America (p. 9). 
What followed was an erratic period of positioning in the apparel categories, from multi-
page advertisements in Vogue magazine to deep discounting. As stated by Interviewee F: 
“..they made so many mistakes with George... so there were a lot of false starts. 
Then they went through that period where they overreacted and Vogue magazine… 
[ran] a 25-page segment [for Walmart]...” (p. 11). 
Despite these challenges, the Canadian consumer obviously found something satisfactory in 
the Walmart apparel offering, such as the everyday value pricing that changed the 
competitive position across apparel retailing and opened new opportunities for both foreign 
and domestic retailers. Sears in particular would be forced to respond to the changed value 
proposition, and specialty chains such as Stitches would depend further upon price 
promotion to drive sales. 
Domestic Response – Re-positioning in the Marketplace 
In the end, the impact of Walmart provided an interesting opportunity for domestic retail 
growth and innovation that otherwise might not have happened. For the Canadian mass 
merchants and department stores, the arrival of Walmart in 1994 would immediately 
restructure the lower end of the retail market, including the apparel sector. It would also 
become the focal point of the expansion of power centres and non-mall shopping growth. 
This would provide an opportunity for many of the domestic clothing retailers to either 
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completely re-position themselves in the market or create a second business model. As 
noted by Industry Expert L: 
...more and more Canadian retailers started to realize there was an opportunity to 
sell sort of a B version of their mall brand. That became I think a real fork in the road 
for a lot of retailers which I think was [directly] related to the fact that space became 
a premium. [Canadian retailers] really had to rethink how they were using their 
space (Interviewee L: p. 2). 
Through the late 1990s and into the early 2000s, the competition for space in the major 
shopping centres and the opportunity for lower cost locations in power centres and 
secondary malls generated diffusion in the channel distribution for apparel in Canada. Only 
Walmart, Moore’s, and Winners (the TJMaxx off-price company) were the foreign clothing 
operators in these expanding non-mall locations. For many domestic retailers, this provided 
an opportunity to escape the intensifying competition of the major malls, hoping that their 
customers would follow. The industry experts had the following to say about the apparel 
retailers who moved to these new locations: 
I would say initially that the power centres were considered to be a secondary 
location. But as the power centres matured and they realized there’s a lot of traffic, 
a lot of retailers were making way more money out in power centres than they were 
out of malls, primarily because of the cost of their space. I would say that it was 
more bottom-line driven as opposed to just accepting the fact that I’m no longer the 
hot brand. I think it was more a matter of how do I get more in the bottom line 
(Interviewee L: p. 4). 
Reitman’s is a remarkable organization through all this and they just keep making 
money. You walk in their stores and you look at the price point. So I suspect that that 
migration [out of major malls]… is really driven financially, that malls are more 
expensive. What you sacrifice in traffic maybe you’ll make up in lower overheads and 
margin if you’re a well-positioned box type [centre] (Interviewee U: p. 7). 
So the bottom line is some of our brands that we left behind, you and I, they are 
leaving the malls. Fairweather can’t really exist at those price points. So they are 
being taken over by whoever can afford the rents (Interviewee P: p. 10). 
Amongst the industry experts, there is disagreement about how many of these B concepts 
were generated as a proactive strategy versus those moves that were a reactive response to 
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the lack of affordable space due to the foreign retailers. Later in this chapter, in the analysis 
of Type of Impact 2: Catalyst for Re-structuring, the impact of churn in the major malls will 
take a further look at the experts’ views on this impact of foreign retailer entry.  
Despite Walmart’s share of clothing sales, most of the domestic retailers who opened stores 
in the power centres did not see Walmart as a direct competitor. Rather, the specialty 
chains viewed Walmart as the draw for traffic to these new centres in much the same way 
as department stores had been the original draws for major shopping centres. This was a 
structure that the domestic retailers were familiar with and believed they knew how to 
capitalize on the traffic. 
Companies such as Reitman’s, Fairweather, Jacob, and Smart Set were finding the major 
mall environment increasingly competitive and expensive, so they opened nearly identical 
formulas in the power centres. As noted by the industry experts, it wasn’t just the struggling 
domestic retailers who opened in these centres: companies such as Roots, Danier, and 
LaSenza opened B concepts as part of a strategy to follow the customers. By 2007, these 
stores were used to clear merchandise and generally represented a true second formula for 
the retailer, however, as the success of the power centres proved to be unsuitable for all 
apparel retailers, the distinction between the major mall formula and the B concept was 
often blurred.  
While many of the legacy domestic apparel retailers focused on chasing the Walmart model 
to find new innovative strategies to stay competitive, other Canadian retailers looked for 
more innovative channel diffusion to not only stay competitive, but also play a dominant 
role in the apparel sector. They accomplished this through a strategy, identified by Industry 
Expert S, called: ‘seeking out the white space in the marketplace’.  
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6.3.4b  Seeking out the ‘White Space’ in an increasingly competitive apparel market 
I think the Canadian retail industry has matured, become a lot smarter, a lot more 
efficient through the pain of the last 20 years. At the end of the day we have a much 
stronger industry than when we really did back in those days. Even though it was 
comfortable, it was fragile. I think today it’s much more sustainable (Interviewee U: 
p. 9). 
In the interview with Industry Expert S, he articulated the idea of searching out the ‘white 
space’ around existing retailers, be they foreign or domestic, to find opportunity for 
innovation in competitive activity. Within the Canadian market between 1989 and 2007, 
two domestic apparel retailers found the white space in the market through location 
diffusion: Mark’s Work Wearhouse and Joe Fresh. 
Mark’s Work Wearhouse – An Iconic Canadian Brand 
Background: 
Our mission is simple. Mark's is devoted to providing extraordinary clothing and footwear to 
Canadians. We define ‘extraordinary’ as products that look, last, protect, feel better and are 
easier to care for than ordinary clothing and footwear. It is a mission that resonates well 
with customers, since we have grown from one store in 1977 to over 380 stores across the 
country. We are now proud to be a part of the Canadian Tire group of companies and to be 
providing more Canadians than ever before with smart clothing and better footwear that 
works better in their everyday lives. We offer our customers exclusive private labels and 
Canada's best sellers in men's and women's casual and business wear, outdoor apparel and 
work wear (Mark’s, 2012). 
It is difficult to explain how a retailer such as Mark’s (re-branded from Mark’s Work 
Wearhouse in the past two years) could own 4.4% of the Canadian Apparel Market in 2007 
(Trendex, 2007), and be the largest single retail banner after Sears, Walmart, The Bay, and 
Zellers at that time. Several of the industry experts found it difficult to explain the success of 
Mark’s, except that it is solidly Canadian. In 2001, without any prior experience in retail, the 
iconic Canadian retailer Canadian Tire bought Mark’s. The partnership has been successful 
thus far, with Mark’s share of market growing significantly each year. What is known about 
Mark’s is that the growth and position has come through a channel distribution network 
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that is unorthodox and not implemented in major malls. Since the acquisition by Canadian 
Tire, Mark’s has built locations inside the hard goods/automotive mass merchant, as well as 
in power centres, secondary malls, plazas, and street locations. The industry experts had this 
to say about the trajectory of Mark’s Work Wearhouse:   
I mean it’s everyday wear. It’s basically a great part of this country, although there’s 
been a huge urbanization, a great part of this country is rural and we’re 
manufacturers and farmers and so on. So there’s a huge population base. There’s 
probably an element of aspirational buying that goes on there from the urbanite 
who just thinks it’s cool to be able to put on that plaid shirt and a pair of boots and 
hold a chainsaw… I think men are probably a lot more relaxed shopping in that 
industrial kind of environment rather than in a formal shopping environment that 
the mall offers. Maybe that’s it... I thought Canadian Tire made that association 
obvious and I think that’s worked out for them. I think that was a brilliant one 
(Interviewee U: p. 18). 
We get asked a lot by foreign investors, particularly U.S. investors, about Canadian 
retailers... ’Can you explain to me why Tim Horton’s is so popular? I don’t 
understand Canadian Tire, can you explain that to me? Mark’s Work Wearhouse, 
who is that?’... And you try to explain it: ‘well it’s generally work wear’. And they just 
look at you and they think ‘well [I guess] it’s sustainable up here’… (Interviewee Q: p. 
14). 
Mark’s Work Wearhouse built an iconic Canadian brand between 1989 and 2007, catering to 
a specific but large market segment that was not as receptive to the in-coming foreign 
retailers, using distribution channels that are innovative in their diffusion and uniqueness. 
They also no doubt benefitted from the weakness of both Sears and Walmart’s clothing 
offerings. 
Joe Fresh – The Upstart 
Background: 
All of our Loblaw control labels and brands make us proud because they follow our 
philosophy of taking something good and making it better – and that’s what our customers 
expect when they shop in our stores. It’s been true since the introduction of The Decadent 
Chocolate Chip Cookie, and it’s still true today, with our PC G.R.E.E.N and PC Organics 
products. We market our control label products in the food, health and beauty, apparel and 
general merchandise categories under brand names that include President’s Choice, PC, no 
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name, Blue Menu, Joe Fresh, Club Pack, PC Organics, PC G.R.E.E.N, Exact and Teddy’s Choice 
(Loblaw, 2012). 
The concept of a major share of apparel sales being captured through non-traditional retail 
channels is not a new format in some parts of the world, such as the UK. However, in 
Canada and North America, this is still viewed as innovative diffusion of distribution 
channels, which was the case when when Joe Fresh launched in 40 Real Canadian 
Superstores (a Loblaw banner) in 2006. As seen above in the Brand Statement from the 
parent company Loblaw, Joe Fresh is but one of several control labels and brands within the 
mix of a company that is predominately a grocery retailer. Even though Joe Fresh has only 
been a brand during the last two years of this study, the impact on the market was instant 
and extensive. The company boldly declared that they would be a billion dollar brand within 
five years. The retail industry experts have the following to say about Joe Fresh: 
“You’ve got Joe as part of Loblaw. These are non-traditional [retailers] that are each 
[putting up] numbers that will register... I mean Joe Fresh has tried to become a 
billion dollars” (Interviewee U: p. 20). 
the reason for Joe Fresh’s existence is because Walmart was so [inadequate]. There 
was a huge void in the market... [Joe Fresh is] not fast fashion. It’s very clean and 
very preppy and very wearable I guess. [And now] they’ve got a place in the market 
(Interviewee B: p. 7/8). 
 The most innovative domestic responses to foreign retail entry in the apparel sector have 
come from outside of the traditional clothing locations. As foreign retailers have generally 
entered the apparel market in very traditional formats – such as major mall stores, 
department stores, and mass merchant discounters – this has left ‘white space’ in the 
market for newer innovations, which Joe Fresh and Mark’s would capitalize on: 
[Joe Fresh] is just brilliant. The good news about that – as with Lululemon, Aritzia, 
and La Senza, as well as Harry Rosen, Henry Singer, and Le Chateau and Reitman’s to 
a degree – you need more of [these domestic successes] because [I think] that in 
most countries when there’s a good mix of both domestic and foreign, that’s where 
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you have the most innovation... So thank God there are still some of those [domestic 
apparel merchants] around because you need them (Interviewee D: p. 17/18). 
Location diffusion has revealed that the disruptive innovation of foreign entry into Canada 
has spread beyond the traditional formats of department stores and specialty chains in 
malls. The location diffusion goes beyond the scope of what the Quantitative Study was able 
to illustrate, but is closely tied to many domestic retailers exiting the malls due to the 
foreign entry. The search for a competitive position in a changing market structure 
encouraged new innovative retailing by the domestic sector.    
6.3.5 Summary of Type of Impact 1 – Innovation in Competitive Activity 
The industry experts have provided important insight into why retail brands such as the Gap 
were so successful entering the Canadian market. The role of consumer-focused innovative 
concepts that continuously evolve with a changing market was seen as fundamental to the 
foreign retailer success, which was lacking in most Canadian retailers. The subsequent entry 
of European multi-nationals brought a new level of sophistication to the marketplace and 
the experts saw the domestic market splitting into the successful responders and those who 
went searching for different market positions. Ultimately, the industry experts saw the 
impact of foreign entry spreading beyond the mall microcosm through the influence of 
Walmart and the channel diffusion that followed.   
6.4  Type of Impact 2: Catalyst for Sectoral Restructuring 
“But the weak retailers won’t win in any situation and that’s the thing about the 
retail business, is it constantly regenerates itself” (Interviewee Q: p. 12). 
“As the new exciting entries come in, they’re all coming from outside of Canada. It’s 
going to squeeze out the existing Canadians I think” (Interviewee Q: p. 18). 
The reflections of Industry Expert Q summarize much of what all respondents had to say 
about the state of foreign retail entry between 1989 and 2007. Reflecting back on the 
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context for foreign entry (as discussed in Chapter 1), it was inevitable that the apparel 
sector in Canada would undergo considerable restructuring as a result of the newcomers 
into the market. With the exception of the Walmart entry in 1994, the influx of foreign 
apparel retailers between 1989 and 2007 would come through the major shopping centres. 
With no new major malls opening between 1990 and 2004, the battle for retail space began, 
which fostered distrust and animosity between domestic retailers and landlords in the 
Canadian malls. As pointed out by Industry Expert B: “...there wasn’t a lot of thought put 
into or strategic understanding about what [the leasing to foreign retailers] would do to 
some of these Canadian retailers” (p. 14). 
As proposed in the Dawson framework, retail internationalization has the potential to 
impact the domestic market when foreign retailers act as catalysts for sector restructuring. 
Based on the interviews with industry experts, the catalysts for sectoral restructuring can be 
classified under three sub-factors: 
6.4.1  Foreign Retailers bring Unisex Format into the market 
• Domestic Response – Unisex Retailers 
• Niche – Success Strategy 
 
6.4.2   Landlords need to re-configure mall space 
• Rise of the Mini-Anchor 
• Domestic Response – Focus on Productivity 
 
6.4.3   Competition for Finite Space brings Churn to the market 
As stated by Interviewee A: 
I think [foreign retailers] created a whole series of consumer expectations and a 
different sense of dynamism within the environment. I just don’t mean closures, but 
[also] how things changed: new product entry, new looks to stores… just a much 
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more dynamic environment in which consumers operate and with different formats 
and with different store signs, etc. (p. 14). 
The study of Mall 1 and 2 provided empirical data to identify what the catalysts were for 
sectoral restructuring. The industry experts validated these findings and provide important 
insight into why these acted as catalysts.    
6.4.1  Catalyst for Sectoral Restructuring – Foreign Retailers bring Unisex format into the 
market 
One can summarize the successful foreign apparel retail company as follows:  
• Unisex 
• Large square footage 
As unisex formats required spaces with larger square footage than the typical women’s or 
men’s only retail operation, the foreign retailers entered the market with larger footprints 
than was the norm in Canadian malls in 1989. Over time, the size of stores would continue 
to evolve, which would have considerable impact on the structure of the marketplace.  
Well they like to go big in America. Basically everything’s been bought up. Almost 
every company you’re talking about now is public and that gives the company the 
resources to try to outdo the next person and the next concept. You know, I don’t 
think Canadians can think that big. Maybe it’s just built in to the [American] DNA 
(Interviewee T: p. 7). 
By comparison, the domestic retailers were predominately pure women’s or menswear. 
Overall, successful domestic response depended upon the Canadian retailer finding a 
differentiated niche in the marketplace. For those domestic retailers that operated in unisex 
formats, the head-on competition would be more difficult and the likelihood of failing 
became much greater.  
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Unisex – The Dominant Foreign Formula  
There are several perspectives from the industry experts as to why foreign retailers arrived 
in a predominately unisex format. One of these explanations indicates that these retailers 
were looking for specific synergies to maximize traffic, and another shows these companies 
arising as the natural offshoot of a lifestyle concept, which was often built from a jeans 
company. Between 1989 and 2007, there was not one foreign pure menswear retailer, and 
only a handful of pure women’s wear retailers who entered in Canada. In the case of 
women’s wear, only Talbot’s and Bebe proved to find some success in the country, while 
Mango was struggling to find its place. Since the majority of Canadian clothing retailers 
catered to a single gender in 1989, the entry of foreign unisex retailers was a direct catalyst 
for the restructuring of the market. The industry experts observed: 
…In every fashion business, every fashion retailer, their main target is women. That’s 
your customer and it doesn’t matter if it’s a woman for yourself, for your husband, 
boyfriend, or for your children… [you have] that customer. So you might as well take 
advantage of that customer who wants to spend and who is your main target 
customer... (Industry Expert M: p. 7). 
In terms of the restructuring of Canadian market space, I think it is important to note 
somewhere along the line that this casual shift, this demographic shift, this kind of 
lifestyle easing shift that happened across North America [and maybe even] 
globally… You know, casual Fridays is really a past 15- or 20-year phenomena... 
(Industry Expert P: p. 17). 
The [foreign retailers] recognized the social environment of shopping: it’s who you 
see, and being seen, and the activity of it, and a place to be. I think they recognized 
all that... if you’re going to do lifestyle and unisex and so on, you need bigger 
stores... I think that was pretty insightful at the time and [Canadians] didn’t see it 
really (Industry Expert F: p. 5) 
Domestic Response – From the Canadian Unisex Retailers 
With the majority of Canadian apparel retailers operating as pure women’s or menswear, 
their response was generally seen as either strengthening their niche position in the market 
– such as Aritzia, Harry Rosen, or LaSenza – or struggling to find a competitive position in a 
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marketplace that was moving away from gender-specific retailing. The experts provided the 
following perspectives: 
In terms of the unisex, we’re talking about American Eagle, Gap, and Banana 
Republic. [Canadian retailers] never did any kind of a crossing of the minds. I mean, 
even Big Steel and Fairweather had different doors [for men and women]. Harry 
Rosen, men and women, different doors or upstairs/downstairs. We never really 
integrated the merchandising. You go in and you go right this, go left this (Industry 
Expert P: p. 16).  
For those Canadian retailers who operated as unisex and had to meet this new competition 
head-on, the responses were a mixture of success, failure, and in some cases constant re-
working as each new competitor came into the market. For Club Monaco, the purchase by 
Polo/Ralph Lauren in 1999 provided new life and much needed capital. For Roots, it has 
been a renewal of their iconic Canadian focus, and for LeChateau, the changes for success 
have been more challenging, which is summarized by Interviewee U: 
“Le Chateau… it’s just remarkable… Suddenly their sales are through the roof and the 
next thing you know they’re off 15% month after month, and then bang up they go 
again” (Interviewee U: p. 16). 
Domestic Response – Niche as Success Strategy  
Between 1989 and 2007, foreign unisex retailers entering the market examined Canadian 
retailers finding successful positioning through specialization and niche formulas. Rather 
than taking on the foreign competitors head-on, and recognizing that the Americans and 
Europeans were vastly over resourced by comparison, the Canadian secret to success was to 
focus on a well-defined niche. As the industry experts commented: 
“...a Danier to some extent who would say ‘look we have a unique niche: this is what 
we do, [and] we do it well… we look at these other guys coming in and we’re not 
that concerned’ ” (Industry Expert N: p. 2). 
“I mean, Harry Rosen is one of the few men fashion retailers that really do it well 
because men customers are not easy and [are usually your] backup because [they’re] 
maybe 9% or 10% of your total business” (Industry Expert M: p. 7). 
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“I think you can almost identify the winners by going back and looking at how well 
focused they are. [For example,] Aritzia walked in and filled a niche that was not 
being filled. Lululemon [also] filled a niche that wasn’t being filled, and that’s the 
secret” (Industry Expert J: p. 6). 
“…[I think] a lot of the newer Canadian retailers that are successful have been niche-
oriented, much more niche-oriented [than] the general fashion [companies]” 
(Industry Expert A: p. 10). 
The general consensus of the experts was that the market re-structured along the lines of 
foreign unisex and domestic niche lines. It had become heavily internationalized and the 
environment was much more about the best of foreign competing against the best of 
domestic. 
6.4.2   Catalyst for Sectoral Re-structuring – Landlords need to reconfigure mall space  
The Quantitative Study identified that many of the foreign retailers were entering with 
significantly larger square footage than was the norm for domestic retailers. As the same 
time, the mall landlords were confronted with a changing department store industry and 
aging malls that required renewal. 
The Rise of the Mini-Anchor 
Part of the re-structuring of the apparel sector during this time was the shift of the major 
shopping centres to include more fashion. The movement of non-apparel retail to less 
expensive locations in power centres had begun, and landlords responded by focusing on 
the higher margin apparel sector. Several industry experts discussed how most major 
shopping centres were undergoing major renovations on aging properties; where possible, 
this included expanding the footprint and re-configuring store locations. The landlords 
needed to fill the gaps left from department store closures and provide access to exciting 
new foreign retail brands, which  required larger renovated spaces.  As the industry experts 
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observed, this was an important turning point in the relationships between landlords and 
domestic retailers: 
When Eaton’s… disappeared at the end, it did pose a significant question as to how 
that square footage was going to be reallocated. Perhaps [the] most dramatic 
example of that is Yorkdale in terms of how they used up 400,000 square feet of 
Eaton’s space... I mean, department stores as a form of retailing matured and 
started declining fairly significantly throughout the 1990s... I think [malls] are all 
trying to get away from one huge anchor into manageable smaller anchors (Industry 
Expert P: p. 13). 
Experts familiar with the leasing negotiations acknowledged the strain that this process put 
on everyone, as the desire for new innovative formats made the foreign retailers sufficiently 
attractive to negotiate different deals. The foreign retailers were then able to build business 
models on a different leasing structure: 
...this gets into a bit of a science in the leasing business, but typically the anchor 
definition in our business is 15,000 square feet. If you’re in 15,000 square feet, it’s 
easier as a landlord to be able to cut a deal with the tenant because the way the 
leases are structured the smaller CRU pick up the shortfall on that (Interviewee C: p. 
8). 
But the rent structures here were so much higher than in the U.S. In the U.S., where 
it was so much more competitive and rents were so much lower, the larger formats 
became their standards and they were making good money there. One of their big 
problems of coming to Canada was they wanted to use that format in a Canadian 
setting. That’s why the money got so crazy for them. So that was a hurdle, [but] 
through negotiations ultimately we got some of these guys in and in some cases in 
those exact formats... But it was a disruption certainly [to try and] aggregate these 
big spaces to accommodate these guys, [which] pissed off a lot of Canadian retailers 
that they were being relocated and bounced in order to bring in this [American 
company] who was getting all sorts of money from the landlord. But they were 
exciting new concepts which truly did drive traffic and business to the malls… so 
everybody benefitted. I think most of them would reluctantly agree that at the end 
of the day it was good for their business to bring these [companies] in (Industry 
Expert U: p. 12). 
The power balance had historically been with the large retail companies such as Dylex Ltd, 
but this influence had now shifted to the shopping centre owners. Not only were domestic 
retailers facing a new competitive set, but they also had to deal with increased costs and 
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less dominance in the mall. The industry experts acknowledged the two perspectives on this 
battle between landlord and domestic retailer, most taking one side or the other. All agreed 
that this was the primary catalyst for the re-structuring of the apparel market.  
Domestic Response – Focus on Productivity  
This response is best illustrated in the Chapter 5 mall analysis, however, it is worth noting 
that the successful strategy for the domestic retailers was to focus on high productivity from 
smaller spaces, seeking out positions near centre court in the major shopping malls. 
Although some attempted to expand stores, such as Roots and Club Monaco, they found 
that the additional square footage did not give them a competitive advantage and lowered 
their productivity. The decision of domestic retailers to scale down operations came at the 
expense of losing market share, but not at the expense of productivity as a means to 
profitability. 
[Aritzia, Lululemon and Danier] crept up a little bit… they started out as very 
specialized and smaller. I think they’ve had some pressure on them to get a little bit 
bigger but they haven’t gone to these big formats or the unisex kind of formats that 
were so popular (Industry Expert U: p. 13). 
“There’s really no Canadian retailer who’s going out and building 15,000-20,000 
square foot stores... you’ve got H&M [with those] big stores...” (Industry Expert H: p. 
16). 
Look, obviously they have survived – Le Chateau, Reitman’s, Laura, Tristan, [and] to 
some extent Group Dynamite – mainly because I think that they understand their 
customer a little better than the Americans do. The Americans… do not have a 
presence in this marketplace other than field personnel and maybe a couple of HR 
people. So they don’t really have a true understanding of the market. They don’t 
really care by and large... But that’s the reason why some of these Canadian retailers 
have stayed and thrived… they’ve understood the customer better than the 
Americans have and the Americans really don’t care – on the margins, ‘yeah we 
could have another 10 points or 12 points but I don’t really want to put the effort in, 
it doesn’t matter, we’re doing well enough’ (Interviewee B: p. 15/16). 
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6.4.3   Catalyst for Sectoral Restructuring – Competition for Finite Mall Space creates 
Churn in the Market 
With no new malls built in Canada between 1990 and 2004, the entry of foreign retailers 
had to target existing malls, which helped expand the market of the major malls. As 
landlords looked to improve productivity and total revenues in their malls, the allocation of 
space became a heated battle and the outcome was a significant restructuring of the 
competitive market through the churn of the domestic retailers.  
While churn would typically refer to failure of the domestic business, the interviews and 
mall analysis in the previous chapter identified varying degrees of churn: 
• Domestic retailers who stayed within the mall – staying in the game, either 
successfully in prime locations or downsized or to less prime locations 
• Out of the mall – proactive or reactive leading to location diffusion and/or creation 
of new formats or formula  
• Out of business 
The industry experts had a great deal to say about the role of foreign retailers and landlords 
as catalysts in the restructuring of the apparel sector in the major malls. The following 
statements best capture the timing of when domestic retailers felt the impact of the 
increased competition for space:  
I would say one of the very first things that Canadian retailers really had to deal with 
was the war for space. [Foreign] entries were coming in at a faster pace than the 
mall base was expanding. I think a lot of Canadian retailers were pretty complacent 
until they actually went to negotiate their renewals and realized that there was 
competition for space, even for their good stores. They had good stores in a location 
in the Eaton’s Centre and Yorkdale that they automatically thought that they could 
easily renew and, all of a sudden, lo and behold… rental rates started to increase and 
[the] demand for the space started to increase. So I think that was the first really 
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solid point of competition. Even before sales started to move in different directions, 
the landlords became very powerful and that’s continued... So really what you have 
is a [real mismatch of] supply and demand (Interviewee L: p. 1). 
So I think competition has really brought much better definition to the market, 
better discipline – there’s a natural cleansing that goes on. The older concepts can’t 
keep up but the new ones keep coming and that’s healthy (Interviewee U: p. 8). 
...I don’t know any developer that has [so] much clout over a retailer that [they] can 
drag them into a foreign market without the retailer having some overriding strategy 
to be in that market (Industry Expert Q: p. 20). 
Put in a historical context, the new space constraints in the 1990s and into the 2000s 
changed the competitive environment, which put an end to the preferential treatment 
described by industry expert Q: 
When a new mall was being built in Canada they would sit down with Dylex first 
because, you know, retailers follow each other. They would ask: Well where is Dylex 
going? Where’s the Fairweather store going? Where’s Harry Rosen going? Where’s 
Tip Top going? Where’s Thrifty’s going? And then retailers would locate based on 
that (p. 11). 
Domestic Retailers who stay in the malls 
In the war for shopping centre space, some domestic retailers developed strategies to stay 
at the top of the productivity performance for apparel retailers. This gave them the clout to 
hold prime locations and negotiate competitively within the shopping centre environment.   
Lululemon and Aritzia are the top two performers in Canada on the fashion side of it. 
I mean, these guys are so far ahead and shoulders above the crowd, it’s almost 
frightening (Interviewee C: p. 4). 
By comparison, there were Canadian retailers who were performing at a lower level of 
productivity. For these retailers, the landlord would decide where and what size of location 
they would be able to lease, keeping in mind that the legacy domestic retailers had been 
accustomed to prime locations and long leases that were well below current market value. 
The re-alignment of space may have eliminated previously prime locations, and the new 
financial pressure of market values forced most companies to re-evaluate their formula and 
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make some difficult decisions to stay competitive in the future. For those who wanted to 
stay in the major shopping centres, the following expresses the situation they were faced 
with: 
Within the mall, there’s always been a fight for that centre court because foot traffic 
is everything in a mall – if you have a bad location off on a wing some place close to 
the subway or whatever, it’s almost like a self-fulfilling prophecy. You’re weak so 
you’re being moved to the weaker spot, which makes you weaker. So I think a lot of 
retailers weren’t easily accepting that… But they did accept smaller footprints and 
I’m not sure your data shows this. But I noticed that a number of retailers that 
[previously] had a 5,000 square foot store went down to a 3,500 square foot store, 
[then] down to a 2,000 square foot store, becoming much more condensed [and 
reducing] their offering, which also made them more focused on their customer 
(Interviewee L: p. 4). 
 
Out of the Mall 
For many domestic apparel retailers, after years of declining performance they were 
essentially pushed out of the mall when leases came up for renewal. In some cases, the 
landlord needed to amass space for a large foreign retailer and domestic retailers were 
asked to leave. The experts had the following observations: 
[Mall landlords] are always scrutinizing who’s productive and who’s not. So I think 
regardless of whether you’re international or local, if you weren’t productive you’re 
not going to be there (Interviewee F: p. 14). 
Sometimes the landlord just said we’re not really interested in you anymore, we 
need someone here that’s going to drive more traffic into the mall. It wasn’t 
acquiescence. It was a forced decision for them (Interviewee L: p. 4). 
I think [Fairweather and Reitman’s] sales within the malls are going down because of 
the intensity of the competition, and then you have mall rents going up, so you get a 
double whammy. So I think they are trying [to develop] locations in secondary malls 
and power centres]... But I think you’re going to see more and more of these 
Canadian retailers moving out of the malls… They’re being pushed out by the 
international retailers who are not as price sensitive (Interviewee J: p. 8/9). 
Whether pushed out of malls or strategically deciding to re-formulate their offer for 
secondary malls and power centres, many domestic retailers saw this as an opportunity to 
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structure a profitable business away from the direct competition of the foreign speciality 
retailers. However, this move would place many of these retailers in direct physical 
competition with Walmart and Winners. Overall, the expert opinion on the success of these 
alternative locations is mixed: 
I agree that some of the players moved to secondary malls. The greatest example of 
that to some degree might be Y&M [YM Inc.], and Northern Reflection is another 
one. But why did Northern Reflection move out of the major malls? The reason was 
they didn’t spend enough money on marketing and advertising to be in a major mall 
and they didn’t want to [because] they found it hard to compete in those malls. So 
they decided to have a strategy of [going] into the second tier malls. Now Bootlegger 
in Vancouver, which is owned by C&A, is a prime example of that today. They’re in 
one major mall out there but [otherwise] they are the king of the secondary malls. 
Now to some degree I think that’s a good strategy: if you can’t beat them, then 
leave... Y&M has a unique business model... Cheap rents and cheap products and 
promote like hell (Interviewee J: p. 5). 
By contrast, some interviewees saw the negative effects of retailers being pushed out of the 
major shopping centres: 
Well I think [that the Canadian clothing retailers’] move out of the malls was 
engineered by the developers, not by them… people will say ‘well we had a strategy 
to move to power centres’ but I think that’s [wrong]. I think that they got shoved out 
partially by rent and partially by the developers saying ‘we don’t want your brand 
here’. Does it mean that’s the end of the brand? Is power centre the end of the 
road? No. There’s tonnes of business that thrives in power centres if they… can 
adapt to the environment. But the environment is not walk-in traffic anymore right. 
So you have to have a compelling reason for people to come if they love your brand 
and your items, or [maybe] they see the 40% sign on the window. But if you don’t 
have either of those you’re gone. But it’s not an instant death. Power centres aren’t 
an instant death. There’s a lot of people thriving in them right (Interviewee N: p. 9). 
The success of power centre locations was considered to be more risky for apparel retailers 
by most of the experts, particularly if the company didn’t fully develop a clearly 
differentiated formula for the power centre compared to the major shopping centre 
location: 
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What’s the difference really between a Pennington’s [at a power centre location] 
and a Pennington’s in the mall? Nothing. So they really didn’t differentiate – the 
retailers didn’t differentiate themselves in the two formats (Industry Expert B: p. 20). 
Power centres or box format shopping centres versus enclosed mall… Prior to 2007, 
[we did see] whether they were American or Canadian retailers opening stores in 
these formats, [particularly] fashion stores. But a lot of them closed because their 
customer wasn’t going there. They couldn’t get there. There wasn’t public 
transportation (Industry Expert Q: p. 19). 
The churn of domestic retailers, evidenced in the analysis of Mall 1 and Mall 2, was 
explained more fully by the industry experts, who provided important insights into whether 
they were pushed or pulled out of the malls, and identified whether they were successful or 
not in the new secondary and power centre locations.  
Out of Business 
For some legacy companies, the challenges of competing with the foreign entries became 
too great and these companies decided to sell off leases to new entrants. American Eagle 
Outfitters will always be considered one of the biggest winners in the acquisition of 
locations in major malls across Canada. Their ability to have an impact immediately 
compared to the organic growth of most other foreign entrants was felt in the early 2000s: 
The first thing to go from Dylex was Braemar because it had the best locations. I 
mean the best 50 or 60 locations… And who bought it? American Eagle. American 
Eagle came in and instantly had 60 [of the] best locations in the malls overnight... a 
brand is lost, a competitor is invited in, and a whole new cycle evolved. There’s 
nobody else to blame for this except us (Interviewee P: p. 25). 
“Yeah, I guess when you really [think] about it, there aren’t an awful lot of old 
Canadian banners around [anymore]” (Interviewee U: p. 7). 
 There is a certain c’est la vie attitude in the comments of the experts about the demise of 
domestic companies during the 1989 to 2007 period, which is captured in the comments 
below. From the perspective of analyzing these outcomes through the Dawson framework, 
one might argue that not all of this churn would be the result of foreign entry. In fact, some 
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experts argue that the companies that didn’t survive played a significant role in their own 
exit. However, it is difficult to diminish the impact that the innovative formats and formulas 
introduced by foreign retailers had on the competitiveness of the sector. In addition, the 
consumer was effectively drawn to these new entrants, forgoing their long-time loyalty to 
the Canadian store.  
I think that [churn] is natural. I think it was very healthy quite frankly for the industry 
and for the customer. The customer wanted more variety: they wanted it to be 
different and they wanted it to be aspirational… Not just a reflection of themselves 
but aspirational (Interviewee G: p. 5). 
American retailers can… enter into prime locations and are welcomed by developers. 
The Canadian retailer has to, in effect, have almost a national or large regional 
presence to even have the economies of scale to [compete]... A change in the level 
of competition, a change in where you’re making your offer, and [the change has] 
been really quite radical.... but there’s always closures in retail. [And] we’ve had 
some major closures... (Industry Expert A: p. 3). 
As Dawson (2003) postulated in his framework, there was anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that small domestic retailers on the margin of profitability would be pushed out by foreign 
entry. In the Canadian apparel market, it was just not the small independents, but also large 
legacy retailers that would close their operations: 
“You know I don’t think Dalmy’s exists anymore. They had 200 stores. Eaton’s, a 
[formerly] major fashion provider, is gone... So you start looking at the retail 
landscape of 1989 and 1990 and it’s frightfully changed” (Industry Expert A: p. 18). 
6.4.4 Summary of Catalyst for Sectoral Restructuring 
The study of the two malls in the Quantitative Study had identified specific impacts from 
foreign retailers that were catalysts for the re-structuring of the apparel sector in Canada. 
The industry experts were able to validate these impacts and explain why and how they 
changed the market. Foreign retailers brought a new format of large square footage unisex 
retail that had not previously existed in the market. Not only did this establish a new 
competitive format but it accommodated the landlords that wanted to re-configure mall 
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space. The Qualitative Study provided additional insight into the relationship between 
landlords and both foreign and domestic retailers, as well as the responses that Canadian 
retailers either proactively or reactively made during the re-structuring of the sector. The 
fight for finite space, the creation of new mini-anchors, and the dominance of foreign unisex 
retailers were the catalysts that left a very different competitive structure in apparel 
retailing in 2007 compared to 1989. 
6.5  Type of Impact 3 – Additional Investment 
Within the Dawson framework, it is proposed that the entry of foreign retail would bring the 
“injection of new and additional investment into the sector often with expectation of higher 
than average sectoral profitability and productivity returns on investment and 
consequential sectoral restructuring” (Dawson, 2003: p. 195). Due to unique provisions in 
the financial reporting laws and accounting standards in the United States, American 
companies are not required to report their Canadian operations as separate businesses, 
even if they are incorporated as such. Therefore, it is impossible to gather specific 
information on investments, performance, or return on investments for the Canadian retail 
business. The retail experts were able to provide some meaningful insight into their 
perceptions and knowledge of the investment and performance activities of foreign and 
domestic retailers, however, this a limitation in the analysis due to the absence of data and 
the general code of confidentiality that surrounds such matters. Perhaps the following 
observation for Industry Expert Q best summarizes the view that foreign retailers have done 
very well in Canada, signalled by the continued entry of other foreign retailers looking for 
success: “But the one thing that we’ve learned over the years, particularly with stronger 
brands, is they’ll follow each other. They’ll follow each other into real estate for sure” (p. 2). 
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In analyzing the content of the interviews, the impact of foreign additional investment can 
be categorized under the following sub-factors: 
6.5.1  Additional Investment - Sophistication and Size of Foreign Retail Formula 
• Financial Stability 
• Technology Investment 
• Looking to the Future 
• Domestic Response – Trajectory of Success 
• Domestic Response – Overwhelming Challenge against Sophisticated Foreign 
Retailers 
 
6.5.2 Additional Investment - Foreign Investment not made 
Overall, the interviewees saw domestic retailers faced with a significant challenge, 
competing against much larger and more aggressive foreign competitors.  
6.5.1 Additional Investment - Sophistication and Size of Foreign Retail Formula 
For the most part the foreign retailers exhibited a level of business sophistication that had 
been developed in their home markets and proved a significant advantage in competing 
with the domestic retailers.  
Financial Stability 
The industry experts focused on the strength of foreign cash flow and foreign companies’ 
ability to invest in large stores with a lavish store design and a significant inventory 
investment. Some believe the Canadian landlords facilitated the foreign investment through 
lease inducements and reduced rental costs on the larger square footage, a point of conflict 
between domestic retailers and landlords that has been well documented elsewhere in this 
research. The following statements from the interviews highlight the issues around the 
impact of foreign additional investment and the attraction of their investments: 
…Most Canadian companies don’t have the kind of cash flow that’s required [to build 
stores the size of the larger unisex foreign retailers] because you don’t [just] build 
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those stores and walk away. It takes a substantial amount of investment and you 
need to be able to have patience (Interviewee D: p. 11). 
…the mall owner’s point of view became very conducive to international retailers 
coming in because they brought the right type of cash flow for the developers. So 
not only could they afford to be in there, but they also brought the right stuff when 
the real estate industry was also changing (Interviewee P: p. 11). 
If you look at our banking systems, it’s very conservative, and in the States [it’s very] 
easy to get money... There are a lot more private equity players in the States... a lot 
of them come to Canada to lend money because there is a bit of a vacuum in 
Canada.... You know, you can’t do a lot of high flying things here without having a lot 
of financial backing and a lot of equity (Industry Expert L: p. 15). 
They’ve just got a different view on business than the apparel retail crowd had in 
Canada. It was just a much more corporate sort of setting in that way. It you’re 
looking at all of these names that [are] on the list – whether it’s Gap, Guess, Talbots, 
Eddie Bauer, Esprit, American Eagle, Zara, H&M, or A&F – they’re all major concerns 
in terms of corporate governance and sophisticated management systems and all 
those things. So it was a little easier for them to go far flung (Interviewee B: p. 3). 
This final quote gives context for the challenges of financial support for Canadian retail and, 
in a more general view, the more risk-adverse nature of the domestic market. As will be 
seen in the domestic response to the impact of foreign retail investment, Canadian retailers 
have had to go out of the country for funding and have had to take a more global 
perspective on their business to stay competitive. 
Technology Investment 
Dawson also suggests that the “introduction of improved information management 
methods that affect competitive success” (p. 195), which will have an impact on the 
competitiveness of the apparel sector in the host country. This is substantiated by the 
observations of the several industry experts: 
... the American retailers came in and they had a 500 or 600 store chains, whereas 
Canadian retailers might have had an 80 or 90 store chain. So spreading that cost 
over an 80-90 store chain in the early days of technology was impossible because the 
cost was just too high, whereas the American retailers were able to make the 
investment. They were much more cutting edge on technology... Canada was a 
laggard (Interviewee L: p. 3). 
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“We know that the best thing that Walmart had was information systems. They 
spent the second most on information technology in the world – [only] the Pentagon 
spends more” (Interviewee J: p. 1). 
Well I think Americans have been good innovators. I think they really kind of led the 
way... there’s a couple of different forms of innovation... Then there’s some 
technological innovations... [which] saves you time and time is of the essence 
(Interview T: p. 11-12). 
A few of the interviewees more involved in the financial side of the retail industry also spoke 
at length about the more advanced accounting practices and systems processes that gave 
foreign retailers a significant advantage over the domestic retailers. The impact of 
competing with less information would force domestic retailers to make investments in 
technology to stay competitive. One of the most notable examples of this has been the 
massive undertaking by Loblaw companies with SAP, which was started at the end of this 
research period in 2007. A billion dollar undertaking, SAP’s single largest global project was 
with Loblaw, spending several years to integrate a myriad of diverse legacy systems. As Joe 
Fresh launched its business, there was not a perpetual inventory system in place to manage 
the business, which is something every other clothing retailer would take for granted. 
Looking to the Future 
“You know most of [the foreign retailers] are incubating a bunch of different 
concepts at the same time...” (Industry Expert H: p. 10). 
This simple statement best summarizes the opinion shared by the majority of industry 
experts: foreign retailers not only have the wherewithal to invest in today’s business, but 
also in preparation for the future. By comparison, domestic retailers have always been 
trying to catch up as each foreign retailer entered the market. The disadvantage was 
obvious to the interviewees: in-order to stay competitive, Canadian retailers had to increase 
their investments in stores, technology, and the future. 
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Domestic Response – Trajectory of Success 
For domestic retailers, different sources of funding to support current and future growth in 
the business have been elusive. On the domestic front, Mark’s Work Wearhouse has 
benefited from the purchase by Canadian Tire and the access this provided to a large and 
loyal customer base. It also provided access to cash flow and low-cost real estate within the 
Canadian Tire stores. As Canadian Tire aspired to be located within 15 minutes of 90% of 
Canadians by 2007, the potential was unlimited for Mark’s growth. One could argue that Joe 
Fresh benefits as much from the deep pockets of Loblaw as from the weekly traffic that a 
grocery retailer can provide. This has allowed Joe Fresh to take time to work through its 
concept and find the ‘white space’ between the Gap, H&M, Walmart, and other style-at-a-
price competitors. Other Canadian apparel retailers have found the necessary funding 
through foreign investment, including LaSenza’s sale to The Limited Brands, Aritzia’s 
investment from American private equity firm Berkshire Partners, and Lululemon’s 
investment from Highland Partners (also U.S. based).  
The interviews revealed other forms of investment that domestic retailers made to ensure 
their competitive position in the market. Many of these investments focused on staying 
currently competitive and not about funding for future. 
...constantly reinvesting capital to improve the businesses. That’s ongoing. You just 
don’t open a store and spend money to open it and that’s it. It has to be innovative 
over time and you’re constantly trying – you’re redesigning new fixtures, and 
obviously new visual materials always go into the stores to keep it fresh (Industry 
Expert T: p. 4). 
[Canadian clothing retailers] increased their store size. They went from 3,000 to 
3,500 square feet. They were probably spending $80 to $90 a foot, not factoring 
inflation, and all of a sudden went to spending more than $150 or $175 a square foot 
and building these beautiful stores. They really took off and I think they’re an 
example of somebody that really [understood that there’s] opportunity out there, 
and it paid off (Interviewee C: p. 3). 
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Another Canadian retailer was Groupe Dynamite... looked at the U.S. guys and 
[found out how] they were modelling, how they were being successful, and went 
and designed really terrific stores (Interviewee C: p. 3). 
So that’s just reinvestment in plant and if you don’t do that, I think you’re at risk... I 
think you [also] have to invest in real estate and this would be in the big box 
environment. You simply have to and if you are not where the population is growing, 
you are forced to continually respond to the competition in terms of physical space, 
in terms of leases and in terms of your offer. I don’t think there’s any choice. If you 
don’t do that, I think you’re going to get run over (Interviewee A: p. 16). 
Domestic Response – Overwhelming Challenge against Sophisticated Foreign Retailers 
 The empirical analysis in Chapter 5 clearly illustrated the overwhelming challenge that 
domestic retailers faced in competing with the large unisex format of the foreign retailers. 
While several Canadian retailers developed strategies for success, many others continued to 
struggle with the realities of being a domestic-based retail operation. The impact of 
additional investment by foreign retailers was difficult to overcome when a domestic 
company was operating multiple stores and formats across the entire Canadian market. As 
noted by the industry experts, this increased the challenge to compete with foreign retailers 
who were located in the top retail malls and streets. Successful retailers such as Lululemon 
and Aritzia had avoided that scenario by opening fewer stores and competing head-on with 
the foreign companies, a best-against-best strategy. On the other hand, companies such as 
Reitman’s, Fairweather, LeChateau, and Laura were operating everywhere, which diluted 
their resources. The industry experts comments on this tendency:  
In terms of investment made by Canadian retailers, I don’t think it would even make 
any difference. I mean an average Canadian retailer is never going to be able to 
withstand the onslaught of global brand creep. They can’t no matter how good they 
are, unless they have something that’s vertical and that’s exportable (Interviewee I: 
p. 15). 
Most of the major American retailers go to the major markets and they go to the 
major malls, often [coming] in with inducements... If a Canadian retailer is going to 
compete effectively, whether it’s [at] Yorkdale or Scarborough Town Centre or right 
across the country in the 25 malls that matter, then they’re going to have to reinvest 
 
 
215 
in their store and they’re going to probably have to reinvest in their people. I would 
think at one end if you don’t do that you’re backing away from the competition 
(Interviewee A: p. 15).   
6.5.2 Additional Investment - Foreign Investment not Made 
One final factor in analyzing the impact of foreign investment on the competitiveness in the 
apparel sector was the investments which were not made. Unlike the mass merchant 
Walmart or big box retailers such as Home Depot and Best Buy, who would open Canadian 
head offices to run their business, apparel retailers did not always see the need for separate 
head offices. For Americans, this was a relatively easy decision due to proximity and a 
comparatively open border to move goods from U.S. distribution centres. For the European 
multi-nationals, their structure of foreign operations had been well established long before 
entering Canada, and they knew how to run businesses at a distance. This foreign expertise 
meant that Canadian retailers had to compete against foreign retailers who could operate 
on better margins due to lower operating costs, which typically achieved economies of scale 
with lower inventory costs, allowing them to achieve higher levels of profitability in the host 
market. This would put greater pressure on the Canadian retailers’ margins and pricing to 
stay competitive. The industry experts provide the following insights: 
We were just talking about head offices and thinking that a lot of the companies 
would not set up head office… I think they certainly [did] in the beginning – not many 
of them would come in and try and run the operation from the States. They did 
have… and still do have, their Canadian people. But I think after a period of time, 
[after] the rollout has occurred, they realized that they can probably maybe cut and 
run. The problem becomes that [the] best jobs in retail are going to end up being in 
the U.S. or being in Europe (Interviewee K: p. 10). 
 ...American Eagle… wanted nothing except Braemar locations. That was their prize 
and then the distribution center of course because they didn’t have a home office. 
They just used several offices and they probably still are. So they had no home office 
facilities needed (Interviewee P: p. 26). 
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6.5.3 Summary of Type of Impact 3 - Additional Investment 
In this study, the qualitative research gathered through expert interviews shed limited 
insight into the details of the financial performance of companies. The lack of numbers is 
compounded by the fact that the foreign retailers do not report Canada as separate to the 
United States, and the majority of Canadian apparel retailers would have been privately 
held during the period of study. However, the demise of some major domestic companies 
such as Dylex Limited has been documented in this study, which helps demonstrate how the 
competitive structure of the market changed significantly to make it impossible for all 
retailers to survive.  
Foreign retailers that increased the investment necessary to compete would forever change 
the apparel sector. Whether through the investment in stores, systems, processes, or 
people, foreign retailers arrived with more sophisticated operations and established a new 
standard for performance. For some domestic retailers, the obvious response was to find 
financial stability that would allow them to compete, and for the rest it was a matter of 
doing as much as possible to stay in the market with limited resources. 
6.6  Type of Impact 4 – Improved Productivity of Assets 
The empirical evidence of what the foreign companies were able to establish as new 
standards of performance was well documented in Chapter 5. To add to this 
evidence, the interviews of industry experts contributed some insights into other 
measures of improved productivity, such as inventory turns, better margins through 
scale, diversified merchandise mix within the formula, better accounting methods, 
and loyalty development. ...I think that [productivity and finance issues influence] 
the type of strategic decisions when these bigger companies get involved and say 
‘you know what, we’ve got to be unisex because that’s just going to increase our 
[productivity] by 30%’ (Industry Expert B: p. 10). “...productivity drives the mall 
business because it tends to drive the [available spaces]... Landlords are constantly 
focused on driving productivity” (Interviewee U: p. 13/14). 
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This attention to productivity as measured in sales per square foot was clearly important to 
foreign retailers, domestic retailers, and mall landlords. Thus, stores had to adjust square 
footage and merchandise offerings accordingly to stay competitive.  
…as soon as you move the square footage higher, your productivity goes down. Now 
that doesn’t mean your profitability down... [but] you get a break on rent and you 
get a break on your common area and maintenance charges because you’re 
considered an anchor now (Interviewee B: p. 12). 
For example, when Loblaw introduced higher margin apparel in a grocery format, it was a 
clear indicator of the types of innovative strategies employed by domestic retailers to 
improve the productivity of their real estate: 
One example of productivity of asset… is the Loblaw experience with Joe Fresh: you 
[enter] into an area which generally has low margins, certainly regular shopping 
behaviours, and you put an awful lot of fashion [in there], which has been extremely 
successful from what I can observe (Industry Expert A: p. 9). 
Throughout this restructuring, domestic retailers saw the foreign entrants as much larger 
and benefitting from economies of scale. Expert H provides an interesting cautionary note 
on this factor: 
I think scale is really underestimated from a buying perspective, particularly [in 
today’s market]. Some of the Asian markets are growing and some of these 
[companies] are starting to make for [the Canadian market]… The Canadian retailer 
is going to have a more difficult time I think if you don’t have real scale because I 
don’t think you’re going to be very important to any of them... Even some of these 
American retailers are starting to look small relative to some of the big international 
[companies] right [now] (Interviewee H: p. 9/10). 
The [Gap] started going in a crazy direction. They opened [even] larger stores... Well 
they couldn’t sustain it because they didn’t have the same broad appeal anymore 
because there was more competition coming in, whether it was from U.S. retailers or 
Canadians that woke up. So they couldn’t sustain the productivities in those larger 
boxes. I think it’s almost like they ate themselves up. So now they’re going back to 
smaller boxes (Interviewee B: p. 11). 
The industry experts saw that improved productivity of assets could take on several forms, 
such as the more fundamental focus on improving inventory turns, or using improved 
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accounting processes to ensure the effective monitoring of retail moves. In particular, one 
expert focused on the strong customer loyalty processes that can play an important role in 
the health and longevity of a brand: 
And Gap was a revolution in those days because their inventory turns were 20% 
higher than most, which in those days was revolutionary [and] meant you had 
fresher merchandise (Industry Expert D: p. 4). 
Consumer focus has been often cited by the industry experts as fundamental to retail 
success – a particular strength of foreign retailers: 
I think one of the things we look at is loyalty and advocacy, and so that concept of 
customer for life, which is an indication of the strength of the brand and [the] 
propensity to buy the brand (Interviewee F: p. 7). 
Greater sophistication and earlier adoption of technology and business systems are also 
attributed to the foreign retailers and their improved productivity: 
But around the late ‘90s [and] early 2000s, we saw a real switch from retailers that 
traditionally used the retail method: [they now] had an access to much more 
sophisticated technology that enabled them to manage their inventory in a much 
more detailed manner. Most of them switched from a retail method to a costing 
method about that time, and now they had the tools all of a sudden to track the 
aging of every sku and almost every item in their inventory. They had to get sharper 
with it because… the bottom lines were shrinking and the way to boost them was to 
be a lot smarter, turning your inventory more quickly, price it properly, and if it 
wasn’t selling to discount it quickly (Interviewee L: p. 2). 
6.6.1 Summary of Type of Impact 4 - Improved Productivity of Assets 
The entry of foreign retailers established new standards for business sophistication and 
improved productivity of assets. The industry experts discussed this across the full spectrum 
of inventory and systems management, customer management, and overall brand 
management. They also indicated that, by 2007, the domestic retailers who had survived 
the foreign expansion were increasingly competitive on these measures. In summary: 
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I now think obviously that, after a 20-year period or a 25-year period, Canadian 
retailing is in a much better position to compete. There’s been a lot of culling that’s 
taken place and as a result I do think we can compete more effectively one-on-one 
than we could before (Industry Expert A: p. 13). 
6.7  Type of Impact 5 – New Competitive Behaviours 
It is not surprising that the overall impact of foreign entry into Canada would result in the 
introduction of new competitive behaviours and the need for domestic retailers to respond 
with their own new behaviours to stay competitive. The culmination of the impacts 
previously discussed in this chapter lead directly to changes in marketing, operational, 
merchandising, and supply chain behaviours. In analyzing the interviews, the discussion of 
new competitive behaviours could be grouped under five headings: 
• 6.7.1  Marketing Activity 
• 6.7.2  Merchandising Strategy 
• 6.7.3  Foreign Retailer Everyday Value Pricing versus Domestic Retailer Promotional 
Pricing 
• 6.7.4  Vertical Integration 
• 6.7.5  The Global Perspective 
Of note, the importance of a global perspective in retail was a broadly shared opinion 
among industry experts. Regardless of whether the retailer operates in many countries or 
just one, the initiative to expand with a global perspective determines top-tier success.  
6.7.1  New Competitive Behaviours - Marketing Activity 
The foreign retailers were seen to enter the market with higher standards of marketing 
activity that were developed and perfected within their own home markets. Much of this 
was the extension of the well-developed retail brand formulas that the foreign retailers, 
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such as the Gap and Abercrombie & Fitch, brought to the market. This point was 
emphasized in the comments of the following industry experts: 
...[foreign retailers] taught us a lot... there was a lot more concern about the staff 
looking the part [and] exemplifying the lifestyle [of the brand]. That was a lot of new 
thinking. I think lastly, and the one that I got more involved in perhaps, was just 
marketing and communications, a much deeper understanding of brand, [and] a lot 
more early emphasis on the web and some of the skills of social marketing. They 
were talking about this and it wasn’t even on our radar (Industry Expert F: p. 2) 
“Well [H&M is] a global collection as well, but you can modify. You can adjust per 
country. But marketing will always be global” (Interviewee M: p. 5). 
The foreign retailers brought a comprehensive and dominating approach to their marketing 
that gave them an advantage over Canadian retailers. By comparison, industry expert J 
describes the marketing behaviour of domestic retailers as both less strategic and under-
resourced: 
Often [Canadian apparel retailers] decide: ‘oh, let’s spend some more money on 
marketing to help sales’, but they haven’t clearly identified who they are. So your 
advertising is not going to work (Interviewee J: p. 6). 
The major thing they failed to do was invest in marketing... my guess is they spent a 
third of their [foreign] counterparts. The other thing that they have never done is 
[properly promote their] private label and [exploit] the brand… there is no marketing 
plan to market the private label like the Gap did. I once had a meeting with a guy 
who was president of a big specialty store and he says ‘well we’re trying to emulate 
the Gap brand, it worked for the Gap’. I said ‘yeah but they spent an enormous 
amount of money in marketing and advertising and you spend basically nothing.’ So 
if I had to make one major comment, it’s the industry failed to react to the degree 
that I think they should have, and [their inaction] sowed the seeds for their demise 
(Interviewee J: p. 2/3). 
However, foreign retailers could not execute established marketing behaviours without 
challenges, as noted in the observations of expert M on H&M and its standards of window 
and visual display in Canadian stores. 
…Fashion, price, marketing, [and] the visual side [determine] the way H&M positions 
itself with windows as an invitation to the customer. I think [quite a bit] changed [in 
its transition to Canada]... I didn’t see nice windows. Nobody used props or different 
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kinds of team in the window... It was tough to find people to do that because there 
was no experience... [H&M] had to make classes for [employees] and send them 
over to Europe to train and teach them (Interviewee M: p. 8/9). 
What was also obvious in the interviews was the benefit foreign retailers had in building 
their marketing profile in Canada, as potential customers already had an awareness of their 
brand due to proximity to the U.S. market. 
Because what these new entries were doing was raising the bar in terms of 
presentation – it was showbiz and pizzazz and these higher spaces, more light, 
[better visuals], etc. But of course you’re coming into the market with a brand that’s 
already got high recognition, and the media had done the work for them already in 
announcing their entrance. So you know they got a lot of freebees coming in... There 
were different presentation tactics that we didn’t really practice here... (Interviewee 
K: p. 2/3). 
...if you have a strong brand people will flock to your store. To get a brand, you have 
to advertise, you have to have marketing, you have to be in magazines, commercials, 
TV, etc. If you can spread that over 800 stores [throughout] North America versus 80 
stores in Canada, that makes a huge difference... Because Canada and the U.S. are, 
from a media point of view, almost integrated… There’s very little difference 
between the two... (Interviewee L: p. 11). 
Despite the accessibility of the Canadian market and the advantages that the foreign 
retailers had in marketing, one of the industry experts saw the potential for domestic 
retailers to claim a unique marketing differentiation: 
“It’s proudly Canadian. So I think it’s interesting – I think it’s increasing and I think 
that retailers are trying to take advantage and promote that” (Interviewee K: p. 19). 
The more general consensus among the experts was that the successful domestic apparel 
retailers approached their marketing consistent with their brand positioning, with a focus on 
the niche opportunity. These domestic retailers would expend resources in the stores and 
on-line instead of investing in large traditional marketing campaigns. Both industry experts 
O and S saw the future as being on-line globally and excellent at the store level locally, 
emphasizing the importance of expertise in these areas. The marketing mix for apparel 
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retailers was seen as shifting as much as the competitive environment was shifting in 
Canada.  
6.7.2  New Competitive Behaviours - Merchandising Strategy  
Consistent with the perception that the foreign retailers’ marketing activities were at a 
higher standard than those of Canadian companies, the industry experts also saw the 
merchandising strategies in a similar light – more evolved and sophisticated. For the 
majority of industry experts, the most significant change in merchandising behaviour was 
the frequency of inventory turns within the foreign merchandising strategy. When the Gap 
entered Canada in 1989, one of its lasting impacts on the competitive activity of domestic 
retailers was the frequency of inventory turns and the strategy of consistent newness to the 
consumer. As Industry Expert T recalls: 
...talking about two seasons of deliveries and a sale twice a year [in] the ‘70s. In the 
80s there was probably four seasons, but then when the Gap came in you had to get 
into almost monthly deliveries to compete… Canadian retail was not as good as the 
American retail in terms of product development, speed to market.  
Numerous interview comments spoke to the acceleration of inventory turns, which has 
accelerated from the faster turnover of basics that the Gap introduced to the hyper-speed 
of cheap chic fashion at H&M.  
...the whole change in the retail calendar. Much earlier to market, the sales period is 
expanding, expanding... and a lot of that is in response to competition, which comes 
from the U.S. entrance (Interviewee L: p. 19). 
Over time, Canadian retailers would change their merchandising strategies to meet the 
challenge of more frequent inventory turnover. However, the industry experts cited the 
challenges and barriers that left the majority of domestic retailers lagging behind the foreign 
competition: 
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So there was quite a flurry in the ‘90s when the department stores really cleaned up 
that supply chain and started to eliminate the distributors in Canada. Then as it 
evolved, eventually they were actually going right to the manufacturer, [which] took 
a lot of overhead out of the process. But they were forced to do that [really] because 
they were not competitive once the Gap came in (Interviewee U: p. 1). 
...none of the major [Canadian] retailers have upgraded their information systems. 
They [only] use their information systems for one reason: to have a real time 
indicator of sales... on sourcing they paid no attention to that and all they tried to do 
was keep their prices lower and lower. So instead of using domestic vendors to be 
able to react quicker, they went offshore and that real movement to offshore began 
in 2006 and 2007, which was the wrong thing to do [in a way]... that [move] 
precludes quick response to trends (Interviewee J: p. 2).  
Of course, at the same time we had the downturn we had the Gap coming in and 
shortly thereafter you had Walmart, new competitors. I think a lot of people were 
probably slow reacting on the merchandising side of the business because they were 
so preoccupied with the financial difficulties that they were in because of the high 
rents and the high debt and soaring interest rates and an economic slowdown, which 
was cutting sales everywhere. It was a great confluence of stuff that happened 
(Interviewee U: p. 4). 
In summary, the industry experts identified factors such as the cost of technology and the 
recession of the early 1990s as impediments to the speed of changing competitive 
behaviour on the domestic front. Those domestic retailers who have been successful in 
competing in the changed competitive market eventually adopted merchandising strategies 
that were consumer-focused, adapting to the strategies of successful foreign retailers. 
6.7.3  New Competitive Behaviours - Foreign Retailer Everyday Value Pricing versus 
Domestic Retailer Promotional Pricing 
There is no clearer statement of differentiation between the pricing strategies of domestic 
versus foreign retailers than the following quote: 
I remember the Gap saying ‘we came into this new market and everybody was 
calling out their prices. We don’t call out our prices. We would have it in the back in 
a rack and here’s our clearance prices at the back, bring everybody back there’. So 
[Canadian retailers had to adjust] pretty quick. I also think that our department 
stores had led the way in terms of price reductions, doing deeper and deeper 
discounts before the height of the selling season to entice people [until] there’s not 
much further that it can go (Interviewee K: p. 2). 
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The interviews revealed a general agreement within the industry that the foreign retailers 
set a new challenge for the domestic players by not only turning their inventory much 
faster, but also committing to an everyday value pricing strategy that consumers responded 
to in a positive manner, which is evidenced in the following comments: 
 ...[it is not a new combination] to market the H&M brand as a very high fashion 
brand with extremely good prices. That is not a new business model, but I think it 
was very sexy of course that we came from Europe, that it was H&M and it was 
young and fast and the marketing was cool (Interview M: p. 3). 
Walmart and to a decreasing extent Sears have taken the price proposition through 
hard discount. H&M, Zara, and the Canadian retailer Le Chateau have created a 
differentiated discount offering of style at a price, [which was a] position created and 
once dominated by Old Navy (interviewee S). 
What the industry experts observed was that the market over time became clearly 
differentiated on pricing strategy behaviour with a store such as Walmart at one end of the 
discount scale and Everyday Value Pricing (EDVP) on the other end. As noted above, fashion 
at good prices was not a new strategy by the time H&M entered the market in 2004. Some 
Canadian retailers had adopted the practice, such as Le Chateau and other foreign retailers. 
The challenge is finding the right strategy and sustaining it, as noted in the following 
observation: 
I think it’s very difficult to go from high low to EDVP. You see Walmart struggling 
with that because they went back and forth in the U.S. and now they can’t figure out 
how to do it... I think it’s more the brand – [high-low pricing] has been associated 
with it right. So if you’re brand has been associated with that for years and years, I 
think trying to get away from that is suicide right. I think you buy and structure to 
that as best you can. There’s nothing wrong with that in a power centre” 
(Interviewee N: p. 8). 
Amongst the many criticisms levied at the domestic retailers, the failure in pricing strategy 
received some of the strongest condemnations, as illustrated in the following excerpt: 
So I think [Canadian retailers] reacted rather than [anticipating and] strategizing for 
the long-term. They weren’t thinking about creating a differentiation. They didn’t 
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understand the competition. It was way stronger than they ever thought about and 
price was the first thing that [foreign competition] thought about (Industry Expert K: 
p. 5). 
As noted by expert K, the domestic retailers were pre-disposed to rely on price promotion 
to drive business, but many of the companies who dominated the domestic market lost 
their positioning to the focused foreign brands. As a result, several legacy companies have in 
fact exited the major malls as an outcome of their non-branded price-driven strategies. As 
noted by the following industry experts: 
...the business model that the YM and INC. Groups pursue is really a completely 
supply side business, the promotional model. I mean their model depends on getting 
blue jeans at $3 and selling them for $10... They can sell twosomes, threesomes, 
foursomes, just pure volume. Those people, because they are advertising-driven or 
promotional-driven, they can’t really survive in the malls because malls are still 
brand-oriented entities. I mean they want brand names to have some stability, some 
price discipline, and so forth (Interviewee P: p. 10). 
Dylex goes away and it gets really replaced by the INCs of the world. INC bought 
Fairweather, Suzy Shier, Urban Planet, Urban Behaviour, Costa Blanca. Everything 
that has to do with pricing and price... It’s all import. It’s all unit driven and it’s all 
commodity driven (Industry Expert B: p. 5). 
Industry expert R gave credit to Walmart for setting the standard for everyday value pricing 
across the retail industry, placing pressure across all sectors to re-position their promotional 
and pricing strategies. For many domestic apparel retailers, this was particularly problematic 
since their business strategy was substantially based on a price/promotion proposition 
rather than integrated brand positioning. 
6.7.4  New Competitive Behaviours - Vertical Integration 
The underlying business model for the success of the foreign retailers was their vertical 
integration. Without the differentiation of merchandise and control over the supply chain, 
the retailer brand formula is seen by industry experts to be far less viable. Multi-brand 
retailing can be successful though, as noted here: 
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Intermix is a retail concept of brands. So that’s an unusual scenario for a retail of 
mixed brands to come if you’re not a major business like Nordstrom or anyone. But 
basically no other entry other than Walmart has come [to Canada] that’s multi-
branded. I don’t think so, because the rest are all vertical. I think that vertical has a 
much better chance of succeeding than multi-brand and mostly because a multi-
brand store is going to have exclusivity issues to deal with... (Interviewee I: p. 4) 
For the most part, dominant foreign retailers entered Canada as vertically integrated 
companies. In 1989, there were very few Canadian companies operating in the vertical 
integrated model, the exceptions being Roots and Club Monaco: 
I think Roots was the first [retailer] in this country to be private branded, design and 
create their own product, and only sell their own product in their own stores. This 
would be in the late ‘70s... back then everything was made in Canada. It was 
fantastic (Interviewee T: p. 3). 
By 2007, the successful Canadian retailers would also be fully established as vertically 
integrated operations: 
Lululemon is 100% vertical and Aritzia is 100% [as well]. They don’t have any non-
private label I don’t think, [or they] might have one pair of pants in a season. It’s very 
small (Interviewee I: p. 5) 
This move to increase numbers of domestic clothing retailers to develop private brands and 
take production off-shore increased significantly during the time frame of this study. While 
this changed, competitive behaviour on the part of the retailer was considered essential for 
their survival against the foreign retailers, although it did have a very negative impact on the 
once large clothing manufacturing base in Canada. As noted here: 
...one of the things I did notice during that 1989 to 2007 period was that we did see 
the Canadian retailer going to foreign production, if you go back to the ‘80s and even 
early ‘90s, a lot of manufacturing was still done within Canada... I think that’s when 
the Canadian retailer became much stronger, that the margin improved significantly 
from what they had historically been (Interviewee C: p. 13). 
...it’s a zero sum game. So why wouldn’t you believe that the Canadian retailers are 
going? The really bad news in this whole thing is the domestic apparel 
manufacturers – none of the internationals will source from them, even though 
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they’re in Canada. So many of the domestic ones who are still here do some sourcing 
but they lose share [and often go out of business] (Interviewee J: p. 13/14). 
The geographical relationship between Canada and the U.S. favoured the logistics of the 
American companies. As noted by industry expert G, the north-south links were in fact more 
efficient than the east-west distribution required for Canadian firms. Along with the 
potential for less expensive transportation, the impact of timing was also a factor: 
Because of their distribution centres are dotted across the U.S., that’s a big 
disadvantage for Canadian retailers [that have] to distribute across the country or 
land in Vancouver, come back to Montreal, and [then] do the redistribution. So their 
whole distribution network really supports doing business in Canada easier than a 
Canadian does. It’s tough... So everything went directly into Montreal. Sometimes 
we’d be taking a markdown when it arrived in Vancouver because it had to be – It 
would be a month (Interviewee G: p. 10/11/12). 
As with most competitive behaviours, the industry experts viewed the domestic retailers as 
generally late to adapting new behaviours over the period of this study. Despite some of the 
noted limitations, the successful ones had made up the gap with the more advanced foreign 
retailers and were increasingly competitive on key business strategies, including the 
development of private branding and the global sourcing necessary for vertical integration. 
6.7.5  New Competitive Behaviours - The Global Perspective 
The global perspective of retail revealed itself in a very subtle way until the collective 
analysis of the interviews was completed. In particular, the interview with industry expert O 
was most significant in revealing the global perspective as critical to successful retailing: the 
key to success became finding a sustainable niche that was not only competitive in the local 
market but could compete internationally, supporting the business through a sustainable 
global supply chain strategy. According to industry expert O, the business point of view had 
to be global across all aspects of the business, whether the business was currently doing 
business in one country or one hundred. This perspective is elaborated on by expert K: 
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...I mean you’re dealing with some very sophisticated competition… and when you 
know you see the tactics that the Walmart uses, I mean you think… pricing, looking 
at location issues, purchasing, you’ve got to compete with a global network that can 
source and sourcing I think is going to become increasingly a big issue (Interviewee 
K: p. 24). 
This is further reinforced by the following observation: 
I think the reality is that brands are global today… it’s all about marketing. A brand 
that has a marketing global awareness… any brand that is an internationally 
recognized brand is going to be wanted in a country like Canada and it’s going to be 
considered cool... (Industry Expert I: p. 3). 
The Canadian retailers saw this global marketing strategy as both a challenge and 
increasingly more an opportunity. Looking at the downside, some of the industry experts 
had the following to say about why Canadian retailers have difficulty changing their 
competitive behaviour to meet the impact of foreign entrants: 
...I mean I always make the argument that one of the reasons that we are not as 
innovative and we are not as outrageous in our successes in retailing is because we 
just can’t do it in Canada, unless you have ambitions beyond Canada because I don’t 
care what you take, after you hit the 100th store you are really going into C’s (third 
tier mall) if you’re mall oriented. I think we have about 60 really good malls in 
Canada... our biggest failure I believe is that we are not ambitious enough and we 
cannot generate enough capital to venture outside of our borders. So we are at the 
mercy sometimes of these international retailers coming in and eating our lunch in 
Canada. That is really the bottom line I believe (Interviewee P: p. 18). 
But it’s very hard for a fashion business to play on being Canadian and have any 
followers. It’s just you know – that’s a non-starter. The global aspect of a fashion 
brand I think is one of the first criteria a customer looks at when they’re choosing a 
brand is I’m wearing something that has credibility and fashionability and is in all the 
worldwide magazines (Interviewee I: p. 6). 
On the other side of the discussion is the identification of those domestic companies that 
have taken a global perspective to their business and have been successful in doing so. 
Industry experts articulated the importance of a global view as follows: 
I think the Canadian retailers that survived or emerged in the ‘90s and in the next 
decade were the ones that always thought of themselves as global. Even though 
they thought locally, they operated based on the fact that they would be competing 
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globally which allowed them to look at opportunities to think big (Interviewee D: p. 
8). 
Interviewee D quoted a Canadian apparel retailer who had expanded to other 
markets: “until you test your metal in different markets where you’re not controlling 
it and figure out what you’re not doing well, you’ll never survive” (p. 8). 
So they’ve got to go to the models that are working and Aldo is a good example of 
one that works who have got the international global presence but are still running it 
close to the marketplace and doing all the right things and staying the course 
(Interviewee F: p. 10). 
The global perspective that is key to successful competitive behaviour in the apparel 
industry references some of the foundational research on retail internationalization and the 
strategy of adapting to the foreign market or executing a standardized brand entry. The 
industry experts had opposing views on this point. Speaking of taking a company into a 
foreign market, industry expert H had the following view: 
... it can help you evolve your concept and it makes you even better because you go 
into a very competitive market, you do play with the dialing up and down, and then 
you come out with maybe even a better concept at the end of the day. And then 
once you have that set – I do believe in standardization. I think Esprit is the best 
example of why you can’t go country by country because then I think it loses its 
sense of brand (Interviewee H: p. 19). 
On the other hand, expert B sees the value of a foreign retailer adapting its behaviours in 
the new market to build a customer relationship: 
...unfortunately, I think they are still known as American retailers who have some 
good stuff as opposed to ‘this is my Old Navy’ or ‘this is my Mexx’. [Mexx’s Canadian 
licensee] took a lot from Europe, but when Europe didn’t do what they needed, he 
knew what the market needed and he went out and did it. So it was a hybrid of sorts. 
So it was really a Canadian business (Industry Expert B: p. 17). 
Whether adaptation or standardization was considered to be the more successful 
competitive behaviour for a foreign retailer, the following observation succinctly 
summarizes what most industry experts believes is the reality for consumer’s awareness 
and knowledge of the retailers they shop: “...if you surveyed 100 consumers and you asked 
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them to identify foreign domestic country of origin, not very many of them could do it” 
(Industry Expert A: p. 25). 
6.7.6  Summary of Type of Impact 5 – New Competitive Behaviours 
The discussion of competitive behaviour demonstrates that, by 2007, the retail business had 
become a global marketplace, but consumers had become less aware of where a retailer 
had originated. The industry experts would also observe that as the retail 
internationalization process in the apparel industry was underway, the best domestic 
retailers elevated their competitive behaviours to compete successfully with the foreign 
retailers, which is shown in the data from the Quantitative Study of Mall 1 and Mall 2.  
Within the category of apparel retailing, competitive behaviour comes down to the 
following in the view of Expert I: 
I think that at the end of the day, the reason that the global brands are more 
successful than Canadian brands (and will continue to be more successful than 
Canadian brands)... [is] price: [the company] who makes the most goods gets the 
best price and is also first to market, [and] has more margin to be able to markdown. 
So the most successful brands are going to be the global brands.... [and] the 
customer is going to vote on the cool quotient and price. Some people only vote on 
cool quotient, some people only vote on price (Industry Expert I: p. 11). 
6.8  Summary of Chapter Six – Analysis of Industry Expert Interviews 
The Dawson (2003) model was used to examine the impact of foreign retailer on the host 
country, providing an insightful framework to assess what the impact has been on the 
apparel sector in Canada between 1989 and 2007. Industry Expert P summarizes the 
evolution of the most significant period of sectoral competitive change:  
...[the Gap and other foreign retailers had] more sophisticated approaches and much 
more professional approaches to the business and to multi-store operations, [which] 
started to eat away at some of the market share of the original Canadian retailers. 
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[For me], that was really the big moment in terms of how sophisticated retail 
became in Canada (p. 2). 
The Dawson framework provided the industry experts with a thought-provoking structure to 
reflect on what had happened to Canadian retail after the Gap entered in 1989, and how 
the market was re-structured by 2007. It also gave this study the opportunity to extract the 
key points of impact and the evolutionary nature of the change that resulted from foreign 
retail entry. However, it is important to state that the empirical data analyzed in Chapter 5 
was pivotal to testing the framework’s ability to assess the impact of foreign retailers on the 
host market. Without this data, it would have been impossible to measure the intensity and 
degree of the impact, and track the evolutionary nature of the retail internationalization 
process. 
6.8.1 Industry Expert Observations Outside of the Dawson Framework 
The industry experts spent considerable time discussing the retailer-landlord relationship 
and its role in the process of retail internationalization. This third party factor is not 
identified in the Dawson framework as having an impact on the expansion process, yet it 
was shown to be pivotal to when and how the foreign retailers were able to enter and grow 
in the market. There are some situational aspects to the role of landlords in this study, given 
the focus on apparel retailing primarily in malls. The role of landlord as gatekeeper in the 
control of access of sites is especially relevant to fixed store retailers and must be seen as a 
key factor in the study of operational expansion for both domestic and foreign retailers. To 
the extent that the landlord maybe viewed as an ‘enabler’ to foreign entry, and not a 
passive third party then their role in the study of foreign impacts should be factored into 
future study.   
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There was also a temporal element to the industry expert comments that does not fit into 
the current framework. This specifically relates to the question of embeddedness: at what 
point in time does a company become part of the host country competitive structure? There 
is a general perspective in the model that a foreign retailer will remain a foreign retailer 
regardless of stage of entry and growth in the host country, however, the industry experts 
would view this differently, as was noted in several quotes. Certainly for H&M arriving in 
2004, they were more focused on the other foreign retailers operating in Canada than they 
were on the domestic retailers. To the extent that retail internationalization continues to 
escalate the distinction between foreign and domestic, these categories may need to be 
defined using new criteria in the future.  
Industry experts were also turning their sights to the impact of the internet, such as the 
broad spectrum of e-commerce and social media, and the growing importance of its role in 
the future. This of course needs to be tempered by the time frame for this study, which 
ended in 2007. Looking specifically at the period under study, the role of the internet was 
significantly less developed and impactful than it is today. However, one must acknowledge 
that e-commerce currently has a large role in retail development, which should be 
considered in future iterations of the framework.  
It is acknowledged that the structure of the study was based on the Dawson model, which 
may have limited the exploration of internationalization processes outside of these 
parameters. However, there is some indication that the pace of change in the expansion of 
international retailing would align with a modified framework that can capture the dynamic 
changes currently underway. This will be addressed in the concluding chapter, as will the 
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overall findings of the study and the contribution made by evaluating the Dawson 
framework with both empirical and qualitative research.  
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
7.1 Overview 
Through the later decades of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century the 
pace of retail foreign expansion has accelerated; bringing with it the recognition of the 
complexity of the retail internationalization process and the need for further study in this 
area.  The fundamental decisions of adaptation or standardization for internationalizing 
retailers continue to prevail; while the importance of brand transfer, knowledge transfer 
and the multiplicity of factors leading to continuity or discontinuity of foreign operations 
have been studied as increasingly important to understanding the process. Significantly, the 
earlier concentration on retail expansion into developing countries has given way to the 
realization that retailers have been most active in their entry into developed markets. The 
analysis of the Canadian apparel sector within this study is a case in point; with first time 
internationalizing companies such as the Gap and experienced multi-nationals such as H&M 
making their moves into established marketplaces. What is evidenced through the 
progression of research on the internationalization process and substantiated in this study is 
that the context of the market and the cause-effect relationship between foreign and 
domestic retailers must be considered in understanding - what is the retail 
internationalization process? The perspective of the firm must now be seen as too narrow a 
lens to analyze what occurs when foreign expansion is undertaken.  
In 2003 Dawson identified the need for a model to study the impacts of retail 
internationalization. Since then little research has been conducted to directly address the 
question of impacts even though the pace of internationalization has accelerated and the 
cause-effect-response relationship between foreign retailer and host country has been 
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substantial. This study set out to investigate the impact of foreign entry on domestic 
retailers in the host country using the Dawson framework, and specifically to explore impact 
in respect of changes in sectoral competitiveness. As detailed in Chapter 4, the objectives of 
the research were to address: 
1) What are the impacts of foreign retailer entry and how can they be measured over 
time and by degree of impact? 
2) What are the changes in sectoral competitiveness that can be measured and 
interpreted? 
3) What processes are used when responding to the changes in sectoral 
competitiveness? 
4) What gaps in the Dawson model are identified from this application? 
In response to Dawson’s call for the “design and undertaking of empirical surveys to 
measure the presence, processes and intensity of the impacts of foreign retailers.”, Dawson 
(2003, p. 205) the author attempted to make a contribution to the understanding of the 
retail internationalization process and to further develop the Dawson model as a theoretical 
framework for the study of this complex process.  
In order to fulfill these objectives the research was undertaken in two stages. The first stage 
was a quantitative analysis of retail activity in the apparel sector in two major Canadian 
shopping centres between the years 1989 and 2007. Recognizing that the competitive retail 
market structure is manifest at the local level, even for internationalizing companies, the 
mall was used as microcosm for the broader market; providing meaningful empirical data to 
assess the when and what of foreign entry impacts. The second stage was a qualitative 
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analysis where twenty-one industry experts were interviewed utilizing the Dawson model as 
the framework for the questions. Analysis of the interview content provided important 
explanation of the first stage findings, expanding on what occurred, why foreign retailers 
had a significant impact, and why domestic retailers responded in the manner that they did. 
The findings of these two studies were discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. The conclusions of the 
research in meeting the objectives of the study will be presented here. In addition the 
author’s perspective on the contribution of this research to the study of retail 
internationalization impacts, the limitations of the study, and some considerations for 
future research will also be presented. 
7.2 Conclusions from the Study of Impacts in the Process of Retail 
Internationalization  
The mixed method approach to the study of impacts in the process of retail 
internationalization revealed strong empirical evidence, enriched through qualitative insight 
into the changes in sectoral competitiveness that occur when foreign companies enter a 
host market. The analysis of foreign entry at the local level of the major shopping centre 
over a specified time period providesd a frame which allowed observable measurement into 
both when impact occurs and the intensity or degree of impact. In addition, the responses 
of the domestic retailers in the host market were also identified in this analysis. The mall 
data allowed the researcher to quantify these observations and trends, providing an 
important contribution to the understanding of the impact of foreign entry in changes to 
the sectoral competitiveness. The quantitative analysis effectively laid the foundation to 
meet the objectives of the research; providing further understanding of when and what 
happens during foreign entry into the host market. The qualitative interviews provided the 
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data to explain why the effect and responses of internationalization occur. The findings 
arising from analysis of these interviews were presented in detail in Chapter 6. In particular, 
Figure 6.1 summarizes the types of impacts and their sub-factors as identified by the 
experts. Collectively the two stages of this research met the four objectives of this study as 
presented here. 
7.2.1 Retail Internationalization Impacts can be Identified and Measured at the Local Level 
The retail internationalization process has been extensively studied at the macro level, 
capturing the generic processes involved in a retail company expanding into one or more 
foreign host countries. In terms of pre-entry activities, this macro level investigation has 
generally proven satisfactory in the explanation of the processes of internationalization as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Given that most research has been undertaken from the firm’s 
perspective, the macro level post-entry analysis has been effectively measured by the 
success or failure of the company; however, the macro level approach does not allow for 
measurement of impacts on the host market until the scale of the foreign entry is of a 
sufficient size to be measured. In order to meet the first research objective it was necessary 
to move from the macro level to the micro level in identifying and measuring impact of 
foreign entry. 
Focusing on a specific point of entry for foreign retailers overcame the challenges of macro 
level analysis, and shifted the focus to the micro level. Access to data that captured the key 
measures of foreign entry – stores, square footage and sales – was tracked over time; 
enabling the study to analyze whether impact could be measured. Based on the results 
presented in Chapter 5, it can be concluded that impact can be measured both on a 
temporal and intensity basis. The results of the quantitative analysis revealed that there is a 
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change in market share when foreign entry occurs in a defined market (such as a major 
shopping centre), drawing customers away from existing retailers to the new entrant. This 
change in market structure is demonstrated in the number of stores operated by foreign 
rather than domestic operators, as well as the respective shares of square footage and 
sales. This impact can be tracked through the timing of entry and the degree of impact on 
the domestic sector. Using these dimensions, measurement of the impact of retail 
internationalization provides important knowledge on when the process occurs.  
7.2.2 Retail Internationalization Impacts are Observable and Definable 
The ability to observe and define the impacts of foreign retail expansion is as important as 
the measurement of when and to what degree an impact occurs. The analysis of the 
shopping centre data revealed that the impacts of foreign retailers are unique for each 
company entering the market; however, this analysis provides limited insight into the 
underlying process. The method of tracking the activity of multiple firms over time and their 
interaction with the host country reveals a more significant understanding of the 
internationalization process; revealing definable impacts that go beyond the individual firm. 
From the quantitative study, this study concludes that foreign retailers were able to 
establish a dominant position in the host country based on a differentiated format: stores 
that were larger in size and broader in consumer segment than the domestic sector. This 
large square footage unisex format was not unique to one foreign retailer, but defined the 
business model for the majority of foreign successes. Specific formula employed by each 
foreign retailer was observed to be sufficiently differentiated within the unisex format to 
establish a market position. It was also observable that over time retailer positioning would 
evolve; impacting which retailer would be most dominant at any given point in time. The 
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change in the competitive structure of the apparel sector was a direct result of the entry of 
this large unisex forma, brought to the market by new foreign entrants.  
It can be also concluded that the foreign retailer’s large unisex format positioned them to 
meet the needs of the expanding shopping centre environment. The results of the first stage 
study found that foreign retailers were able to further their dominant position as landlords 
re-configured the mall space. These foreign companies seized the opportunity to replace the 
declining department store format with a new type of mini-anchor, which was well suited to 
the large unisex format. From the macro level tracking of foreign entry the researcher was 
able to identify the impacts of foreign entry, track changes over time and measure the 
intensity of the impacts on the mall market.  
7.2.3 Measurement and Interpretation of What are the Changes in Sectoral 
Competitiveness 
The first stage identified that sectoral restructuring did occur as a result of foreign entry and 
this could be both measured and defined at the local level through an analysis of the data 
from the two malls. The industry experts confirmed that restructuring did occur between 
1989 and 2007 and were able to provide important insight into what aspects of foreign 
retailer entry contributed to the change in competitiveness. The industry experts confirmed 
that the foreign retailers brought a more sophisticated and competitively advanced 
approach to retail than existed in the Canadian market at that time. They were able to 
explain the impact that a dominant size and broader target audience of a unisex offering 
had on domestic retailers.  
The interviewees were able to provide insights that were not directly evident from the 
quantitative study, such as the notion that both the domestic retailers and the landlords 
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enabled the foreign impact. The industry experts used terms such as oligopoly and 
complacency to describe the domestic apparel sector at the time of this foreign expansion. 
It was their collective view that many of the domestic retailers played a significant role in 
their diminished market position; not anticipating or responding effectively to the foreign 
entrants. This was not to suggest that foreign entry would never have occurred. However 
the experts believed that the intensity and scope of impact might have been different had 
domestic retailers reacted sooner and with effective competitive strategies. These experts 
also observed that the landlords played a key role in the entry of foreign retailers, offering 
prime space at preferred leasing costs and displacing domestic retailers in the process. The 
real estate experts interviewed did not agree completely with this view, as they saw a more 
complex series of events with department stores exiting and the malls being re-configured 
as opportune for foreign retailers. However, they did acknowledge that the new entrants 
were appealing and that favourable deals were negotiated as a result. Thus, the cumulative 
effect of both the domestic retailers’ complacency and the landlords pro-activity allowed 
foreign retailers to effect the re-structuring through an enabled internationalization process. 
As set out in the second objective for this research study, the combined findings of the 
Quantitative and Qualitative Studies revealed the measurement and interpretation of the 
changes in sectoral competitiveness as a result of the internationalization process. 
7.2.4 Innovation within the Internationalization Process as Key to Success for both Foreign 
and Domestic Retailers  
Whether measuring the types of impacts of foreign retailer entry (Objective 1) and their 
impact on changes in sectoral competitiveness (Objective 2) or the processes used by 
domestic retailers in response to these impacts and changes as set out in Objective 3, it was 
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found that innovation was a key to success.  Martenson (1984) was amongst the earlier 
researchers to identify the role of innovation in the retail internationalization process 
through her study of IKEA and its differentiated offering. As proposed by Dawson (2003), 
changes in sectoral competitiveness would be brought about by the introduction of new 
innovations in competitive activity. The entry of apparel retailers with well developed brand 
concepts was seen by the industry experts as the dominant innovation that contributed to 
foreign entry and its impact on the host country. From the first notable brand retailer (the 
Gap) through successive entrants from both the United States and Europe, the 
differentiated private label and the fully integrated brand offering was commonly 
recognized by the industry experts as the game changer in international retailing. In stark 
contrast to the multi-brand and promotional driven concepts of domestic retailers, the 
innovation of a retailer as a brand introduced a new consumer focus to the retail strategy. 
Domestic retailers were slow and often unable to transform to a brand approach. By the 
later part of this study, the successful retailers (both foreign and domestic) were identified 
by the industry experts as having well developed retail brands built upon a consumer centric 
offering.   
The findings of both the quantitative and qualitative studies revealed that the retail brand 
concept would prevail as the dominant innovation in shopping centre apparel retail 
between 1989 and 2007. Foreign retailers were considered the leaders in retail brand 
strategy and execution, each one differentiating itself within the market: from the solidly 
American Gap brand to the fast fashion brand of the multi-national H&M or the 
consumption driven lifestyle brand of Hollister. As illustrated in the data from the first stage, 
the experts would expand upon the finding that the change in sectoral competitiveness 
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would impact the established foreign retailers in the host country as much as the remaining 
domestic retailers. The rise and fall of the Gap in the Canadian market exemplifies the 
process of retail internationalization over time. As proposed in Dawson’s model, the study 
of impacts is intended to reveal the cause-effect-response relationship between foreign 
retailers and the host country. The evidence from this study indicates that the foreign 
retailers would eventually themselves need to respond to  changes in sectoral 
competitiveness. In addition, the interviews highlight the work of Hess (2004) on the 
existence of embeddedness and the relevance of its role in the internationalization process. 
This will be addressed in the considerations for future research. 
7.2.5 Further Understanding of the Dometic Response to Changes in Sectoral 
Competitiveness 
There is an underlying assumption in the retail internationalization process that the foreign 
entrant is expected to be superior to the domestic competition – the foreign retailer is 
expected to have a negative impact on the domestic retailer. The evidence from the 
quantitative analysis would confirm that this assumption is justified, even in developed to 
developed country internationalisation. The changes in sectoral competitiveness cause 
several forms of churn amongst domestic retailers, the most dramatic being the close of the 
business but more frequently significant alterations to the business model or retail format. 
It can be concluded from this study that such impact does occur and that it can be 
temporally linked to changes in the competitive structure of the sector due to the entry of 
foreign retailers. 
However, not all domestic retailers will be negatively impacted by the entry of foreign 
competition. Significant numbers of domestic retails are able to withstand the initial impact 
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of the entry and find their own dominant position in the market over time. The Quantitative 
Study identified a group of Canadian apparel retailers who have continued to compete at 
the top levels of performance. The majority of these retailers were well positioned prior to 
the foreign expansion into Canada and, for the most part, they were able to retain or 
increase their market position and market share. Notably, a niche strategy was most often 
employed by these successful domestic retailers – avoiding direct competition by choosing 
not to alter their formats to match the large unisex model of the foreign countries. While 
this may have resulted in Canadian retailers losing some of the overall share of square 
footage and sales, their performance on the key measure of sales per square foot equaled 
or was better than the best of the foreign retailers. 
Building on the conclusions related to retail innovation within the internationalization 
process, the industry experts provided important insight into the successful responses of 
domestic retailers to the entry of innovative foreign brands. This was best summarized by 
Industry Expert S with the term ‘finding the white space’, which refers to the process of a 
retailer finding a differentiated position in the market that is not currently dominated by a 
competing retailer. Yet the entry of foreign retailers can interrupt this process for domestic 
retailers as the new entrants cause the competitive structure to change, filling in a white 
space or pushing a domestic retailer out of their space. This action forced successful 
domestic retailers to find their white space through either a niche position or channel 
diffusion.  
The successful niche retailers retained a strong position in the shopping centre market, 
competing against the large foreign unisex retailers by creating a well defined brand that 
the foreign competitors were not dominating: Aritzia fills the gap in price point and fashion 
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between the foreign unisex players and the designer labels, i.e., Zara and Coach; Danier 
dominated the leather apparel market; and Lululemon created a lifestyle niche built on yoga 
apparel. As evidenced in the mall data and explained by the experts, these niches have 
proven their ability to sustain the numerous impacts of foreign retailer entry between 1989 
and 2007.  
For several domestic retailers, the response or search for white space took the form of 
channel diffusion. This was identified on two different levels: 1) the significant number of 
retailers who searched for locations better suited to their promotional driven formula, 
categorised as “chasing the Walmart Effect”, and 2) innovating channel diffusion by taking 
an apparel brand to the consumer. This later response has proven to be highly successful for 
two retailers: Mark’s and Joe Fresh. The specifics of the channel diffusion options were 
discussed in both Chapters 5 and 6.  
In conclusion, the changes in sectoral competitiveness within the internationalization 
process caused domestic retailers in the host market to search out a sustainable white 
space for their market position. This study identified two specific strategies of niche 
branding and channel diffusion as successful responses employed by Canadian retailers to 
compete in this new market structure.  
7.2.6 Impacts and Responses - Comparing the Best Against the Best 
The quantitative analysis of retail performance through the market share of various 
performance measures captured by the foreign retailers over the period 1989 to 2007, 
showed that the change in competitive structure was dramatic during this time as foreign 
retailers increased market share, which was reflected in their domination of square footage 
and sales in the shopping centres.  Taken alone, these measures seem to show that 
 
 
245 
domestic retailers were overwhelmingly impacted in a negative manner; however, many 
domestic retailers did continue to grow, benefiting from the overall growth of the apparel 
categories in these malls, even if they did not grow their sales at the same rate as the 
foreign competitors.  
On the matter of productivity, in this case measured as sales per square foot of retail space 
and considered a key measure of performance, domestic retailers were found to either 
equal or out-perform the foreign retailers (see Tables 5.17 and 5.18). Thus, this study 
concludes that, as the change in competitive structure unfolds over time, the domestic 
retailers are able to respond to the impact of the foreign entrants and perform at a 
competitive level. This also speaks to the wider range of individual firm competence that 
exists amongst domestic retailers compared to the foreign retailers. It has been well 
documented that retailers who engage in foreign expansion have had proven success in 
their home market – viewed as bringing best-in-class operations to the host country. The 
churn in the domestic market caused those retailers unable to adjust to the changing 
competitive market to exit, leaving a stronger domestic compliment of retailers. Therefore, 
the changes in sectoral competitiveness can be seen to result in an overall strengthening of 
the market.  
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7.2.7 The Process of Retail Internationalization – Different Perspectives 
The Dawson (2003) framework proposed that the study of retail internationalization should 
move from looking at activities or events to the study of processes. It is concluded from the 
first stage of this research that the impacts of internationalization must be studied over time 
to understand when and what happens in the process. These impacts can be identified with 
a point of entry, but a more fruitful assessment takes the cumulative effect of multiple 
entries into account, documenting the responses of the domestic sector that reveal the full 
process of retail internationalization. The competitive structure of te market continues to 
change with each new entry and exit and with each response by both foreign and domestic 
retailers. Within the context of this study, the question of when retail internationalization 
occurs would be seen to be continuous – as series of impacts and responses that contribute 
to a changing competitive structure. 
Industry Expert O articulated the view that retailers must have a global perspective on their 
business in order to succeed in today’s marketplace. This is a point of view supported by all 
of the interviews, expressed in several different ways. The global perspective goes beyond 
the operational competitive environment and was presented as a broader business 
philosophy and strategy. To simplify this perspective, global expansion requires a successful 
retailer to have a brand concept that can dominant a segment of the market in any 
marketplace and sustain itself over time. The issue is not whether the retailer is competing 
only in its home market or in many markets, but whether the internationalization process is 
sufficiently pervasive to have an impact in all markets. Either the retailer goes to foreign 
competition or the foreign competition comes to the retailer. This perspective also captures 
the full retail business model by suggesting that global sourcing and knowledge exchange 
are as integrated into the internationalization process as operational expansion. In fact, 
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some experts, including O, observed that the difficult competitive battle ahead focuses on 
supply not for consumers. 
This global perspective is significant to the study of retail internationalization as it challenges 
the underlying assumptions of defining foreign and domestic. An aspect of this question was 
raised in the analysis concerning the definition of domestic. If a domestic retailer comes 
under foreign ownership but continues to manage its business from the original home 
country, is it domestic or foreign? Also, if it expands to other countries and over time 
operates in more locations outside of the home country, is it domestic or foreign? These are 
not questions that were intended to be answered in this study, but they are raised within 
the findings of this study and certainly are critical to the understanding of the 
internationalization process.  
7.3 Contributions of the Thesis 
The retail internationalization process has been shown to be complex and evolving as the 
rate of foreign expansion accelerates and research attempts to keep pace. It was the aim of 
this study to address a relatively new area of understanding in the internationalization 
process. Initially put forth by Dawson (2003) and followed by Coe & Wrigley (2004, 2007) 
with further refinements, the need for a theoretical framework to study the impacts of 
foreign entry on the host country has received little study in the past 10 years. This study is 
an initial step toward contributing to the understanding of the internationalization process 
and to assessing the theoretical framework for the study of this process.  
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7.3.1 Empirical Study of the Impacts of Retail Internationalization 
The lack of empirical studies of retail internationalization has generated a call for such 
research, including the request from Dawson (2003). There are numerous reasons for this 
gap in research, most notably the general practice of gathering retail performance data at 
the macro level. This makes it difficult if not impossible to measure cause and effect 
relationships within the competitive structure of the market, as a level of scope and scale is 
required for competitive activity to be measurable at the macro or national level. In order to 
effectively measure the impact of foreign entry, empirical data would need to be collected 
operationally at the local level. This challenge was addressed by proposing that the local 
market could act as a micro-market and that the analysis could be conducted within this 
microcosm of the market. For several reasons, which have been documented in Chapter 4, 
the major shopping centre was identified as an acceptable microcosm for the study of the 
apparel sector.  
This approach to research focuses on the impact of foreign entry at the point of impact, 
which has demonstrated that it is possible to measure impact. Utilizing the mall as a market 
provided insight into the full complexity of a foreign entry, facilitating the study of the cause 
and effect relationship of foreign entry. This is most significant on a temporal level, as the 
impact of retail internationalization must be studied as a process.  
The availability of performance measure data from the shopping centres was an important 
contribution to the study of impacts of foreign entry because it allowed the degree of 
impact to be quantified. The ability to replace anecdotal evidence is increasing, i.e., through 
the statistical measurement of the number of foreign retail stores. For example, the market 
share of foreign retailers has increased from 24% to over 50% in eighteen years, which is an 
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important contribution to understanding what the impact has been. There are of course 
limitations to the interpretation and extrapolation of the data from two malls, but the 
process for empirical analysis has been effectively established. 
Finally, this study has clearly identified that impact is in fact an output of the 
internationalization process. The ability to measure the output and build linkages to the 
causes is an important contribution to our understanding of the process. Within this study 
measurement is confined to specific categories and formats of retail - apparel retailing in 
major malls; the Canadian market and a specific time frame. Therefore the output as 
measured must be defined within these boundaries. There is however a methodology here 
for researching impacts that is transferable to other defined retail internationalization 
processes.  
7.3.2 Study of Developed to Developed Country Retail Internationalization 
The value of studying the foreign expansion of retailers from one developed country to 
another developed country is significant for two reasons: 1) it neutralizes many of the other 
extraneous factors and considerable assumptions when studying the entry into developing 
countries, such as political or socio-cultural considerations, which are either not relevant or 
can be fully disclosed when analyzing a developed host country, and 2) overturns the 
assumptions generally associated with entering developing countries, such as the 
superiority of the internationalizing company, which are seen as having less relevance in the 
future global market. In addition, access to the internet and the spread of information must 
be seen as accelerating the pace of change for retailers in developing countries in advance 
of the actual physical entry of developed foreign retailers.  
 
 
250 
This study also provides insight into what happens when the best of foreign retail compete 
with the best of the domestic retail as well as the best of other foreign retail. The Canadian 
market has a relatively unique position in its advanced stage of apparel retail 
internationalization, providing a perspective of what could happen elsewhere. The author 
does not assume that there is broad interest in the Canadian apparel sector, but rather that 
the level of international competition experienced in this developed market is projected to 
continue in other markets, both developed and developing; suggesting the need for 
continued study of changes in sectoral competitiveness.  
Fundamental to this study is the classic economic paradigm of structural changes in the 
marketplace as a result of competitive behaviours that bring about certain responses which 
in turn have performance consequences for all players involved. It has been demonstrated 
that foreign entry played a significant role in these structural changes in the Canadian 
apparel market. There is also evidence that some change was impacted by domestic retailer 
behaviours; certainly the structure of the market in 1989 was conducive to such change. 
Over time the dynamic evolves beyond a simplistic foreign impact and domestic response to 
a more complex study of embedded foreign impact/response and innovative domestic 
impact/response. It is the culmination of all of these forces that contribute to the changes in 
sectoral competitiveness. Future study of the impact of foreign entry in retail 
internationalization in both developed or developing countries will need to investigate this 
structure- behaviour-performance relationships within each market; potentially contributing 
to an economic model of the retail internationalization process.      
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7.3.3 The Dawson Model: A Critique 
This study offers an application of the Dawson (2003) model that has not been conducted in 
other published research. It has demonstrated that the framework as proposed by Dawson 
provides a foundational model for the study of the impacts of retail internationalization. The 
specific investigation of the framework’s proposed changes in sectoral competitiveness 
resulted in an empirical study at the micro-level to successfully study impacts and 
responses. The model also established a context for the development of the interview 
questionnaire, bringing a structure to the contributions of the industry experts that could be 
analyzed and reported on. This structure was extremely useful in focusing discussion. It was 
also apparent that the model contained some inherent beliefs, originating from early 
research by Hollander (1970) and Goldman (1981) that foreign retailers would have superior 
competitive qualities that would be the catalyst for positive change to the host country 
structure. The validity of this perspective should be challenged in future research. From this 
application, and in meeting the fourth objective of this research, there are some proposed 
modifications for future development of the model: 
• The model identifies six distinct types of impacts, but the results of this study would 
point to considerable connectivity between the six types; which needs to be 
accounted for in future. An example of this would be the factors that surfaced in 
analyzing changes in competitive behavior, many of which referenced changes to the 
demand chain. Socio-cultural factors that frame the market structure pre and post 
foreign entry were found to be essential to the interpretation of impacts and the 
changes to sectoral competitiveness and not an independent type of impact. Over 
time consumer literacy is also seen to have evolved in the internet era to increasingly 
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have less direct relationship to bricks and mortar foreign entry; this will be 
elaborated on later in this chapter. These findings from the study and many others 
discussed through out the dissertation point to the need for re-evaluating the 
structure of the model from six separated types of impacts within the retail 
internationalization process to a relationship model for the types within the process. 
• As the model evolves, it should incorporate an understanding of the host market in 
order to establish a context or basis for evaluating impacts. In the undertaking of this 
study, it became evident that the context was essential before the research could 
progress; without a base there is no assessment of pre- and post-impacts of retail 
internationalization.  
• There is an important temporal condition to the study of impacts and this should be 
framed in the model – both in terms of the point in time and the evolution of a 
process such as internationalization over time. To exemplify the significance of point 
in time, it was observed that Benetton never had the impact on the market that 
might have been anticipated based on their European dominance. Much of this can 
be attributed to the timing of entry, which was pre-free trade agreements, and the 
general opening of foreign markets and consumer receptiveness. By comparison, the 
need to study impact over time is exemplified by the Gap, whose initial timing was 
perfect and benefitted from first mover advantage, but over time became a victim of 
the impacts of subsequent new foreign entry.  
• The model is founded on the study of physical retail operations entering the host 
country in the form of bricks and mortar stores. Throughout most of the 1989 to 
2007 timeframe, it was evidenced that the specific point in time of foreign 
operational entry was the ‘measurable point of impact’ on the host market. The 
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indicators of consumer awareness and anticipation, specific to the Canadian-United 
States proximity, were noted but not seen as pre-empting the physical entry impact. 
By example the existence of the Gap in the United States and some level of 
consumer and competitive awareness of its existence did not pre-empt the impact of 
entry in 1989. As has been discussed previously, the perspective of the future of 
retail internationalization in 2012 is considerably different than in 2003. The role of 
the internet, which provides global access to both information and product, has 
changed this process dramatically. Consumer literacy can no longer be tied to bricks 
and mortar foreign expansion or confined to small segments of early adopters in a 
host market. It is suggested that the scenario for consumer literacy and access will 
be much different looking ahead and should be incorporated into the future 
iterations of the Dawson model. 
Finally, it is suggested that the thesis has provided a meaningful contribution to assessing 
the proposed Dawson model’s application for the study of the impacts of retail 
internationalization. It was demonstrated that effective application of the model must 
include: a base assessment of the host market at a defined point of time to conduct 
quantitative research at the local level; measuring cause and effect impacts and conducting 
qualitative research to provide explanations of the when, what, and why of cause, effect, 
and response. Further the temporal dimension of the retail internationalization process 
cannot be minimized as the dynamic of sectoral change must be considered as evolutionary 
and not static. All of these findings point to progression of the Dawson model from the 
proposed six independent types of impacts to a model that captures pre and post market 
entry; the inter-connectivity of the types of impacts; and the multi-dimensional forms of 
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foreign expansion that include virtual as well as physical internationalization. It is 
conceivable that this model could contribute to the further development of an economic 
framework specific to international retail business that has been investigated but not 
resolved. Where early efforts to apply manufacturing based international business models 
have failed to explain the retail internationalization process, the more recent work 
discussed in Chapter 3 coupled with further study of impacts may lead to such formulation.  
7.3.4 Contribution of the Thesis – Final Thoughts  
Reflecting back to the foundational research on retail internationalization, this study has 
brought forth further insights into the subjects that Martenson (1981) in particular but also 
other early researchers explored on the role of innovation and the dynamic nature of the 
internationalization process.  The findings of how domestic retailers responded to foreign 
entry in the Canadian apparel market are consistent with the concepts presented by 
Martenson (1981) in the Combined Dynamic Model as discussed in Chapter 2. It might be 
argued that this study furthers the understanding of domestic response as either flexible or 
rigid through an empirical interpretation of the cause and effect relationship that occurs in 
the internationalization process. Where Martenson isolated one innovative impact, IKEA, 
the study of the apparel retailers here demonstrates the greater dynamic of repetitive 
innovative impacts. Given the current pace of retail foreign expansion the reality of constant 
new entrants and changing market structures is one that most retailers must respond to in-
order to survive. The proposed revisions to the Dawson (2003) model made here based on 
this study should provide significant insight into the future study of the internationalization 
process in an increasingly dynamic period of retail market change. 
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And finally, the study has established that not all innovation or positive impact is caused by 
the foreign retailer. Within the Canadian apparel sector it was demonstrated that domestic 
retailers are capable of innovative concepts that can also impact sectoral competitiveness, 
Lululemon and Joe Fresh are prime examples. This is important learning for future retail 
internationalization as companies and researchers might focus more attention on analyzing 
the host market and its domestic retail structure.  
7.4 Limitation of the Study 
The detailed review of the limitations of the study’s methodology is provided in Chapter 4. 
In summary, it should be noted that the findings and conclusions of this research are limited 
by the study of one market in one retail category in a specific time period. The focus of the 
study was also confined to one of the categories of the Dawson model and not the full 
model. The very nature of studying impacts suggests a cause and effect relationship. It is 
acknowledged that foreign entry has been attributed the primary impact on changes in 
sectoral competitiveness in this study; the interviews with industry experts substantiated 
this conclusion. With these considerations in mind, the conclusions drawn are limited to the 
context of the study. 
7.5 Implications for Future Research 
This study has addressed a specific area of the retail internationalization process and in 
doing so revealed the complexity of the activity and its study. There is obviously much to be 
researched on a wide range of subjects, particularly as the pace of internationalization 
continues to rapidly expand and the dynamic of traditional brick-and-mortar operations and 
internet-driven activity forges new territory. More specific to this study, the following 
considerations for future research could be used to build on this study and contribute 
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further to the understanding of the impacts of retail internationalization on the host 
country’s sectoral competitiveness: 
1. The evolution of the Dawson model requires further applications to build on or 
challenge the findings of this study. The recommendation to re-configure the model 
requires additional findings to support this view.   
2. There would be value in applying this study to retail categories other than apparel 
and to other markets than Canada to further explore such factors as: the catalysts 
for structural change; and the role of innovation in competitive changes. 
3. To extend this study to the period of 2008-2012 would be of interest to this author, 
as the pace of foreign entry has accelerated in recent years. This may be of 
particular interest to managerial understanding of market structure change; 
embeddedness in the context of foreign expansion; and innovation as a catalyst for 
market change. 
4. To take the idea of the ‘global perspective’, that surfaced as an important 
behavioural outcome in this study, and propose a theoretical framework for the 
study of its place in the process of retail internationalization.  
5. Given the importance of the BRIC group of countries in the world economy and in 
the international growth aspirations of many retail organizations it may be beneficial 
to managerial decision making to assess these markets for a pre-entry base point 
utilizing the six types of impact categories proposed by Dawson. As demonstrated in 
this study the context of the market pre-entry provides important knowledge for 
assessing and measuring the impacts. There is considerable academic research to 
illustrate that retail companies have not engaged in substantive pre-entry market 
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study and as a result met with disappointing or surprising performance outcomes. 
The persistent ‘superior’ foreign company perspective that has existed both with 
managers and in the academic study of internationalization may be re-assessed 
through further host country studies. 
6. To investigate the role of the internet in the study of the impacts of the retail 
internationalization process. The later years of this study observed the entry of 
companies such as H&M, Abercrombie & Fitch and Hollister to name a few, 
achieving immediate impact on the market . While not explored in this study the 
observations from industry experts that factors are increasingly at play in building 
awareness and acceptance of foreign retailers that are different than in the past 
need to be understood in the study of the process of retail internationalization. 
By no means have the implications for future research been exhausted in this short list. The 
continued acceleration of foreign expansion requires that both the managerial 
understanding of retail internationalization processes and the contribution of academic 
research to this knowledge is as important today as in the early research of Hollander and 
others. It is hoped that this study has furthered the understanding of an increasingly 
complex and dynamic process.   
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APPENDIX 1 – Currency Exchange Rates between the 
U.S. and Canada from 1970-2007 (Bank of Canada, 
2012) 
 Date Rate 
Low 1979-02-01 $1 CAN = 0.8320 US 
High 1974-04-25 $1 CAN = 1.0443 US 
Highest and lowest CAN/US rates between 1970-1979 
 Date Rate 
Low 1986-02-04 $1 CAN = 0.6913 US 
High 1980-07-07 $1 CAN = 0.8767 US 
Highest and lowest CAN/US rates between 1980-1989 
 Date Rate 
Low 1998-08-27 $1 CAN = 0.6311 US 
High 1991-11-04 $1 CAN = 0.8934 US 
Highest and lowest CAN/US rates between 1990-1999 
 Date Rate 
Low 2002-01-21 $1 CAN = 0.6179 US 
High 2006-05-31 $1 CAN = 0.9134 US 
Highest and lowest CAN/US rates between 2000-2007 
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APPENDIX 2 – Timelines for Foreign and Domestic 
Apparel Retailer Activity in Canada up to 2007 
Pre-1989 
1869: 
• Eaton’s Department Store founded 
• Hbc becomes retail entity (yielding sovereignty over the land it had held since 1670 
to Canada) 
1952: Simpsons-Sears created by partnership of Sears Roebuck Co and Robert Simpson Company 
 
1959:  LeChateau opens 
 
1965: Simpsons-Sears goes public 
 
1968: Suzy Shier opens 
 
1970: Tristan & Isuet opens (1985 opens America for men and 2007 consolidates to Tristan) 
 
1972: Marks & Spencer enters Canada 
 
1973: Roots opens 
 
1975: Suzy Shier acquired by Dylex Limited 
 
1976: Comark Canada retail formed – privately owned by Brenninkmeyer Family 
 
1977: Jacob opens (predecessor to Jacob started in 1960s) 
 
1978:  
 
• HBC buys Zellers, Fields and Simpsons Limited 
 
• Marks & Spencer buys D’Alliards (goes to U.S. in 1980’s and sold in 1996), People’s and 
Walkers (which become the M&S stores) 
 
• Les Boutiques San Francisco opens first store in Montreal 
 
1979: 
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• HBC buys Robinson’s 
 
• Comark buys Irene Hill 
 
1980: Comark buys Bootlegger 
 
1982: Comark buys Ricki’s 
 
1984: Aritzia launched 
 
1989 to 1994 
 
1989 Gap opens in Canada 
 
1990:  
 
• HBC buys Towers/Bonimart 
 
• LaSenza opens (division of Suzy Shier) 
 
1991:  
 
• Simpsons closed 
 
• Urban Behaviour opens (banner of Clothing for Modern Times – also Costa Blanca) 
 
• Talbots enters Canada 
 
1993: Suzy Shier goes public 
 
1994:  
 
• HBC buys Woodwards 
 
• Walmart buys Woolco and converts stores to Walmart 
 
• Shirmax re-organizes (operates stores as Addiitonal-Elle, AE Sport, Shirley K Maternity, 
Thyme) 
 
Early 90s:    Guess opens  
 
Mid 90s:      Mexx opens 
 
1994 to 2000 
 
1995:  
 
• Banana Republic enters Canada 
 
• Reitman’s acquires Penningtons Stores Limited 
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• Dalmys seeks CCAA 
 
• BCBG opens 
 
1996: Reitman’s acquires Dalmys (Canada) Limited 
 
1997: Eaton’s enters re-structuring 
 
1998: 
 
• Eaton’s goes public 
 
• HBC buys K-Mart Canada 
 
1999: 
 
• Eaton’s declares bankruptcy and assets are bought by Sears Canada 
 
• Polo Ralph Lauren buys Club Monaco 
 
• Bebe enters Canada 
 
• Zara opens in Canada - Reitman’s in strategic alliance with Inditex Group of Spain  
 
• RW & Co opens (banner of Reitman’s) 
 
• Marks & Spencers exits Canada 
 
2000 to 2007 
 
2000:  
 
• Sears re-opens Eaton’s stores 
 
• American Eagle Outfitters buys Thrifty’s and Braemar locations from Dylex Limited 
 
• Grafton-Fraser Inc acquires Tip Top Tailors 
 
2001:  
 
• Old Navy enters Canada 
 
• Canadian Tire acquires Mark’s Work Wearhouse 
 
2002:  
 
• Sears retires Eaton’s name and closes stores – convert to Sears 
 
• Reitman’s buys Shirmax 
 
2003:  
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• LaSenza opens in U.S. 
 
• YM Inc. buys Suzy Shier 
 
• Continential Saxon Group purchases Cotton Ginny and Tabi International 
 
• Les Boutiques San Franciso restructures 
 
2004:  
 
• Walmart launches George Ladies Apparel 
 
• H&M opens in Canada 
 
• AEO sells Bluenotes to YM Inc. 
 
2005:  
 
• Aritzia LP enters partnership with Berkshire Partners LLC 
 
• Walmart launches George Menswear 
 
• Lululemon sells 48% to Advent and Highland Partners 
 
• Mango opens 
 
• Comark purchased by KarpReilly LLC (American investment fund) 
 
2006:  
 
• Joe Fresh opens in 40 Real Canadian Superstores 
 
• LaSenza sold to The Limited Brands 
 
• HBC bought by J Zucker and his company The InterTech Group 
 
• Abercrombie & Fitch opens 
 
• Hollister opens 
 
2007:  
 
• Aeropostale opens in Canada 
 
• West 49 (Billabong, Off the Wall) WXX on TSE  
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APPENDIX 3 – List of Developed and Developing 
Countries (United Nations, 2007). 
 Developing regions 
002 Africa 
019 Americas excluding Northern America 
(numerical code 021) 
029 Caribbean 
013 Central America 
005 South America 
142 Asia excluding Japan 
009 Oceania excluding Australia and New 
Zealand 
 (numerical code 053) 
    
 Developed regions 
021 Northern America 
150 Europe 
392 Japan 
053 Australia and New Zealand 
    
199 Least developed countries  
004 Afghanistan 
024 Angola 
050 Bangladesh 
204 Benin 
064 Bhutan 
854 Burkina Faso 
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108 Burundi 
116 Cambodia 
140 Central African Republic 
148 Chad 
174 Comoros 
180 Democratic Republic of the Congo 
262 Djibouti 
226 Equatorial Guinea 
232 Eritrea 
231 Ethiopia 
270 Gambia 
324 Guinea 
624 Guinea Bissau 
332 Haiti 
296 Kiribati 
418 Lao People's Democratic Republic 
426 Lesotho 
430 Liberia 
450 Madagascar 
454 Malawi 
466 Mali 
478 Mauritania 
508 Mozambique 
104 Myanmar 
524 Nepal 
562 Niger 
646 Rwanda 
882 Samoa 
678 Sao Tome and Principe 
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686 Senegal 
694 Sierra Leone 
090 Solomon Islands 
706 Somalia 
736 Sudan 
626 Timor-Leste 
768 Togo 
798 Tuvalu 
800 Uganda 
834 United Republic of Tanzania 
548 Vanuatu 
887 Yemen 
894 Zambia 
    
432 Landlocked developing 
countries  
004 Afghanistan 
051 Armenia 
031 Azerbaijan 
064 Bhutan 
068 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 
072 Botswana 
854 Burkina Faso 
108 Burundi 
140 Central African Republic 
148 Chad 
231 Ethiopia 
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398 Kazakhstan 
417 Kyrgyzstan 
418 Lao People's Democratic Republic 
426 Lesotho 
454 Malawi 
466 Mali 
496 Mongolia 
524 Nepal 
562 Niger 
600 Paraguay 
498 Republic of Moldova 
646 Rwanda 
748 Swaziland 
762 Tajikistan 
807 The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
795 Turkmenistan 
800 Uganda 
860 Uzbekistan 
894 Zambia 
716 Zimbabwe 
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722 Small island developing States 
016 American Samoa 
660 Anguilla 
028 Antigua and Barbuda 
533 Aruba 
044 Bahamas 
052 Barbados 
084 Belize 
092 British Virgin Islands 
132 Cape Verde 
174 Comoros 
184 Cook Islands 
192 Cuba 
212 Dominica 
214 Dominican Republic 
242 Fiji 
258 French Polynesia 
308 Grenada 
316 Guam 
624 Guinea-Bissau 
328 Guyana 
332 Haiti 
 
 
284 
388 Jamaica 
296 Kiribati 
462 Maldives 
584 Marshall Islands 
480 Mauritius 
583 Micronesia (Federated States of) 
500 Montserrat 
520 Nauru 
530 Netherland Antilles 
540 New Caledonia 
570 Niue 
580 Northern Mariana Islands 
585 Palau 
598 Papua New Guinea 
630 Puerto Rico 
659 Saint Kitts and Nevis 
662 Saint Lucia 
882 Samoa 
678 Sao Tome and Principe 
690 Seychelles 
702 Singapore 
090 Solomon Islands 
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670 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
740 Suriname 
626 Timor-Leste 
776 Tonga 
780 Trinidad and Tobago 
798 Tuvalu 
850 United States Virgin Islands 
548 Vanuatu 
    
778 Transition countries d/ 
172 Commonwealth of Independent 
States 
051 Armenia 
031 Azerbaijan 
112 Belarus 
398 Kazakhstan 
417 Kyrgyzstan 
498 Republic of Moldova 
643 Russian Federation 
762 Tajikistan 
795 Turkmenistan 
804 Ukraine 
860 Uzbekistan 
    
  Transition countries of South-
Eastern Europe 
008 Albania 
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070 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
191 Croatia 
499 Montenegro 
688 Serbia 
807 The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
a/ The designation sub-Saharan Africa is commonly used to indicate all of Africa except northern Africa, 
with the Sudan included in sub-Saharan Africa. 
b/ The continent of North America (003) comprises Northern America (021), Caribbean (029), and 
Central America (013). 
c/ There is no established convention for the designation of "developed" and "developing" countries or 
areas in the United Nations system. In common practice, Japan in Asia, Canada and the United States in 
northern America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania, and Europe are considered "developed" 
regions or areas. In international trade statistics, the Southern African Customs Union is also treated as 
a developed region and Israel as a developed country; countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia 
are treated as developing countries; and countries of eastern Europe and of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (code 172) in Europe are not included under either developed or developing regions. 
d/ "Countries in transition from centrally planned to market economies" is a grouping used for economic 
analysis. 
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APPENDIX 4 – Industry Expert Interview E-mail and 
Letter 
Letter 
Dear  […], 
As you are aware from previous conversations I am completing my PhD at the University of 
Stirling, Scotland. My topic is the study of the impact that foreign retailers have on the 
sectoral competitiveness of the domestic retailers in the host country, obviously a topic that 
has been dominant of late with the current influx of foreign companies. My research is 
actually focused on the period of 1989 to 2007 and specific to the clothing sector, a period 
of significant activity of foreign entry and changes to the domestic retail men’s, women’s 
and unisex clothing businesses.  As a final stage in my research I am conducting interviews 
with industry experts and would be most appreciative of your contribution to this study. 
At this time I have completed an analysis of some data that shows what has happened 
competitively in the clothing sector since the entry of the Gap in 1989 to the pre-recession 
year of 2007. I am now interested in understanding the underlying reasons and outcomes of 
why these changes in competitiveness occurred and what impact the foreign retailers had 
on these changes. As an industry executive who has experienced these changes first hand 
your insights into the dynamics of the market would be a valuable contribution to my 
research. 
The interview will be approximately one hour in length and will be structured around a set 
of open-ended questions. You will be provided with the interview questions in advance. All 
information gathered during the interview will be kept confidential. The reporting of results 
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will be done on a cumulative basis across the group of interviewees. As an academic 
researcher I am subject to the strict requirements for research ethics and confidentiality.  
I hope that you will give consideration to this request and will follow up with you in the next 
two weeks to answer any questions you may have, expand upon the interview process and 
hopefully set a time for an interview at your earliest convenience.  
Sincerely, 
Elizabeth Evans 
Associate Professor and Director 
Ted Rogers School of Retail Management 
Ryerson University 
 
E-mail 
From:  Elizabeth Evans <eevans@gwemail.ryerson.ca> 
To: Industry Expert 
Date:  7/12/2011 1:32 PM 
Subject:  Industry Expert request for Research Interview with Liz Evans 
Attachments: Letter.07.12.11.docx 
 
Dear Industry Expert, 
  
I am now in the final stages of the research for my thesis and will be interviewing industry experts to get their perspectives on the impact that foreign 
retailers have had on the Canadian retail clothing sector. I would like to interview you for this research given your vantage point ….. 
  
I have attached an interview request which outlines in more detail what the process would involve. Your consideration of this request is greatly 
appreciated. 
  
Best regards, Liz 
  
  
Elizabeth Evans 
Director 
Ted Rogers School of Retail Management 
Ryerson University 
 
 
  
 
 
289 
APPENDIX 5 – Interviewee Profiles 
• Industry Expert A: Academic, Applied and Academic Researcher 
• Industry Expert B: Retail Executive, CEO both domestic and foreign apparel retail 
• Industry Expert C: Executive, Shopping Centre Landlords 
• Industry Expert D: Executive, Retail Trade Association 
• Industry Expert E: Executive, Retail Leasing 
• Industry Expert F: Consultant, former department store executive 
• Industry Expert G: Retail Executive, both domestic and foreign retail companies 
• Industry Expert H: Retail Executive, domestic apparel retail 
• Industry Expert I: Retail Executive, both foreign and domestic apparel & 
department store 
• Industry Expert J: Consultant, North American apparel specialist 
• Industry Expert K: Consultant, former department store executive 
• Industry Expert L: Retail Financial Specialist 
• Industry Expert M: Retail Executive, both foreign and domestic apparel companies 
• Industry Expert N: Retail Analyst 
• Industry Expert O: Retail Executive, domestic apparel retail 
• Industry Expert P: Consultant, former apparel retail executive 
• Industry Expert Q: Executive, Shopping Centre developer 
• Industry Expert R: Retired Academic and Consultant in multi-national large 
format 
• Industry Expert S: Brand Expert 
• Industry Expert T: Retail Executive, domestic apparel retail 
• Industry Expert U: Executive, Shopping Centre developer 
 
 
 
  
 
 
290 
APPENDIX 6 – Interview Guide 
Date: 
Interviewer: 
1. The entry of a foreign retailer into a market may be a catalyst for sectoral restructuring – 
a. Has it been your experience or observation that this happened between 1989 
and 2007 in the Canadian clothing sector? 
b. Are there specific foreign retailers that had this impact and if so how did this 
impact manifest itself with Canadian retailers? 
c. Any other comments on the restructuring? 
2. The entry of a foreign retailer may cause new competitive behaviours – 
a. Are there specific new competitive behaviours that you experienced or observed 
between 1989 and 2007 that Canadian retailers undertook in response to foreign 
retail entry? 
b. Any other comments on changes in competitive behavior? 
3. Changes in sectoral competitiveness may lead to improved productivity of assets – 
a. Can you comment on how this has impacted Canadian clothing retailers? 
4. The changes in sectoral competition due to foreign retailer entry may require additional 
investment- 
a. Has it been your experience or observations that this happened with Canadian 
clothing retailers? 
b. Any other comments on the change in investments made by Canadian retailers? 
5. The entry of foreign retailers may lead to innovation in competitive activity – 
a. Are there any innovations that you could comment on during 1989 to 2007 that 
impacted the sectoral competitiveness in the clothing sector? 
6. Analysis of the data would indicate the following impacts on the Canadian clothing 
sector between 1989 and 2007, would you comment on why these happened? 
a. Closure of the following retailers……. 
b. Expansion of uni-sex formats 
c. Re-positioning of retailers from fashion to promotion and from major malls to 
secondary locations 
d. Store size changes 
7. Are there any other impacts from foreign retail entry that you would like to discuss? 
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APPENDIX 7 – Ethics Board Approval 
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APPENDIX 8 – Interview Consent Form 
Study of the Impacts of Retail Internationalization on the Host Country 
Elizabeth Evans, Associate Professor, Ted Rogers School of Retail Management, Ryerson 
University 
Consent Agreement 
Dear Study Participant:  
 
You are invited to participate in a research study.  Before you give your consent to 
participate, it is important that you read the following information and ask as many 
questions as necessary to be sure you understand what you will be asked to do. 
 
The study is being conducted by Elizabeth Evans, MBA, Associate Professor and Director Ted 
Rogers School of Retail Management at Ryerson University.  
Investigator 
 
Purpose of the Study
The objective of this study is to examine the impact that the entry of foreign retailers into 
the Canadian market has had on domestic retailers. This is specifically focused on the 
clothing retail categories.  
  
 
The study will include a set of general questions about your experience and observations of 
the types of changes that have happened in the competition among the clothing retailers in 
Canada. The questions will be based on an analysis of the industry between 1989 and 2007. 
Description of the Study 
 
The study location will be at your discretion either at your office or at the Ted Rogers School 
of Retail Management in Toronto.  The interview will be approximately an hour in length 
and will be audio recorded for purposes of analysis only. You will be provided with an 
interview outline in advance. 
 
None of the questionnaires used in this study are experimental in nature. The only 
experimental aspect of this study is the gathering of information for the purpose of analysis.  
Because you are being asked for your contact information, there is a potential risk involving 
subject identification. However, this information is being collected solely for the distribution 
of the final report. You may chose not to receive the report in which case you can chose not 
to provide your contact information. 
Risk of the Study 
Names of individuals and/or organizations will not be used to calculate results nor will this 
information be used in the presentation or distribution of the final results. We are confident 
that the questions are designed in such a way that respondents and/or the companies for 
which they work cannot be identified by their responses. There is no guarantee that you will 
benefit from your participation.  
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Confidentiality 
Your questionnaire responses will be kept confidential. The names of those surveyed will 
not be used in the calculation, preparation or publication of results. Survey questions are 
designed so that respondents cannot be identified by responses. We ensure you that your 
responses and identities will be kept confidential: raw data will only be accessed by the 
Principal Investigator.  The responses will be kept in a secure location, locked in a file 
cabinet in the investigator’s office at Ryerson University. The audio tapes will be used for 
analysis. The recordings will be kept in a secure location for up to three years. You may 
chose to participate in the interview but not agree to be audio taped. 
Voluntary Nature of the Study 
Participation in this study is voluntary. Your choice of whether or not to participate will not 
influence your future relations with Ryerson University. If you decide to participate, you are 
free to withdraw your consent and to stop your participation at any time without penalty or 
loss of benefits to which you are allowed.  At any particular point in the study, you may 
refuse to answer any particular question or stop participation altogether. 
 
Questions about the Study 
Please let me know if you have any questions about the study. If you have questions later 
about the research, you may contact Elizabeth Evans at eevans@ryerson.ca or 416 979 5000 
x7281 
If you have questions regarding your rights as a human subject and participant in this study, 
you may contact the Ryerson University Research Ethics Board for information. 
 
Research Ethics Board 
c/o Office of the Vice President, Research and Innovation 
Ryerson University 
350 Victoria Street 
Toronto, ON M5B 2K3   416-979-5042 
 
Your signature below indicates that you have read the information in this agreement and 
have had a chance to ask any questions you have about the study. Your signature also 
indicates that you agree to be in the study and have been told that you can change your 
mind and withdraw your consent to participate at any time. You have been given a copy of 
this agreement.  
You have been told that by signing this consent agreement you are not giving up any of your 
legal rights. 
Thank you very much. 
I consent to participate in the interview. 
 
____________________________________  
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Name of Participant (please print) 
 
_____________________________________  __________________ 
Signature of Participant     Date 
  
_____________________________________           __________________   
Signature of Investigator     Date 
Elizabeth Evans 
Ted Rogers School of Retail Management, Ryerson University 
 
 
I consent to be audio taped for the interview. 
 
 
 
________________________________________       _________________ 
Signature of Participant      Date 
 
 
 
 
I consent to provide contact information for purposes of receiving the report. 
 
 
 
_______________________________________         _________________ 
Signature of Participant      Date 
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APPENDIX 9 – Proto-typical Mall Performance Report 
Mall A - All Stores Sales Report for the period November 2005    
         
Tenant Unit # Nov-05 Nov-04 % Chg GLA TY GLA LY $ YTD  $ Last 
YTD 
  Sales Sales      
Womens         
A         
B         
C         
D         
E         
F         
G         
Sub-total         
         
         
Mens         
H         
I         
J         
K         
L         
M         
N         
Sub-total         
         
         
Unisex         
O         
P         
Q         
R         
S         
T         
U         
V         
W         
X         
Y         
Z         
Sub-total         
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APPENDIX 10 – Examples of Data Analysis Spreadsheets  
Mall One 2000 
Apparel Format  Square Footage   Sales  
Annual 
Sales 
Months 
in 
Operation 
Sales per 
Square 
Footage 
Retailer A  15,973  
 
25,000,000    12 1565.14 
Retailer B           
Retailer C           
Retailer D           
Retailer E           
Retailer F           
Retailer G           
Retailer H           
Retailer I           
Retailer J  2,425   3,525,000    12 1453.61 
Retailer K           
Retailer L           
Sub-Total Canadian  18,398   28,525,000        
Open 12 Months  18,398  
 
28,525,000      1550.44 
            
Retailer AA  -     -          
Retailer BB           
Retailer CC           
Retailer DD           
Retailer EE           
Retailer FF            
Retailer GG           
Retailer HH           
Retailer II           
Retailer JJ           
Sub-Total US  -     -          
Retailer AAA           
Retailer BBB  -     -          
Retailer CCC           
Retailer DDD           
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Sub-Total Non-US  -     -          
Sub-Total Foreign  -     -          
Open 12 Months  -     -          
Total $2M Plus  18,398  
 
28,525,000        
            
Retailer M           
Retailer N           
Retailer O  2,039   1,985,222    12 988.73 
Retailer P           
Sub-Total Canadian  2,039   1,985,222        
Open 12 Months  2,039   1,985,222      988.73 
Retailer KK  1,662   425,242    7   
Retailer LL           
Sub-Total US  1,662   425,242        
Retailer EEE  -     -          
Sub-Total Non-US  -     -          
Sub-Total Foreign  1,662   425,242        
Open 12 Months  -     -          
Total Under $2M  3,701   2,410,464        
            
Retailer Q           
Retailer R           
Retailer S           
Retailer T           
Retailer U           
Retailer V           
Retailer W           
Retailer X           
Retailer Y  2,916   1,403,086    12 481.17 
Retailer Z           
Sub-Total Canadian  2,916   1,403,086        
Open 12 Months  2,916   1,403,086      481.17 
Retailer MM  -     -          
Retailer NN  -            
Sub-Total US  -     -          
Retailer FFF  -     -          
Retailer GGG  15,080   3,245,153    5   
Sub-Total Non-US  15,080   3,245,153        
Sub-Total Foreign  15,080   3,245,153        
Open 12 Months  -     -          
Total Closed  17,996   4,648,239        
            
            
Actual Total for Unisex Apparel  40,095  
 
35,583,703        
Open 12 Months  23,353  
 
31,913,308      682.09 
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Total Canadian Unisex  23,353  
 
31,913,308        
Open 12 Months  23,353  
 
31,913,308      682.09 
Total US Unisex  1,662   425,242        
            
Total European Unisex  15,080   3,245,153        
Total Foreign Unisex  16,742   3,670,395        
Open 12 Months  -     -          
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 APPENDIX 11 – Trendex Apparel Marketing Report 
(1990-2007) 
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APPENDIX 12 – Store openings and closings in Mall 1 
and Mall 2 
Mall 1 – Unisex, 1991 to 2007 
 
 
Mall 1 – Men’s Wear, 1991 to 2007 
 
 
Mall 1 – Women’s Wear, 1991 to 2007 
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Mall 2 – Unisex, 1995 to 2007 
 
 
Mall 2 – Men’s Wear, 1995 to 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mall 2 – Women’s Wear, 1995 to 2007 
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